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Abstract 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 and the ensuing manifestation of the Greek debt 
crisis in the euro area have abruptly ended the credit-fuelled boom in the South East 
Europe (SEE). The crisis episodes have also reignited the interest of researchers and 
policy makers on the determinants of credit risk and the impact of crisis on the 
stability of the SEE banking sectors.  
The contribution of this thesis lies in the fact that it provides the first systematic 
assessment of the relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic shocks in the 
Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems with an explicit role for the Greek debt 
crisis and the spillover effects transmitted through the Greek banks’ subsidiaries in the 
thesis’ focal countries. The empirical research uses a comprehensive dataset spanning 
from 2001 to 2010, thus covering a significant part of the boom-bust cycle, as well as 
advanced modelling approaches that have not been used before in the focal banking 
systems.  
The results indicate that credit risk plays a central role in the linkages between 
banking systems and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. The determinants of credit risk 
in Bulgaria and Romania are macroeconomic, bank-specific and institutional. The 
evidence on the spillover effects from the Greek debt crisis, manifested through the 
strong banking linkages, differs between the two countries. The data generate 
evidence of a Greek crisis spillover effect on Romania but not on Bulgaria, given the 
pronounced differences in the economies and banking systems of these two countries. 
The results of the empirical research are country-specific, suggesting that the region 
does not form a homogeneous block, thus each country merits research on its own. 
The implications of the research support the view that banking stability should be at 
the core of central banks’ policymaking, while strong regional cooperation and 
coordination among regulators would be beneficial in safeguarding banking systems 
from crisis contagion. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The recent financial crisis of 2007 has manifested that market economies, irrespective 
of their stage of development, are susceptible to shocks. The SEE region was among 
those regions severely hit by the crisis. Historically, at the centre of episodes of costly 
banking distress and crises in the SEE developing economies has been the 
deterioration in the quality of banks’ loans. Hence, the recent financial turmoil has 
underscored the importance of understanding financial instability, especially in the 
context of credit risk, with particular emphasis on the banking systems of the SEE 
region that has attracted little research interest.  
This thesis unravels the determinants of credit risk in the banking systems of Bulgaria 
and Romania over a critical timeframe that spans over 2001-2010. As such, the 
research covers the SEE credit-fuelled boom that was abruptly ended by the global 
financial crisis and the ensuing Greek sovereign debt crisis that hit the region in 2008.  
The original contribution of the thesis to knowledge is to provide empirical evidence 
on the linkages between banks’ credit risk and the business cycle as reflected in a 
comprehensive dataset that comprises monthly observations of macroeconomic, 
monetary, financial and bank-specific indicators. Bulgaria and Romania have been 
largely neglected in the empirical literature, as the only available studies in which 
these countries participated are panel estimations. However, the SEE region 
constitutes a unique region worldwide in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows in the banking sectors (Barisitz, 2009). Within the SEE region, the cases of 
Bulgaria and Romania are interesting for several reasons, apart from being major FDI 
recipients. Both countries present a long record of crises, banking upheavals and 
turmoil. In their transition process, a wave of bank privatizations took place and 
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foreign banks dominated the financial sectors of both countries. In fact, nowhere else 
have foreign banks wielded such a high degree of control over banking sectors.  
The banking system in both focal countries plays a central role in their economies and 
banks have been thought of as the major catalysts of economic growth. In their 
financial liberalization process, spurred on by ample liquidity at a global level, these 
countries have seen a growth of real credit that was among the strongest in the SEE 
region. Then, as the global financial crisis erupted, both Bulgaria and Romania were 
plagued by surging non-performing loans (NPLs) and a much deeper recession than 
other emerging economies. Evidently, the boom-bust cycle left a legacy of high NPLs 
in both countries that has impeded the stability of the banking sectors and became a 
drag on economic growth. It seems that addressing credit risk in the Bulgarian and 
Romanian banking systems is of paramount importance and a cause for serious 
concern for policy makers and regulators. The resolution of credit risk, manifested in 
rising problem loans, calls for an investigation into its determinants on a case-by-case 
basis.  
Another key contribution of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence of the 
spillover effects from the Greek crises to the banking systems of Bulgaria and 
Romania. The financial integration and liberalization process has given rise to 
interconnected financial networks manifested in the substantial presence of the Greek 
banks in Bulgaria and Romania. The strong banking networks and links heighten the 
danger of cross-border transmission of risks and economic contagion (ECB, 2005; 
Altmann, 2006). 
Hence, the original contribution of the thesis is two-fold: first, it investigates the 
drivers of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania and secondly it explores the spillover 
effects from the Greek crisis to Bulgaria and Romania through the banking channels. 
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A unique element of the thesis is that it provides evidence at a country level by means 
of a robust and multi-staged econometric framework. In this respect, the research 
applies, among other estimation techniques, the autoregressive distributed lag 
approach to cointegration and the Markov regime switching modelling framework. 
Neither of these modelling approaches has previously been used in the investigation 
of credit risk determinants in the focal countries, while their application in other 
geographical areas is almost non-existent.  
Credit risk is a permanent feature of banks’ balance sheets. Understanding the 
channels between credit risk and the business cycle is important when assessing the 
stability of a banking system. At the same time, understanding the crisis transmission 
channel through foreign-based financial intermediaries questions the conventional 
view on the role of foreign banks as banking systems stabilizers.  
The remaining part of the chapter provides the terms of reference of the thesis. As 
such it outlines the aims and objectives and poses the research questions. The study of 
financial stability has become the cornerstone of macroeconomic policy, especially 
for developing countries. The recent financial crisis has increased the research interest 
in understanding financial instability in the context of managing banks’ credit risk 
(Ali and Daly, 2010), as a stable financial system is a key ingredient for a healthy 
economy. The deterioration in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios has been at the 
heart of episodes of costly banking system distress and economic crises in both 
developed and developing countries. Such events have had extremely severe 
consequences in the case of crisis-prone Bulgaria and Romania. Arguably, there is 
abundant empirical literature on the interaction between macroeconomic conditions 
and credit market frictions, in particular rising credit risk (Nkusu, 2011). The existing 
literature on the determinants of credit risk deals with diverse samples and covers 
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many geographical areas and countries. Equally, Bulgaria and Romania have 
participated in several cross-sectional studies. These studies generalize the causal 
relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic variables across countries. The 
problem of cross-sectional methods is that by grouping countries at different stages of 
financial or economic development, they may fail to explicitly address the country-
specific effects on credit risk. In particular, this method fails to address the potential 
bias induced by the existence of cross-country heterogeneity, which may lead to 
inconsistent estimates (Quah, 1993; Casselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; Ghirmay, 
2004; Odhiambo, 2008). On the other hand, the same set of macroeconomic and bank-
specific indicators display different default rates in comparative country-specific 
studies (Ali and Daly, 2010; Chaibi and Ftiti, 2015).  
The financial accelerator framework as developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999), provides the theoretical 
explanation of the role of banks in amplifying economic fluctuations. Most theoretical 
as well as empirical studies suggest that banks tend to behave pro-cyclically. As such 
during expansionary periods, the financial profile of borrowers improves, asset prices 
rise and this euphoric situation paves the way for an increase in the demand for credit. 
This leads to an oversupply of credit, typically accompanied with relaxed lending 
standards, thus increasing credit risk. Once the downturn begins, triggered by some 
exogenous shock, borrowers’ financial position deteriorates and as such their debt-
servicing capacity. This leads to increasing credit risk manifested in rising NPLs and 
curtailed bank lending which, in turn, reduces the otherwise bankable investments, the 
demand for credit declines, amplifying the recession. In view of the negative impact 
of credit risk on financial stability, accompanied by the banks’ pro-cyclical tendency, 
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the issue merits research especially in the case of the SEE region where the number of 
studies is modest.   
Against this backdrop, the thesis sets out to investigate the drivers of credit risk in 
Bulgaria and Romania on a case by case basis, given that the SEE region does not 
constitute a homogeneous group of countries (Cottarelli et al.2003; Duenwald et al. 
2005; Zoli, 2007; Zinkovskaya, 2008). To the best of the author’s knowledge, on a 
country-level basis, the research area remains broadly uncharted.  
The thesis aims to explore the determinants of Bulgarian and Romanian credit risk 
measured by the ratio of NPLs to total loans in the former case and the ratio of loan 
loss provisions to total loans in the latter, as data constraints prevent the use of the 
same proxy for both countries. In this endeavour, the empirical research uses a 
monthly dataset spanning December 2001 to December 2010 and a comprehensive 
dataset that is comprised of macroeconomic-cyclical, monetary, financial and banking 
system specific variables. In modelling credit risk, the thesis delves into and utilises 
the empirical literature but also the historical evolution of the transition economies of 
Bulgaria and Romania that morphed the stylised facets of their respective banking 
systems. The research questions, which the thesis attempts to provide answers for, 
are: 
- Can business cycle indicators explain the vulnerabilities of the Bulgarian and 
Romanian banking systems arising from deteriorating asset quality? 
- Which are the key determinants of each country’s credit risk and what is the 
direction of the shaped relationships? 
- What is the role of credit growth and money supply in determining credit risk?  
- How do the results of the research compare with past studies in other geographies 
or timeframes? 
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An equally novel aspect of the research is that it sets out to investigate potential crisis 
contagion stemming from the Greek debt crisis. Understanding the mechanics of 
crises on banks remains a key challenge in economics, as empirical studies are scarce 
and constrained by small samples and incomplete data (Gorton, 2012). Evidently, 
economic development does not result in the elimination of crises. As Minsky (1982a) 
suggests, the crises are systemic, endogenously generated events that manifest a 
fundamental instability of capitalist economies. It has been argued that the eruption of 
the global crisis propagated the Greek debt crisis that in turn spread like wildfire in 
Europe affecting mostly other countries that had strong ties with Greece. Based on 
Bankscope data and IMF (2013a), the Greek banks controlled 25% of the Bulgarian 
banking assets and 16.6% of the Romanian ones as at the end of 2011. Notably, the 
Greek banks accounted for a critical 33.8% of the Romanian system’s aggregate share 
capital (NBR, 2011). In the light of the banking linkages in place, and given the large-
scale banking distress in Greece, the risk of crisis spillovers into Bulgaria and 
Romania was extremely high. The risk of contagion was further aggravated by the 
buildup of large negative net foreign positions of the Greek subsidiaries in the SEE 
region vis-à-vis the parent banks, as during the euphoria times the credit growth had 
far outpaced the growth in domestic deposits. Empirical evidence suggests the 
existence of a strong association between banking stress in advanced and emerging 
economies, with transmission being stronger to emerging economies with tight 
banking links than to more advanced economies (Balakrishnan et al., 2009). Hence, 
the risk of Greek-crisis contagion was high on the agenda of the central banks of 
Bulgaria and Romania.   
The preceding analysis dictates the imposition of the Greek crisis hypothesis as a 
destabilizing factor of the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems. In tackling this 
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challenge a set of indicators is constructed to approximate the Greek debt crisis, using 
the literature on financial contagion as well the empirical studies on early warning 
systems, on the diffusion role of credit risk. Given that, the previous hypothesis is 
transformed in the following research questions to be tackled using econometric 
analysis: 
- Is there evidence of the Greek crisis in the Bulgarian and Romanian banking 
systems? 
- What is the effect of the Greek credit risk on Bulgaria and Romania? 
- What is the effect of the financial markets’ turmoil, manifested in the Greek bond 
spreads, on the banking stability of Bulgaria and Romania? 
Within this framework, the research forms the basis of a comparative analysis of two 
countries in the SEE region that share several common characteristics arising from the 
transition period, but they also present stark divergences.  
Following a weak apriorism stance, the research questions are dealt with in a robust 
modelling framework that applies several estimations techniques. Most importantly, 
the research applies an autoregressive approach to cointegration to establish the 
relationship of credit risk with meaningful variables in the short and long run. The 
research also makes use of the Markov switching framework that allows for regime 
shifts in the data and can accommodate for non-linearities. Both these methods have 
several appealing features. Overall, the research methodological design follows an 
extensive modelling approach through a variety of econometric techniques that serve 
as a cross-validation of the robustness of the results. 
The research findings provide evidence of the strong, significant effect of 
macroeconomic variables and bank-specific indicators on Bulgarian and Romanian 
credit risk. There is a pronounced effect of the institutional settings pertaining to 
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financial regulation and supervision in Bulgaria. Several mechanisms were found at 
work during the timeframe of the research. In terms of macroeconomic indicators, the 
results are broadly aligned with the empirical literature. As for the effect of the Greek 
debt crisis, there is evidence of spillovers in Romania in most modelling approaches. 
On the other hand, the research findings do not support the Greek crisis hypothesis for 
the Bulgarian banking system. As there are stark differences between the economies 
and banking systems of the two countries, it is reasonable to conclude that any future 
research in Bulgaria and Romania should be country-focused.  
The results of the research facilitate a better insight into the key determinants of credit 
risk in the focal countries. The identified economic variables convey useful 
information in explaining Bulgarian and Romanian banking stability and the 
relationships surfaced hold during both boom and troubled economic periods.  
Banks matter, both when they function well and when they function poorly. After all, 
banks’ raison d’être is to maintain the capacity to deliver services needed by the 
public and facilitate sustainable economic growth. The results have practical 
applicability as they can help in the direction of policy making and equally can be 
utilized in the framework of stress tests. In both countries, banking stability should be 
at the core of macroeconomic policy. In the light of the increased risk of cross-
country spillovers, the results of the empirical analysis argue that there is a strong 
case for regional cooperation between host country regulators from the SEE region 
and home country regulators. 
The thesis is structured around six chapters in the following order. Chapter 2 provides 
an overview of the economies and banking sectors of Bulgaria and Romania along 
with their linkages with Greek banks. The chapter presents the stylized facts that 
morphed the banking systems in both countries, and surfaces their idiosyncratic 
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features that call for an individual, country-by-country modelling treatment. 
Furthermore, Chapter 2 substantiates the Greek crisis hypothesis relating to the 
potential spillover effect arising from the Greek crisis through the banking linkages. 
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical underpinnings of the research problem and 
identifies the determinants of credit risk in the literature while Chapter 4 delves into 
the empirical studies on credit risk, emphasizing the key findings and methodologies 
applied. Chapter 5 describes the dataset and justifies the research methodological 
design. This chapter translates the research questions into testable hypotheses and 
spells out the econometric modelling activity; it also discusses the issues that helped 
or hindered the research process and the econometric techniques used. Chapter 6 
presents and interprets the results of the econometric analysis with respect to the 
research’s theoretical and empirical priors. Finally, Chapter 7 provides the summary 
and conclusions. The chapter evaluates the research’s results and provides avenues for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2: The economies of Bulgaria and Romania and the 
toxic legacy of the Greek crisis 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the bank-based financial sectors of Bulgaria and 
Romania vis-à-vis their linkages with the Greek banks. The aim is to give an account 
of the economic and banking settings in these SEE countries. More importantly, the 
chapter introduces and justifies one of the key hypotheses of the thesis that relates to 
the potential spillover effects arising from the Greek crisis. The chapter is organized 
in five sections as follows. Section 2.1 provides an overview of the banking transition 
from communism to capitalism in the SEE region. Then, Sections 2.2 and 2.3 present 
the economies of Bulgaria and Romania and confer on the stylized facts that have 
shaped the respective banking systems up to the unfolding of the global financial 
crisis in the SEE region. Section 2.4 draws comparisons between Bulgaria and 
Romania while Section 2.5 discusses the role of Greek banks in the research’s focal 
countries. In line with the scope of the research, the section touches upon the recent 
evidence of crisis contagion and puts the Greek banks into perspective. As such, the 
section provides the rationale for the Greek banks’ critical position in transmitting the 
crisis from the home country to Bulgaria and Romania. The last section concludes the 
chapter. 
2.1 The banking transformation in South Eastern Europe 
This section provides a brief historical account of the transition processes in SEE 
banking. This is because financial systems need to be treated in their historical context 
(McGoun, 2003; Soros, 2010) since an over-reliance on models may constrain 
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researchers’ vision, rendering them exposed to analytical myopia and theory-induced 
blindness (Haldane, 2012b). The crash of 2008 falsified established theories and 
reminded us that there are no timelessly valid laws that govern economic phenomena. 
Uncertainty, often neglected in the advanced quantitative models, prevails and the 
historical course of events should not be ignored. 
The centrally-planned economies of the Soviet bloc realized at the end of the 1920s 
featured a state-owned banking system, essentially consisting of one large institution, 
the State Bank, often assisted by three or four special purpose units
1
 with branches 
across the land, the so-called one-tier or mono-bank system (Green and Petrick, 2002; 
Barisitz, 2007). The banking activity aimed at monitoring and facilitating the plan 
fulfillment and payment flows. Credit evaluation and risk management were 
irrelevant. Banking supervision simply did not exist (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003). The 
comprehensive collapse of the former system triggered, almost immediately, a 
weakening of the state structure.  
There were few indications in the SEE region of the momentous events that were 
about to unfold shortly after the fall of the USSR Empire. Mazower (1998) suggests 
that the result was the destruction of the old communist welfare system, but without 
anything being put in its place. Although the transition direction was clear, its final 
aims were not (Åslund, 2011).  
Severe recession in the early 1990s intensified the massive debt problem in the 
corporate sector and led to an avalanche of defaults. The prior over-industrialization 
disappeared and the service sector began to expand. Romanians were forced to live 
through cold winters with almost no heat and factories had to cut back production 
because of limited electricity (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). But the decline in the 
                                                 
1
 Typically the scheme in Bulgaria and Romania involved a central bank, a foreign trade one and a state 
savings bank. Later, other specialised state-owned banks entered, such as investment-development and 
agricultural banks. 
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standard of living has been much less than the real contraction of output (Åslund, 
2002). Under these chaotic conditions, the Western governments kept out of the 
region, leaving the provision of the investment capital to the private sector (Mazower, 
1998; Åslund 2002). In portraying the situation, Mazower (1998) states that: 
“The transnational and volatile financial markets which emerged in the 1970s, 
awash with petrodollars, saw Eastern Europe, with its highly stable regimes 
and well-trained workforce, as a neglected area for investment. Bankers with 
short memories (which certainly did not stretch back the requisite fifty years) 
convinced themselves that the Soviet ‘guarantee’ over the Eastern bloc ruled 
out any chance of default…Communists and bankers fell into each other’s 
arms”(p.373). 
 
At most, Western banks provided a kind of short-term financial aid for monetary 
stabilization. A new constitutional order had to be re-made in Eastern Europe, 
hampered initially by an uncertain legal situation. Only in Bulgaria and Romania were 
the new constitutions brought in relatively swiftly. 
A shock therapy or the ‘Washington consensus’ became the main proposal of how to 
undertake the systemic change in the ex-communist countries (Åslund, 2002). That 
translated into a radical market reform with key elements such as the swift 
liberalization of prices and trade, sharp reduction of budget deficits, strict monetary 
policy and early privatization. In opposition to the radical reform programme, many 
argued that the quality of privatization was more important than its speed. According 
to ‘gradualists’ the state was capable of driving the social engineering (Stiglitz, 2002). 
The debate polarized between advocates of early mass privatization and the stance of 
gradualists proposing a case-by-case privatization.  
In most CESEE countries, the 1990s were a decade of banking upheavals, turmoil and 
reform. The shock gave rise to transition recessions and caused banking crises which 
were followed by reform efforts. Barisitz (2007) identifies two regime changes along 
the process: the first embodies liberalization and the second essentially refers to 
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restructuring and institutionalization. Given the legacy of a state-dominated, 
monopolized banking system devoid of competition, the ex-communist countries 
initially opted for liberalization of regulation and supervision so as to inject 
competition into the market. As a result, numerous weak, undercapitalized banks 
entered the sector. The legacy of bad debts inherited from the previous times was 
exacerbated by a second round of loans to the same, bankrupt, state-owned enterprises 
due to political pressures (Altmann, 2006). Through ever-greening loans, the system 
swept the suspect assets under the carpet, as it was unwilling to write off bad debts. 
Authorities had to step in and carry out habilitation measures, replacing the bad debts 
in the portfolio of the state-owned banks with government bonds. Then, some 
tightening of monetary policy and banking oversight took place in order to combat the 
skyrocketing inflation and rein in the proliferation of credit institutions (Barisitz, 
2009). But the soft budget constraints were retained. Lax credit policies and directed 
loans encouraged by the Central Bank or the government were carried over into the 
market-oriented economies, given the absence of the concept of bankruptcy. Table 1 
provides the details of the systemic banking crises experienced in Bulgaria and 
Romania in the 1990s as well as some background information of each crisis, 
including peak NPLs as a percentage of total loans (NPLs), gross fiscal costs as a 
percentage of GDP, and minimum real GDP growth rate
2
. 
                                                 
2
 The table lists the starting year of each banking crisis. The peak in NPLs is the highest level of NPLs 
as a percentage of total loans during the first five years of the crisis. Gross fiscal costs are computed 
over the first five years following the start of the crisis while minimum real GDP growth rate is the 
lowest real GDP growth rate during the first three years of the crisis (Luc and Laeven, 2008). 
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Table 1 The banking crises in Bulgaria and Romania (1990-2000) 
 
Country  Banking 
crisis 
(start date) 
 
NPLs at 
peak (%) 
Gross fiscal 
cost 
(% of GDP) 
 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
 
Comments  
Bulgaria 1996 75 14 -8.0 The 1996 banking crisis had its roots in bad loans made 
during 1991-1995, but the deepening insolvency of the 
system was not reflected in sustained liquidity problems 
until the second half of 1994. Two ailing state banks 
required ongoing refinancing from the Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB) and the State Savings Bank until 
they were bailed out in mid-1995. The public began to 
lose confidence in banks after the collapse of pyramid 
schemes in some cities, and in response to reports on the 
ill health of other banks. In late 1995 withdrawals of 
deposits, especially from the largest private bank in 
Bulgaria, were reflected in substantial BNB refinancing 
and falling foreign reserves. By early 1996 the sector had 
a negative net worth equal to 13% of GDP. The banking 
system experienced a run in early 1996. The government 
then stopped providing bailouts, prompting the closure of 
19 banks, accounting for one-third of sector assets. 
Surviving banks were recapitalized by 1997.  
Romania 1990 30 0.6 -12.9 In 1998 NPLs reached 25-30% in the six main state-
owned banks.  
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008)
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Barisitz (2007) recites a re-accumulation of bad debts and structural problems coupled 
with external shocks, arising mainly from three sources: foreign trade, exchange rates 
and oil prices. New banking crises ensued followed by recessions, particularly in 
Bulgaria, that led to a second wave of reforms that consisted of hard budget 
constraints for the banks initially, and the real sector later and profound restructuring. 
Åslund (2002) argues that the crisis in Bulgaria was rooted in excessive budget 
deficits that led to untenable public debt. The underlying reason was the semi fiscal 
expenditure that essentially involved public refinancing of loss-making banks.  
During the 1990s, foreign involvement in the financial sector of the emerging SEE 
economies rose substantially. By the end of the decade, foreign-owned banks in 
Central and Eastern Europe accounted for an average of 70% of bank assets 
(Mathieson and Roldós, 2001). The growth of foreign banking activities in emerging 
economies is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of the well-documented increase 
in FDI flows towards emerging economies. This has largely been led by mergers and 
acquisitions, reflecting the extensive privatization of state-owned assets (Herrero and 
Simón, 2003). In a theoretical survey, the authors explain the surge in banks’ 
internalization by expanding in emerging countries in a ‘follow the client’ fashion, 
expected economic growth in the host country, but also in profit opportunities and risk 
sharing. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) provide evidence of institutional characteristics 
of the destination country that usually translate into lower regulatory restrictions on 
banking activities. Broadly, the authors depict macroeconomic and risk diversification 
theories to explain the banks’ behaviour (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Herrero and 
Simón, 2003).  
The turn of the millennium featured sector consolidation and was a culminating point 
of restructuring efforts. The first years of the new millennium have seen calmer and 
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more open banking sectors than in the 1990s. The incidence of banking crises in SEE 
declined sharply. However, the transition process was hardly smooth (Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2003). European banks stepped in and acquired the greater part of the 
banking sectors in most SEE countries. The introduction of foreign banks was 
perceived as a means of cutting the umbilical cord between the government and the 
banking system. Mitra et al. (2010) argue that foreign bank ownership helped hard 
budget constraints and attained macroeconomic stability. Table 2 gives a description 
of the swift transformation that took place in Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
Table 2 Market shares in total banking assets (%) of State and foreign banks in 
Bulgaria and Romania 
 
Country Bulgaria Romania 
Year 1996 2000 2005 1994 2000 2005 
Majority state-owned banks 82.2 19.8 1.7 80.4 48.0 6.5 
Majority foreign-owned banks 9.5 67.7 72.8 20.0 50.9 59.2 
Source: Barisitz (2009), Bank-Austria Creditanstalt, Raiffeisen Bank, IMF. 
 
Next, lending prevailed that soon turned into a credit boom in almost all countries in 
the region. Banks kept on searching aggressively for market share, primarily on the 
asset side. FDI poured into the region in record amounts, and economic growth 
continued unabated. In brief, the regional economies really took off rapidly. But the 
growth was, by and large, supported by capital inflows which are prone to reversals, 
given the increasing financial interconnectedness through trade, finance and 
confidence channels (Frankel, 2012). The latter suggests that the prospects of these 
economies might have been overstated. Åslund (2011) reports that, in the autumn of 
2008 both Bulgaria and Romania were in a state of overheating, a standard credit 
boom-bust cycle, while suddenly world liquidity dried up and SEE faced a sudden 
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stop. The following figures display aptly the situation experienced in Bulgaria and 
Romania in terms of FDIs and credit acceleration.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Foreign direct investment in Bulgaria and Romania, net inflows in 
billion USD, 1991-2012. 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Credit growth (% change in bank lending to public and private 
sector), 1999-2012. 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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There is little to say in defence of the overheating and the policies that bred it, since a 
loose monetary policy was a global phenomenon and it was difficult for these small 
and open economies to defend themselves against abundant capital inflows (Åslund, 
2010, 2012). Few were listening to the warning bells in the midst of the tremendous 
boom. Well before the global financial crisis, the IMF (2005) warned about the 
macroeconomic imbalances driven by the strong credit growth in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The key question raised was whether that was part of the ongoing process of 
financial liberalization or if some countries experienced a situation where credit was 
expanding at an unsustainable pace. A particular concern was that credit, encouraged 
by low interest rates, was largely being financed by bank borrowing from abroad 
instead of domestic deposits’ accumulation. Åslund (2010) argues that the cause of 
the financial crisis was a long-lasting credit expansion
3
 that eventually became 
excessive, especially in Bulgaria and Romania. Yet, Åslund (2010) claims that a 
dominant cause of the Eastern European financial crisis in 2008-9 boils down to one 
single factor: the exchange rate policy. Before the crisis, the ‘currency board’ 
countries, such as Bulgaria, were the most overheated economies with the highest 
current account deficits and the highest inflation
4
, and they suffered the greatest 
output falls. In contrast, Åslund (2010) maintains that Romania belongs to the 
‘successful’ group of European countries that pursued inflation targeting and a 
floating exchange rate.  
Inevitably, the banking sector in the SEE transition economies developed remarkably 
quickly. But banks are not immune to problems and do not always provide sufficient 
                                                 
3
 This credit bubble was financed with capital inflows, and the larger the share of bank credit as 
opposed to FDI, the worse the crisis became (Åslund, 2010). 
 
4
 A typical problem, especially for countries with currency boards is high inflation. Although, these 
countries took a hit in the midst of the global financial crisis, they had a stellar fiscal record and soon 
enhanced the credibility of their currency boards by standing firm (Åslund, 2010). 
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impetus for economic development. The market-based legislation did not lead 
automatically to prudential banking practices. The notion was that competition would 
be enhanced by easy entry and the relatively new, often undercapitalized, banks 
placed an added burden on an immature regulatory structure (Βonin et al., 2009). 
Similarly, effective supervision does not follow automatically.  
In retrospect, it appears that in ‘early birds’ such as Bulgaria, reforms proved less 
costly compared to late reformers such as Romania that ended up with a large fiscal 
bill for restructuring their banks (Barisitz, 2007). As a number of studies purport (e.g. 
Cardenas et al., 2003; Cull and Martínez Pería, 2007) the entry of foreign banks in 
emerging economies was the result of dealing with crises. In contrast, the foreign 
banks’ entry into mature economies was mainly motivated by competitive forces. 
Thus, a key factor that contributed to the unusually high foreign ownership in CESEE 
banking systems is the history of the region. Equally, the main aspect of banking in 
the SEE was not the depth of the crises but the speed of financial restructuring (Bonin 
and Wachtel, 2003; Βonin et al., 2009). Two interrelated phenomena explain the rapid 
transformation of these under-banked countries and their appeal to European banks: 
their desire to become members of the EU and the expectation of a quick convergence 
that would ultimately lead to the adoption of the euro. 
The next section introduces the Bulgarian economy and the banking system, putting 
emphasis on these idiosyncratic elements that have shaped the landscape.   
2.2 The Bulgarian economy and banking system 
The Bulgarian economy has evolved from a long history of high inflationary periods 
and banking crises. Similarly to all transition economies in the SEE region, bad loans 
were a serious problem in the 1990s, partly due to the inherited legacies but also to 
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continuing lending practices. Furthermore, the weak bank governance and poor 
regulation of the many small, state-owned commercial banks resulted in considerable 
asset stripping and insider lending (Bonin et al., 2008). Given that, the 
macroeconomic shock of the transition period during the mid-1990s was severe
5
. It 
made the Bulgarian banking crisis one of the most costly of all transition countries. 
Following the turbulent period of 1996-1997, the Bulgarian banking system has gone 
through a process of stabilization which involved the privatization of most banks. 
Walko (2004) argues that this has led to a deepening of the financial intermediation, 
although the share of banking assets in terms of GDP was modest by European 
standards. Following major political changes, the Bulgarian banking system 
transformed from a one-tier to a two-tier system comprising a central bank and 
several commercial banks at the end of 1989. At the same time the 59 branches of the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) were transformed into commercial banks (Barisitz, 
2001). But as this large number of banks proved inefficient, the State encouraged the 
establishment of larger operating units through mergers. As a result the total number 
of banks was reduced from 81 in 1992 to 42 in 1995. It was not until 1994 that the 
first foreign investor – a synergy between a Greek and a Dutch bank – entered the 
market. As the banks’ lending policy was characterized by soft budget constraints, it 
finally resulted in an unprecedented boom in the non-bank commercial sector that 
inevitably led to a surge in bad debts. To prevent large banks failures, the BNB had to 
intervene and provide liquidity in the market, finally losing control of the monetary 
policy and inflation (Barisitz, 2001; Walko, 2004). This series of events culminated in 
a currency and banking crisis in 1996 and a short period of hyperinflation. Several 
banks collapsed, thus reducing the number of banks in the system to 30 by the end of 
                                                 
5
 Repeated rounds of recapitalization of banks resulted in a total cost to the government of 42% of the 
1998 GDP. 
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1997. In tracing the roots of the crisis, Dobrinsky (2000) asserts that:  
“Apart from the foreign debt issue, there is nothing unique in the type of 
economic problems that led to the crisis. All economies in transition face the 
problem of restructuring state-owned firms; closing down unviable loss-
making state firms is a difficult policy problem in any country in transition; 
keeping loss-making state firms afloat does imply fiscal costs to all 
governments”(p.600). 
 
Yet, the uniqueness of the Bulgarian case lies mainly in the combination of several 
serious problems that accelerated the crisis and amplified its magnitude. In fact, the 
Bulgarian crisis was a combination of a fiscal crisis, a banking crisis and a currency 
crisis. And the escalation of the crisis was indeed a textbook example of the dangers 
of moral hazard (Dobrinsky, 2000) manifested in the lack of commitment by the 
authorities to pursue hard budget constraints. Then, repeated bailouts followed that 
led to a complete erosion of financial discipline not only among the financially 
troubled firms, but throughout the whole economy. Another critical aspect of the 
Bulgarian crisis was the lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy that 
led to the emergence of vicious circles and widened the macroeconomic disequilibria 
instead of reducing them. Certainly the crisis was a lesson learned the hard way that 
involved the painful experience of capital flows’ short-termism and revealed the 
inherent degree of vulnerability of a fragile transition environment to external shocks. 
But under such circumstances, the crisis usually acts as a catalyst to post-crisis 
stabilization reforms (Dobrinsky, 2000; Iskrov, 2012). In the aftermath of the crisis, 
the BNB managed to tidy up the country’s banking system. Broadly, the Bulgarian 
policymakers reformed the laws of the Central Bank and the commercial banking 
sector and corrected the shortcomings of earlier regulations (Balyozov, 1999). Iskrov 
(2012) indicates that in 1996-97, one third of the banks went bankrupt and the 
confidence in the national currency vanished. 
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In the centre of the economic policy that followed was the currency board
6
. 
Introduced in mid-1997, the currency board imposed strict controls on money supply 
growth. By restricting money supply growth and eliminating the nominal depreciation 
of the national currency as a source of inflation, the currency board managed to limit 
domestic inflation. By forbidding the Central Bank to lend to the government, the 
board limited the amount of deficit financing of the budget that could take place. By 
debarring the Central Bank from refinancing commercial banks, except temporarily in 
the face of clear threats to stability, the board prevented ‘back-door’ deficit financing. 
To some extent, the ban on refinancing could deter banks from reckless lending. 
Finally, by imposing hard budget constraints, it also helped to restructure the real 
economy (EIU, 1998).Evidently, the introduction of the currency board restored 
macroeconomic stability (currency stability, low inflation, lower interest rates and a 
stable operating environment for businesses), and the banking system was rationalized 
quickly thereafter. Yotzov et al. (1998) argue that although financial stabilization was 
an immense success, it failed to produce the desired effect on the real sector. The state 
of the banking system had improved, albeit confidence in the banking system was still 
low. Interest rates did not encourage an increase in savings, limiting the domestic 
investment growth. Furthermore, the share of loans in bank assets has shrunk as most 
banks were reluctant to take risks associated with investment lending.  
Overall, the currency board contributed to a remarkable economic recovery and to 
restoring some confidence in the local currency, which had plummeted during the 
crisis (Dobrinsky 2000). Yet, empirical evidence suggests that the sudden drop in 
inflation was due to a ‘confidence effect’ that created lower inflation expectations 
                                                 
6
 The currency board pegged the Lev at a fixed exchange rate to the German Mark, and tied a selected 
domestic monetary aggregate to the foreign-exchange reserves of the BNB. In the light of this, the 
currency board made automatic many of the standard remedies prescribed by the multilaterals for 
emerging markets (EIU, 1998). 
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rather than a ‘discipline effect’ caused by a reduction in money supply growth rate 
(Beck et al., 2003). The authors find that the budgetary restrictions imposed by the 
currency board had a strong effect on inflationary expectations. The relative success 
of the currency board critically depended on its ‘rule-based’ design but also on other 
supporting measures in the overall stabilization package. Given that, it is safe to 
conclude that the arrangement was well designed to address the pressing banking and 
fiscal issues, but its success can be attributed to a combination of events and actions
7
, 
of which the currency board was a crucial, but not the only, determining factor 
(Gulde, 1999). As IMF (2010b) suggests, the establishment of the currency board set 
in train rapid disinflation to single digit and helped restore confidence in the banking 
system. Moreover, the tight fiscal policy and debt management cut public debt in half 
relative to GDP and sustained a manageable current account deficit. The results of the 
debt management that took place can be seen in Figure 3 that presents jointly the 
Bulgarian and Romanian cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 These were a solid legal basis and transparency, a budget stabilization programme and debt 
management, including the rule of not extending credit to the State, prudential regulation, 
independence of the BNB, ‘monitor-able’ steps to improve the operating environment, elimination of 
barriers to bank privatization, and broad-based parliamentary support. 
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Figure 3 Total (domestic plus external) gross government debt/GDP (%) for 
Bulgaria and Romania, 1993-2010. 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).  
 
Since then the Bulgarian economy has been growing in an environment of practically 
non-existent exchange rate risk, with flexible labour markets, hard budget constraints 
and fiscal discipline. Following the crisis of 1996-1997, the Bulgarian authorities had 
to build the banking sector from scratch. Gradually, the sector freed itself from 
political dependence, along with the privatization process and the foreign capital 
inflows, mainly from EU countries. But it was the stable macroeconomic policies 
shaped by the intense efforts of the Bulgarian authorities that enabled restoring 
financial stability to the country after the crisis of 1996-1997. On this macroeconomic 
basis, a stable, well-supervised, strongly capitalized and risk-averse banking sector 
was developed (IMF, 2002). Hence, the sound regulatory base was the key element 
that supported the process of reviving the banking sector after the first years of 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy (Dobreva, 2014). The 
privatization of the Bulgarian banking sector began in the early 1990s following a 
liberal licensing regime. Despite the increasing competitiveness in the financial 
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centrally planned economy. In late 1996, the number of foreign banks grew 
substantially as the State actively encouraged the activity of foreign banks as a 
possible way to secure the liquidity of the system. The end result was an opaque 
banking sector operating with borrowed capital, which originated from unidentifiable 
sources (Dobreva, 2014) with the goal of providing credit, backed by an over-
estimated value of collateral, to shareholders or related parties. Thus, the banking 
crisis which commenced in 1996 was primarily due to a lack of sound regulation 
(Yonkova et al., 1999). Many governments tried to ‘fix’ the sector without actually 
undertaking a policy reform process to lay the regulatory and institutional foundations 
that the banking industry needed for an independent intermediation (Andronova, 
2001). Since 2001, significant progress has been made in the privatization programme 
for the banking sector as strong foreign banks have been attracted as strategic 
investors. As a result a highly capitalized and liquid banking system has been 
operating in an environment of fundamentally good rules and regulations on the 
premise of effective banking supervision exercised by an independent from political 
interference central bank (IMF, 2002). By the end of 2003, Walko (2004) reports that 
about 98% of the total banking assets were in private ownership in a financial sector 
dominated by banks. Benefitting from being a prospective EU country, Bulgaria has 
been a major recipient of capital inflows in the SEE region during 2003-2008. This 
has led to a surge in imports and a sharp increase in the current account deficit as 
domestic demand has outgrown GDP in the context of rising wages and the shift of 
resources towards non-tradable activities. In turn, the increase in wages has led to a 
significant appreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, the growth has relied 
upon both domestic and external demand. Bonin et al. (2008) claim that a main 
concern in the SEE region is that credit deepening, as measured by credit to GDP, has 
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come mainly in the form of rapid growth in mortgage lending and other forms of 
consumer credit. The accelerating lending expansion in the euphoria times led to a 
real estate and construction boom as the findings of numerous empirical studies on 
financial crises purport (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). Financial liberalization is manifested in rapid credit growth and 
the burst of asset price bubbles, which are those crucial factors that propagate the 
boom-bust cycles. Equally, Duenwald et al. (2005) argue that the lending boom in 
Bulgaria has been driven by macroeconomic stabilization and capital inflows but, in 
the end, it contributed vitally to widening macroeconomic imbalances. 
Notably the steep credit expansion in the aftermath of the Bulgarian crisis up to the 
eruption of the global financial one, presents remarkable fluctuation which is more 
evident in the period 2005-2006, reflecting the announcement of stricter lending 
controls by BNB in 2005. Opposed to external voices, the BNB decided to introduce 
various policy measures
8
 in an attempt to limit bank lending and mitigate the boom-
bust cycle. The growth rate of credit to the non-governmental sector, which had been 
a matter of paramount concern to the BNB, slowed down by mid 2006. But that was 
temporary, as credit started to pick up again in 2007 as a result of the BNB’s decision 
to relax credit controls in late 2006 as part of Bulgaria’s EU preparations. In co-
operation with the IMF, the Central Bank established a 20% year-on-year target level 
for credit growth that was quickly surpassed in 2007-2008. In retrospect, IMF (2010b) 
considered these measures insufficient as banks, keen to fight for their market share 
were able to freely borrow from abroad. Inevitably, the top priority of the newly 
privatized banks was to boost profitability and market share, shifting the composition 
of their asset base towards loans mainly directed to the non-government sector. 
                                                 
8
 For instance, BNB introduced credit ceilings whereby banks were allowed to expand credit by up to 
6% per quarter. In failing to comply, the banks faced a penalty in the form of marginal reserve 
requirements. 
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Growth of real credit has been among the strongest in the SEE region, and this 
aggressive stance has been actively encouraged by banks’ foreign parents in both 
Bulgaria and Romania. The credit boom was suddenly interrupted in 2008 as the 
domestic operating environment had been negatively affected by the global financial 
crisis. Inflows of FDI fell and banks started taking a more cautious lending approach. 
The crisis found the sector, comprising of 30 banks, to be dominated by subsidiaries 
of large foreign banks mainly engaged in traditional commercial banking. These 
major foreign banks are from other EU countries, most notably Greece, Italy and 
Austria. The potentially adverse impact of the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian banking 
system soon became a major concern for policymakers as some of the largest banks
9
 
as well as other financial institutions in Bulgaria are owned by Greek banks. Some of 
these banks expanded their operations in the Bulgarian territory aggressively in the 
years prior to the global crisis and have relied little on domestic deposits to fund their 
activity, as witnessed by their high loan-to-deposit ratios (IMF, 2010b). Thus, the 
stability of the Bulgarian financial sector in the face of a Greek collapse has been 
called into question. Table 3 displays the structural financial indicators and Table 4 
the financial soundness indicators
10
 (FSIs) for the Bulgarian banking system.   
  
                                                 
9
As of the end of 2009, five Greek Banks together controlled 30% of the sector’s assets (BNB, 2009; 
IMF, 2010b). 
 
10
 FSIs are indicators of the current financial health and soundness of the entire sector of financial 
institutions in a country, and of the corporate and household sectors that are the financial institutions’ 
clients. These indicators represent an innovative and new field of macroeconomic data (IMF, 2006). 
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Table 3 Structural financial indicators of Bulgaria, 2008-2012 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of EU subsidiaries 13 13 13 13 13 
Herfindahl index,  
total assets (%) 
0.0834 0.0846 0.0789 0.0766 0.0738 
Shares of the 5 largest credit 
institutions in total assets (%) 
57.3 58.3 55.2 52.6 50.4 
 
Source: ECB. 
 
 
Table 4 Financial soundness indicators of Bulgaria 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Regulatory Capital to risk-weighted assets 14.9 17.0 17.4 17.6 16.6 
Capital to Assets 11.4 10.8 10.5 10.8 10.1 
NPLs to Total Gross Loans 2.4 6.4 11.9 15.0 16.6 
Loans to General Government to Total Gross 
Loans 
0.3 0.4 0.9 1.1 0.5 
Loans to non-financial Corporations to Total 
Gross Loans 
60.4 59.0 58.9 60.5 59.8 
Return on Assets 2.1 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.7 
Return on Equity 19.5 9.8 7.8 5.7 6.3 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets  19.0 18.9 20.9 22.0 22.4 
Liquid Assets to Short-Term Liabilities 26.4 26.6 30.0 29.1 30.0 
Customer Deposits to Total Loans 83.9 83.0 87.8 95.4 100.2 
 
Source: IMF Statistics. 
 
The credit slump experienced in 2008-2009 was as sharp as the surge during the credit 
boom. The key risk encountered by the Bulgarian banks in the aftermath of the crisis 
was the weakening of asset quality. The recession caused the NPL ratio to reach 
11.9% by December 2010. The challenging situation is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Bank NPLs to total gross loans (%), for Bulgaria, Romania and the 
EU, 2001-2012. 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
However, Bulgaria’s banking system has built in various buffers against external 
shocks. Following an assessment
11
 of the financial sector, the IMF (2010b) has 
indicated that the Bulgarian authorities still have room to relax their conservative 
regulatory standards on bank capital in case of need, since the minimum regulatory 
capital is set at 12% in Bulgaria, compared to 8% at the EU level. Furthermore, the 
BNB has several instruments in hand to implement further a counter-cyclical macro-
prudential policy
12
 within the confines of EU (IMF, 2010b). As Table 4 shows, the 
Bulgarian banking system enjoys a relatively comfortable liquidity profile, even 
judged by EU standards. Furthermore, banks are predominantly deposit funded (Festić 
et al., 2011). As such, banks finance their lending activity through deposits which 
                                                 
11
It is noteworthy that the Bulgarian authorities do not make public the results of the periodic stress 
tests performed on an individual bank or system wide basis. The Governor of the BNB, Mr. Iskrov, 
confirmed this during the presentation of the preliminary results of this research in a conference 
organized by VUZF University on the 27
th 
of May 2011 in Sofia, Bulgaria. 
 
12
 The macro-prudential policies aim to reduce the systemic risk arising from the disruption of the 
provision of financial services that can have serious consequences for the real economy. Hence, the 
ultimate objective is to minimize the losses associated with banking crises. 
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makes them relatively independent of any turbulence in the international wholesale 
markets. Equally, the sharper increase in deposits compared to lending caused banks’ 
liquidity to increase in the period 2008-2012. With credit demand subdued, banks 
opted to use the excess liquidity afforded by the increase in deposits to repay foreign 
debt. Bulgarian banks reduced their dependence on wholesale funding but at the 
expense of reduced profits, which was reflected in the performance metrics (return on 
equity - return on assets) that had been on a declining trend since 2008. Reduced 
dependence on wholesale funding was also accompanied by increasing capital 
buffers. The Bulgarian banks remained relatively well capitalized with an aggregate 
capital adequacy ratio
13
 in excess of 17% during 2010-2012. Equally, the equity to 
assets ratio remained above 10% in this period. Despite the relative stability of the 
Bulgarian banking system, the significant risks arising from international 
developments (Valev and Carlson, 2004) or spillover effects of the Greek crisis 
cannot be overlooked. For instance, in terms of trade linkages, Greece is the fourth 
largest destination for Bulgarian exports, and Greek non-bank companies are among 
the biggest foreign investors in Bulgaria. Despite the system’s deleveraging, Greek 
banks had still sizeable exposures in Bulgaria. Tightened capital and liquidity by the 
European Banking Authority could well prompt parent banks to reduce funding to 
their subsidiaries in Bulgaria which in turn could destabilize the system. Table 5 
provides a snapshot of some economic indicators for Bulgaria. 
                                                 
13
 Equity ratios relative to asset risk are the key attributes of interest in prudential regulation. Miles et 
al. (2011) estimate that the optimal bank equity capital should be around 20% of risk-weighted assets, a 
level that is much higher than Basel III requirements. Higher capital requirements create benefits by 
reducing the probability of systemic banking crises, as shown by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).     
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Table 5 Key economic indicators of Bulgaria, 2001-2010. 
 
Indicator/year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Real GDP (% change pa) 4.2 4.7 5.5 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 -5.5 0.4 
Nominal GDP (billion US Dollars) 13.9 16.0 20.7 25.2 28.8 33.4 42.2 52.1 48.6 47.9 
Private consumption (% of GDP) 79.3 78.6 79.0 78.5 77.6 75.8 76.6 74.0 70.6 70.8 
Government consumption (% of GDP) 9.9 9.8 10.2 10.2 10.0 9.7 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.2 
Gross fixed investment (% of GDP) 18.3 18.3 19.0 20.4 25.7 27.6 28.7 33.6 28.9 22.8 
Industrial production (% change pa) 2.5 4.7 12.7 12.6 7.2 6.1 9.9 0.1 -18.0 1.9 
Real effective exchange rate 128.1 133.9 138.9 145.9 145.9 152.3 161.1 176.1 183.9 176.6 
Budget balance (% of GDP) -0.6 -0.6 0.0 1.6 2.9 3.4 3.3 2.9 -0.9 -4.0 
Public debt  (% of GDP) 66.0 52.4 44.4 37.0 27.5 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.3 
Domestic credit growth (%) 26.0 27.4 33.9 34.2 33.0 15.2 58.8 33.0 6.8 5.1 
M2 (% change pa) 25.8 11.7 18.8 23.3 24.3 26.9 31.3 8.7 4.3 6.4 
Consumer prices (% change pa) 7.4 5.8 2.3 6.1 5.0 7.3 8.4 12.3 2.8 2.4 
Population 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.4 
Unemployment rate (%) 17.5 17.4 14.3 12.7 11.5 9.6 7.7 6.3 7.6 9.5 
Net direct investment flows (billion US Dollars) 0.8 0.9 2.1 2.9 4.0 7.6 12.9 9.2 3.5 2.1 
Current-account balance (% of GDP) -5.8 -2.0 -4.9 -6.6 -11.6 -17.0 -20.7 -22.9 -8.8 -1.5 
Inward FDI flow/GDP (%) 5.9 5.6 10.1 10.5 15.0 23.3 31.3 19.2 7.1 4.9 
Inward FDI stock/GDP (%) 21.6 23.1 27.5 36.5 50.7 65.3 83.7 89.0 101.5 107.7 
Total foreign debt 10.5 11.5 13.4 15.7 15.7 21.0 33.0 48.6 53.5 48.1 
Total external debt/GDP 75.6 71.6 64.4 62.1 54.4 62.9 78.2 93.3 110.2 100.3 
Sources:  World Bank, IMF, BNB, National Statistical Institute, EIU.
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Bulgaria, an export-oriented country that joined the EU in 2007, presents a per capita 
wealth well below 50% of the euro area average (Moody’s, 2012). Broadly, the 
country’s fundamentals provide evidence of financial healthiness coupled with one of 
the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios in the eurozone. Past budget surpluses allowed Bulgaria 
to build up fiscal reserves and retain the debt at a reasonable level during the booming 
years. In general, these metrics are expected to contribute to a moderate susceptibility 
to event risk. Among the key strengths of Bulgaria is a disciplined fiscal policy, a 
relatively low government debt and a track record of maintaining reserves. On the 
other hand, the country presents a high private sector external debt and an 
appreciating real effective exchange rate that could raise concerns on the 
competitiveness of the economy. The rapid increase in the leverage of the Bulgarian 
economy and the overheating in the run up to the global financial crisis has led to a 
sharp contraction in economic growth in 2009 and deceleration compared to recent 
past (2004-2008).  
A prudent fiscal policy and a sharp improvement in the current account balance in 
2010 have helped Bulgaria to contain financial risks despite the uncertain global 
outlook in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Following the booming period 
of 2002-2008 with a real GDP growth rate of around 6.1% on average, the output 
growth contracted severely in 2009 and recovered in 2010, albeit at a modest pace. 
The current account hit a deficit of 22.9% in terms of GDP in 2008 but stabilized 
below 3% thereafter as growth in exports outpaced the growth in imports. This 
adjustment in the current account has occurred with the maintenance of the Lev’s 
fixed peg against the euro. With the fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP and government 
debt at less than 20% of GDP, sovereign financial risk was minimized. Notably, the 
Bulgarian fiscal policy was underpinned by a constitutional change limiting fiscal 
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deficits at 2% of GDP and government spending at 40% of GDP. Although GDP 
growth slipped to negative territory in 2008 (-5.5%), it rebounded a year later driven 
by increasing exports, but at a much slower pace than before the crisis. The slow 
output recovery as well as structural rigidities had hit the Bulgarian labour market 
hard, especially for those workers who lost their jobs once construction activity 
collapsed. Historically, the unemployment rate in Bulgaria was relatively high. In the 
period 2001-2008, unemployment declined from over 17.5% in 2001 to 6.3% in 2008. 
Similar to other countries in the SEE region, Bulgaria experienced labour shortages as 
a result of strong economic growth, emigration, and an ageing population. At the 
same time, inflation kept on rising in the period 2003-2008. Bulgaria experienced a 
significant domestic demand-led boom between 2005 and 2008. Large capital inflows 
into the banking system and real estate property fuelled an investment binge that 
drove the current account deficit to almost 23% of GDP in 2008. At the outset of the 
global financial crisis, Bulgaria had a ballooning current account deficit. Inflation 
peaked at 12.3% in 2008, signifying that the economy was overheating. Inflationary 
pressures went out of control in 2008 because the currency peg prevented BNB from 
raising interest rates to combat them as the country was going through a debt-financed 
consumer boom and commodity prices were rising relentlessly. The strong GDP 
growth rate and significant interest from foreign investors have propelled the 
residential and commercial property markets upwards. The decline in real GDP in 
2008 was accompanied by a struggling construction sector, subdued industrial output, 
and rising unemployment. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, FDI trends in 
the world have been undergoing a structural shift in favour of emerging markets. 
However, this trend bypassed SEE. In 2009, the region suffered the sharpest decline 
in FDI inflows of any emerging-market region. Inevitably, the prospects from a weak 
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growth have hit investors’ confidence and this has been the main reason for the 
decline in FDI. Growth has weakened as the eurozone, the region's most important 
market and source of investment, has sunk into recession dragging along several 
countries in the SEE region.  
Although the Lev is fixed against the euro under the currency board arrangement, 
movements in the euro - US dollar exchange rate and the weakening of currencies of 
most of Bulgaria’s trading partners have caused Lev to appreciate in real effective 
terms since 2008. Standard and Poor’s (2010) states that Bulgaria entered the global 
financial crisis with all the symptoms of an overheating economy. The rapid increase 
in the Bulgarian economy’s leverage had led to a sharp contraction in economic 
growth in 2009 and deceleration compared to the recent past (2004-2008). The GDP 
growth was financed through FDI, two-thirds of which was directed into the sectors of 
real estate, construction and financial services. Overall, the banks’ exposure to the 
construction and real estate sector, including mortgages, accounted for about 30% of 
total loans. Then, banks reduced their leverage and the ratio of private sector credit to 
GDP shrank to 72% at the end of 2012 from 75.9% in 2009. Credit to the private 
sector has been virtually flat since 2008. Overall the Bulgarian economy went through 
a ‘correction’ phase as the rapid increase in leverage and overheating triggered a 
deceleration in economic activity in 2009. Nevertheless, in the wake of high external 
imbalances, Bulgaria benefited from political consensus favouring macroeconomic 
stability and supporting the currency board.  
Åslund (2011) indicates that Bulgaria weathered the global financial crisis relatively 
well. He notes that in the midst of the crisis in SEE, Bulgaria opposed the IMF 
orthodoxy of devaluing. In retrospect, it appears that the currency peg, supported by 
institutional commitment, survived to some extent the debt crisis on the periphery of 
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the euro area. Without any particular support, the country seized ownership of its 
stabilization programme and aimed to carry out major adjustments (Åslund, 2012). 
Because of the currency peg, the BNB has to maintain interest rates in line with the 
euro area’s rates and has limited discretion in adjusting monetary conditions. 
Although the BNB has limited wherewithal to combat inflation with monetary policy 
tightening, it still needs to revive an economy that has remained in recession since 
2009.  
In the light of the tightness in international financial markets, in December 2008 the 
BNB reduced the minimum reserve requirements for commercial banks in order to 
boost liquidity in the domestic market. In retrospect, it seems that those measures 
were not sufficient to revive banks’ lending to the economy. Rating agencies and the 
IMF consider the BNB as competent to supervise banks. The BNB has a record of 
playing a proactive role
14
 in bank surveillance, identifying and addressing problems 
before a bank’s solvency is endangered. Contrary to other SEE countries, the 
Bulgarian government has not adopted a large-scale action plan to support the 
banking system. Bulgaria has remained one of the few EU members, where not a 
single bank needed to be rescued with taxpayers’ money in the period 2008-2010. The 
government has not provided support to any bank. Instead authorities urged banks to 
retain their earnings for the year 2008 as a buffer against the challenging market 
conditions. Policymakers have suggested that Bulgarian banks have not been a source 
of risk to the real economy. On the contrary, according to the BNB, banks remained 
the pillars of the macroeconomic and financial stability in the country. Several voices 
indicate that the Bulgarian regulatory framework is well-established with a good level 
of supervision exercised by the BNB which retained its independence from political 
                                                 
14
 Unanimously, rating agencies underscore that the BNB has prudent regulatory standards in place that 
compare well with those in more developed markets and is continuously implementing changes in line 
with international best practices resulting in an improving regulatory regime.  
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influence or outside parties in exercising its policy-making to ensure banking stability 
(IMF, 2010b; Moody’s, 2012; Iskrov, 2012). In this respect, the BNB played a critical 
role in maintaining the confidence of customers in the banking system and preventing 
a catastrophic deposit outflow. Hence, it appears that BNB’s effective supervision 
during the recent boom-bust cycle, is rooted back in history. The lesson from the 
financial and banking crisis in the mid-1990s was well-learnt. Nevertheless, the weak 
economic activity along with the slowdown in FDI in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis resulted in a slowdown in credit. To this end, Bulgaria’s currency 
board constrained BNB’s ability to conduct monetary policy and provide support in 
stimulating the economy. BNB’s role was to safeguard the stability of the system as 
the law limited its ability in extending liquidity support to solvent banks (Moody’s, 
2014). Provisions set by the currency board arrangement limited monetary policy 
flexibility. Still, there are legitimate concerns about the potential destabilizing impact 
of the crisis in Greece on the Bulgarian banking sector, given that Greek banks 
account for almost 30% of total banking assets in Bulgaria and 40% of loans (EIU, 
2011). On top of that, credit risk in the banking sector was spiralling as a result of 
relaxed lending and underwriting standards in the pre-crisis period along with the high 
concentration in real estate construction (Standard and Poor’s, 2014).  
The next section provides an overview of the Romanian economy and the banking 
sector.   
2.3 The Romanian economy and banking system 
 
It has long been known that when an economy is in distress, the neighbouring 
countries might be affected, especially if there are strong financial or trade links in 
place or they are in vulnerable macroeconomic situation. Being no exception to the 
 38 
 
rule that prevails in the SEE region, the Romanian economy has also evolved from a 
history of defaults on sovereign debt, high inflationary periods and banking crises. 
During the Great Depression, many domestic and foreign banks in Romania collapsed 
or experienced heavy runs (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The historical database of 
crises indicates that in 1933 the redemption for domestic and foreign debt was 
suspended. Later, in the Post-World War II period, the country experienced a debt 
crisis during the 1980s, a banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, and a currency 
one by the mid 1990s (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
Barisitz (2005) indicates that until 1998 the Romanian banking system was 
overwhelmingly state-owned. Credit institutions granted loans to a largely un-
restructured real economy dominated by inefficient state-owned factories, subject to 
‘quasi-automatic’ refinancing by the National Bank of Romania (NBR), which 
conducted an accommodative monetary policy. Thus, it is not surprising that the bad 
loans problem of the region was also pertinent in Romania due to inherited legacies 
but also to continuing lending practices (Bonin et al., 2008). In Romania, the 
dominant state-owned banks accumulated large portfolios of defaulted loans and 
required massive capital injections from the government. Furthermore, severe 
macroeconomic shocks led to banking crises and economic growth resumed only after 
these crises were resolved. 
By the mid-1990s, a reform-oriented government initiated macroeconomic 
stabilization policies and decided to discontinue the refinancing of bad loans by the 
NBR. In 1998, legal reforms were carried out, including the new Central Bank law 
that strengthened the independence of the NBR and its role in banking supervision 
(Barisitz, 2005). However, the Russian crisis of 1998 aggravated the weak economic 
environment and contributed to a number of bank runs that continued up to the year 
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2000. In hindsight, the year 1999 proved to be sort of structural turning point for the 
Romanian economy as the authorities initiated the first privatizations of major 
Romanian banks. Given the size of the country, the Romanian financial sector 
promised an impressive growth potential for foreign strategic investors. 
In 2001, the Romanian authorities signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF and the 
large scale privatization projects continued up to 2003, albeit at a relatively slow pace 
(Barisitz, 2005), when they then slowed down. Figures 5 and 6 depict the situation in 
the Romanian banking system as of mid-2010. 
 
 
  
Figure 5 Structure of the share capital in the Romanian banking 
system by country of origin. 
 
Source: NBR (2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Market shares of credit institutions in the Romanian banking 
system by country of origin. 
 
Source: NBR (2011). 
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In the run-up to the global financial crisis, Romania’s financial sector went through a 
period of rapid growth, reflected in an increase in the measured financial depth. In the 
excitement of joining the EU in 2007, Romanians enjoyed a three-year booming 
period that came to a sudden stop when the crisis burst. Similarly to many other 
countries in the region, the rapid growth of domestic credit was fuelled by ample 
funding provided by parents of foreign-owned banks to their subsidiaries in Romania.  
The speed of lending expansion raised concerns about whether the country was 
experiencing a credit boom, given the structural weaknesses of the economy (NBR, 
2003). Table 6 presents a set of structural financial indicators and Table 7 some FSIs 
for the Romanian banking system. 
 
Table 6 Structural financial indicators of Romania, 2008-2012 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of EU subsidiaries 23 22 22 22 21 
Herfindahl index, total assets (%) 0.0922 0.0857 0.0871 0.0878 0.0852 
Shares of the 5 largest credit institutions, 
total assets (%) 
54.0 52.4 52.7 54.6 54.7 
 
Source: ECB. 
 
Table 7 Financial soundness indicators of Romania 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Regulatory Capital to risk-weighted assets 13.8 14.7 15.0 14.9 14.9 
Capital to Assets 9.0 8.6 8.9 8.1 8.0 
NPLs to Total Gross Loans 2.7 7.9 11.9 14.3 18.2 
Loans to General Government to Total Gross 
Loans 
2.2 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.3 
Loans non-financial Corporations to Total 
Gross Loans 
32.7 33.3 35.9 38.4 39.8 
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Return on Assets 1.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 
Return on Equity 17.0 2.9 -1.7 -2.6 -5.9 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets  47.1 57.5 60.0 58.7 57.6 
Liquid Assets to Short-Term Liabilities 230.5 132.0 142.2 139.0 147.7 
Customer Deposits to Total Loans 81.9 88.7 84.8 84.0 87.3 
Residential Real Estate Loans to Total Loans 10.6 18.1 19.9 20.5 22.1 
Commercial Real Estate Loans to Total Loans n.a 24.6 26.8 27.6 28.2 
 
Source: IMF Statistics. 
 
In contrast to Bulgaria, the Romanian banking system reported losses in the period 
2010-2012. On a system-wide basis, the Romanian credit risk, as measured by the 
ratio of NPLs to total gross loans, was historically at a higher level compared with the 
Bulgarian one. Overall, the Romanian banks appear more liquid
15
 but less solvent, in 
terms of capital adequacy, than the Bulgarian ones.  
Tables 6 and 7, justify a closer look at the sequence of events that took place in 
Romania as the crisis was unfolding in the region. Table 8 displays a comparison 
between the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems in the middle of the SEE crisis 
in 2009-2010; it also presents the claims of the Greek banks in each system. 
Table 8 Net bank external debt in Bulgaria and Romania and the claims of Greek 
banks. 
 
Country 
Net bank external debt 
(% of GDP) 
Greek banks’ claims  
in the banking system 
(in billion US Dollars) 
Bulgaria 13 14 
Romania 20 21 
 
Source: FitchRatings, BIS.   
                                                 
15
 Two liquidity ratios support the argument. On the other hand, the ratio of customer deposits to total 
loans for the Bulgarian banks improves considerably at the outset of the global financial crisis. In the 
case of Romania, the trend in this ratio indicates a funding gap.   
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Aligned with the FSIs of each system, it appears that the Romanian banks were more 
leveraged than the Bulgarian ones while the Greek banks’ claims were notably higher 
in Romania. Two diverging views describe the situation of the Romanian banking 
system in the period around the wake of the global financial crisis (IMF, 2010a; 
World Bank, 2012). On the one hand, IMF (2010a) and Moody’s (2011a) suggest that 
the Romanian banking system, which dominates the country’s financial sector, 
entered the crisis with relatively high capitalization and liquidity ratios. On the other 
hand, in a report issued later, World Bank (2012) indicates that the soundness of 
Romanian banks was far from perfect in the run-up to the crisis. Given that the 
reported ratio of NPLs before the crisis was rather low, it seems that it was mostly a 
reflection of the high credit growth that masked, to some extent, the underlying 
weaknesses in the system. Towards the end of 2013, NPLs were still increasing and 
reached 21.9% of gross loans. Liquidity in Romania’s banking system has benefited 
from high reserve requirements in the past that were relaxed during 2009 to help the 
banks face the global deleveraging in the aftermath of the crisis (Moody’s, 2011a). 
The system-wide deposit to loan ratio was relatively low during 2008-2010 compared 
to Bulgaria, pointing to the need of Romanian banks to strengthen their deposit bases 
and reduce their dependence on wholesale funding. Certainly, the case of Romania is 
interesting as it is a country whose foreign-bank dominated financial sector seemed 
relatively sound based on conventional ratios but was subjected to rather large shocks 
during the crisis (World Bank, 2012). In the aftermath, the deterioration in market 
confidence that put a downward pressure on the exchange rate, along with the sharp 
increase in NPLs, also put a strain on banks’ capital positions. This sharp increase 
explains why the financial sector assessment performed by IMF (2010a) calls for the 
strengthening of capital positions of ‘some’ banks and suggests that parents of 
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foreign-owned banks should maintain those lines of credit to their subsidiaries and 
corporate borrowers in Romania. IMF (2010a) states that: 
“In view of the vulnerability of the economy and financial system to external 
financial developments, measures to strengthen the resilience of banks and to 
maintain access to external finance should be given a high priority”(p.4). 
 
In April 2008, two rating agencies issued reports warning of the impact of the US sub-
prime crisis on the financial stability of Romania. At about the same time many 
households began to experience the impact of the increase in the NBR’s monetary 
policy rate (EIU, 2008). Standard and Poor’s (2009) rate Romania as the third most 
vulnerable emerging-market economy in the world, stressing the country’s 
vulnerability to any deterioration in the international financial climate. In a report 
issued in February 2008, i.e. prior to the explosion of the Greek debt crisis, the 
governor of the Central Bank of Greece pointed out that the credit risk arising from 
the Greek banks’ activities in the SEE region constituted the most important risk for 
the Greek banking system (Kathimerini, 2008). A year later, allegations in the 
Romanian media report that parent banks had withdrawn funds from the Romanian 
market to consolidate their domestic positions. 
It has been argued that the presence of foreign banks in Romania has increased the 
efficiency of financial intermediation and the availability of credit to the real 
economy. Yet, there are signs that financial stress originating in euro area-based 
parent banks may have been transmitted to Romania. Empirical evidence by de Haas 
et al. (2012) from 1,294 banks in 30 Eastern European countries over the period 1999-
2009 shows that foreign bank credit grew at a faster pace than domestic (public and 
private) banks before the crisis, and sharply decelerated in 2008 following a pro-
cyclical manner. Morosan (2011) claims that the Romanian economic crisis in 2008-
2010was manifested in all economic activities, while the banking sector was one of 
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the most affected economic sectors in Romania. He maintains that Romanian banks 
refrained from taking drastic measures in an attempt to conceal any signal of risk in 
the market. In discussing the non-availability of bank-level data, Morosan (2011) 
states that: 
“Not even available data from the banking system can show us the true extent 
of the crisis faced by the banks because they are not transparent. Non-
performing loans is a taboo subject for many bankers. Of the 42 credit 
institutions present in our country outstanding credit data can be found at 
only a quarter of institutions”(p.254). 
 
On the same wavelength, the lending surveys of the NBR indicate that the risk profile 
of almost all industries rose with the riskiest sectors being construction and real estate, 
reflecting the adverse impact of the global financial crisis and the economic downturn 
on the backbone of the Romanian economy. Evidently, the presence of foreign banks, 
particularly the Greek ones, was mostly seen as a liability rather than an asset (Lazea, 
2009, Moody’s 2011a). As the twin fiscal and public crises unfolded in Greece, 
neighbouring countries in the SEE tried to determine how their banking systems 
would be affected by the developments in Athens, i.e. what would be the 
repercussions of the Greek crisis for Bulgaria and Romania?  
The outlook for the Romanian banking system was negative, driven mainly by the 
tough economic conditions in the country following the severe recession in 2009. The 
operating environment in Romania was characterized by a contracting economy, a 
widened fiscal deficit and rising unemployment. In particular, the country’s 
macroeconomy appeared to be a source of concern for policymakers especially in the 
light of the sharp increase in NPLs. Furthermore the high proportion of foreign 
currency lending, mainly to households, elevated the banks’ credit risk profile while 
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the stressed liquidity, as reflected in the Greek banks’ loan-to-deposit ratios16, led to a 
further tightening on the supply side of credit. A support package by IMF and EU was 
put in place in 2009 to alleviate the macroeconomic pressure as well as the solvency 
and liquidity of the Romanian banking system.   
The global financial turmoil and the ensuing Greek debt crisis exposed the Romanian 
banking system to material risks. The significant presence of Greek banks mounted 
these risks further as their Romanian subsidiaries formed a critical maze in the 
respective banking system. As of the end of 2013, the Romanian banking sector was 
still considered to be exposed to potential contagion from the crisis in the euro area 
periphery (Fitch, 2014a).  
Obviously, it is outside the remit of this research to find the culprits of the precarious 
economic situation in Romania among the players in the banking market, the bankers, 
the politicians or the regulators. However, as Morosan (2011) asserts, they were all 
synchronized to be optimistic before the crisis and pessimistic later. It seems that 
instead of hitting the brakes in the booming years, Romania stamped on the 
accelerator, ending up with a relatively high budget deficit and indebted firms and 
households. Table 9 displays some key economic Romanian indicators that provide 
insight on where the linkages between the Romanian credit risk and the 
macroeconomy should be sought.  
                                                 
16
 Based on published financial statements, the loan-to-deposit ratio for the Greek banks in Romania 
was about 210% in Romania (198% in Bulgaria) as of mid-2009, at a relatively high level reflecting 
also that they were highly leveraged. 
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Table 9 Key economic indicators of Romania, 2001-2010. 
 
Indicator / year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Real GDP (% change pa) 5.6 5.0 5.3 8.5 4.1 7.9 6.3 7.4 -6.6 -1.2 
Nominal GDP (billion US Dollars) 40.6 46.0 59.5 75.8 99.2 122.7 170.6 204.3 164.3 164.8 
Private consumption (% of GDP) 78.2 76.9 75.7 77.4 78.5 77.9 75.3 74.0 71.9 73.0 
Government consumption (% of GDP) 7.3 6.7 9.8 7.9 8.3 7.7 7.6 7.7 8.8 7.1 
Gross fixed investment (% of GDP) 20.5 21.3 21.5 21.8 23.7 25.6 30.2 31.9 24.4 24.7 
Industrial production (% change pa) 3.9 -0.4 -0.8 2.7 -3.2 9.3 10.3 2.7 -5.5 5.5 
Real effective exchange rate 125.6 126.7 124.9 127.9 150.4 160.1 174.2 165.8 153.6 156.8 
Budget balance (% of GDP)  -3.2 -2.6 -2.2 -1.2 -1.2 -2.2 -3.1 -4.8 -7.3 -6.4 
Public debt  (% of GDP)  28.0 28.0 26.7 24.7 16.1 16.4 19.2 20.8 26.3 28.4 
Domestic credit growth (%)  34.9 38.7 49.0 33.0 43.7 38.5 74.5 42.6 10.6 11.5 
M2 (% change pa)  46.2 38.2 23.3 40.1 33.8 27.9 34.0 17.3 8.3 6.1 
Consumer prices (% change pa) 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.0 6.6 4.8 7.8 5.6 6.1 
Population 22.4 21.8 21.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 
Unemployment rate (%) 8.8 8.4 7.4 6.3 5.9 5.2 4.1 4.4 7.8 7.0 
Net direct investment flows (US Dollars) 1.2 1.1 1.8 6.4 6.5 11.0 9.6 13.6 4.9 3.0 
Current-account balance (% of GDP) -5.5 -3.3 -5.6 -8.4 -8.7 -10.4 -13.5 -11.6 -4.2 -4.4 
Inward FDI flow/GDP (%) 2.9 2.5 3.1 8.6 6.5 9.3 5.8 6.8 2.9 1.8 
Inward FDI stock/GDP (%) 20.6 17.0 20.5 27.1 26.6 37.5 37.4 34.1 44.5 43.3 
Total foreign debt (billion US Dollars) 12.7 16.8 22.7 29.7 38.9 54.0 84.4 102.5 120.1 124.4 
Total debt/GDP  31.4 36.5 38.2 39.2 39.2 44.0 49.5 50.2 73.1 75.5 
Sources:  World Bank, IMF, NBR, National Institute of Statistics, EIU. 
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All rating agencies seem to agree that Romania’s economy is among both the least 
prosperous in the EU and the most vulnerable one to external shocks. Having among 
the lowest per capita income in the EU, Romania kept its labour costs low compared 
to its trading partners, thus facilitating the economy’s productivity and an increasing 
GDP prior to 2009. During the last decade, Romania saw its exports rise by about 
19% and investments increase from 18% of GDP to 29%. Arguably, Romania 
benefited from its integration into the EU as approximately 55% of its exports are sent 
to euro area countries.  
Growth in GDP averaged about 5% in the decade leading up to the global financial 
crisis. While the return to GDP growth in the early 2000s, after falling by 12.1% in 
1997-99, was partly driven by exports, the growth of aggregate demand in 2004-07 
was fuelled by the growth of investment and household consumption, which 
outstripped the growth of domestic production and increased the deficit on net 
exports. Private consumption grew by an average of 10.5% per year in 2004-07 
fuelled by the rapid expansion of consumer credit and increases in real wages. The 
growth of gross fixed capital formation accelerated from 10.1% in 2004 to 28.9% in 
2007, reflecting the boom in construction. Export growth, however, has been 
relatively sluggish and could not match the growth in imports. As a result, the deficit 
on net exports grew to 14.3% of GDP in 2007. 
The strong economic growth in Romania that lasted up to 2009, combined with higher 
disposable income, has meant a surge in lending since 2002. Between 2001 and 2008 
domestic credit increased by almost 40% on average with the growth rate peaking at 
75% in 2007. During the same period, the growth rate in GDP averaged at 6.3%. Loan 
growth slowed down in the second half of 2008 reflecting the knock-on effect of the 
global financial conditions, the challenging macroeconomic prospects and low 
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demand for financing new investment projects. Retail lending has been the driving 
force of credit growth in Romania. In the process of convergence with the EU levels, 
low interest rates and high demand for retail loans have fuelled a consumer financing 
frenzy (Moody’s, 2014). Despite the high credit growth witnessed in the period 2001-
2008, Romania has remained one of the most under-banked countries in Europe; 
although Romania’s economy was overheating, the banking assets were less than 50% 
of GDP.    
Typical aspects of the Romanian economy are the exchange rate volatility and the 
inflationary pressures that seem to be inherited from the transition period. The 
depreciation of leu against the euro by around 15% during 2008-2009, jointly with the 
fact that only 40% of total loans granted by banks were denominated in local 
currency, translated to increasing credit risk for Romanian banks. A sharp correction 
in real estate and housing prices of about 20% amid a contracting economy has put 
further pressure on banks’ financial profiles. As a result of the global liquidity 
shortage, Romanian banks went through a liquidity crunch and the NBR had to 
provide emergency liquidity assistance.  
Back in 2005 the IMF had criticized the Romanian authorities over lax fiscal, wage 
and monetary policies, declaring that the stand-by agreement was off-track. As part of 
Romania’s preparations for entry into the euro area, the NBR shifted monetary policy 
away from exchange-rate targeting towards inflation-targeting
17
 in August 2005.  
The authorities revised the Labour Code, which was seen as one of the main factors 
contributing to labour-market inflexibility, and accelerated the liberalization of the 
capital account. Despite these measures, any potential achievements were undermined 
                                                 
17
 The NBR maintains an inflation-targeting regime, with a target of 3% within a fluctuation of +/-1%. 
The objective of this strategy was to ensure aggregate price stability, with all monetary policy 
instruments being employed to this end. On the other hand, inflation targeting implies a floating 
exchange rate as it is extremely difficult for a Central Bank to simultaneously employ two anchors. The 
latter explains partially the exchange rate volatility in Romania. 
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by relatively loose fiscal and incomes policies and the expansion of consumer credit. 
EIU (2008) indicates that the latter policies contributed to growing external deficits 
and hindered the implementation of a monetary policy consistent with a reduction in 
inflation. 
The conduct of monetary policy since 2005 has been complicated by the liberalization 
of the capital account. Strong capital inflows contributed to a significant real 
appreciation of the leu between 2005 and mid-2007. The strong rise in consumer 
credit forced the NBR to increase interest rates in the period from February 2006 to 
February 2007. However, this contributed to high capital inflows, which put upward 
pressure on the exchange rate and led to a further deterioration in the current account. 
As a result, the NBR lowered interest rates in four stages between February and June 
2007. Nevertheless, the leu continued to appreciate until early July. It then started to 
depreciate following the turbulence in global financial markets in the summer of 
2007, causing the NBR to increase interest rates in October 2007. However, this did 
not succeed in stemming the depreciation of the domestic currency which, combined 
with rising food and energy prices, led to a rise in inflation in 2007-2008, forcing the 
NBR to announce further increases in interest rates in 2008. The high inflation during 
the booming years was attributed to the overheating of the economy. Later, the 
inflation was driven by shocks in commodity – food and fuel – prices. Certainly, the 
ability of the NBR to stabilize consumer prices was constrained by the euro-ised 
economy and a wide interest rate corridor around the key policy rate.  
Between 2004 and 2008, Romania’s annual current account deficit averaged at about 
10.5% of GDP, peaking at 13.5% of GDP in 2007. This reflected the country’s 
economic boom which kept import growth consistently above export growth. 
However, the slowdown in growth after the global financial crisis resulted in 
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correcting the external imbalance as imports fell more than exports. The current 
account deficit narrowed to 4.2% of GDP in 2010 and remained below 4.5% in 2011.  
Although Romania can claim one of the lowest debt ratios across the EU, it can be 
seen that this ratio presents a steadily upward trend. It is argued that much of the 
external debt in Romania has been generated through the domestic banking sector and 
has been used to finance domestic growth and imports. Equally, Romania’s fiscal 
position has proved vulnerable to crises as the government debt to GDP ratio almost 
doubled in a single year – inflated from 13.4% of GDP in 2008 to 23.6% in 2009. 
Amid volatile politics, the Romanian authorities negotiated in early 2009 a financial 
assistance package – bailout funds – with multilateral creditors, of €19.5 billion led by 
a two-year stand-by agreement of €12.9 billion by IMF.  
What becomes evident from the analysis so far, are the clear-cut differences between 
the Bulgarian and Romanian economies and banking systems. The following section 
highlights the key differences between the two countries that in essence call for a case 
by case modelling framework, rather than a ‘one size fits all’ approach for the SEE 
region. 
2.4 Comparing Bulgaria to Romania 
The impact of a destabilising shock in a banking system depends upon the 
macroeconomic policy, and particularly the monetary and exchange rate regime in 
place when the shock arrives (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). For this reason, this 
section goes beyond the hard numbers already discussed, by analysing the 
idiosyncratic aspects blended with the historical parallels that have culminated in the 
key differences between Bulgaria and Romania. The comparative analysis focuses on 
two areas: the banking systems and the monetary regimes of the focal countries.    
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As neighbouring countries, Bulgaria and Romania have shared many common 
experiences over the centuries. But they have always been rivals, despite the 
differences in the size and structure of their economies (Nenovsky et al., 2013). The 
authors document that these countries were enemies in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 
and allies in the Second World War, while they shared a common ideology as Soviet 
satellites for more than 40 years. Although both countries were members of the 
Communist bloc, Romania distanced itself from the Soviet Union by adopting more 
independent economic policies. Later, in the process of EU accession, Bulgaria and 
Romania competed with each other in fulfilling the membership criteria.      
Unlike banks in western countries, which granted loans based on credit risk analysis, 
banks in Eastern Europe granted loans based on centrally planned decisions. In both 
focal countries the break-up of the mono-bank and the establishment of the two-tier 
banking system, which coincided with the political opening, took place in 1990. In 
1992, Bulgaria introduced a new central bank which mirrored western legislation. 
Although Romania introduced a new central bank law, amendments to the existing 
banking laws and key elements of western banking legislation needed for market-
based banking systems were still missing in late 1992 (Thorne, 1993). Furthermore, 
Bulgaria and Romania differed in terms of restrictions for the establishment of new 
banks. In the case of Romania, the legislation was more liberal concerning the entry 
of new banks than Bulgaria. Also, the Bulgarian bank legislation imposed higher 
minimum capital requirements than Romania. Stark differences can also be found in 
the measures taken by the Bulgarian and Romanian authorities in dealing with banks’ 
institutional problems, in essence the legacy of NPLs. The differences are pronounced 
in the State guarantees provided for NPLs and the measures taken by Bulgaria for re-
establishing state ownership of the banks. In terms of guarantees provided, Bulgaria 
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stood as the only country in the region that has made an open recognition of all 
enterprise loans. Other countries, including Romania were reluctant to do so because 
of the fiscal implications.    
The Bulgarian banking system is considered conservative as it engages in traditional 
financial services with relatively low exposure in risky financial instruments. The 
mechanisms that are in place in the Bulgarian banking sector aim at ensuring an 
adequate response in case of need. These mechanisms are constructed in such a way 
that put the higher burden on the shareholders of the banks rather than on the State 
budget. The BNB has the ultimate responsibility for banking supervision. Also it has 
the power to replace a bank’s management should there be breaches in the execution 
of its professional duties. Bulgaria was among the countries that tried to calm the 
credit boom through macro-prudential measures applicable to the banks established 
within its jurisdiction (IMF, 2013b). 
Although notable progress has been made in the area of banking regulation and 
supervision in Romania, the critical steps
18
 had been implemented by the time the 
global financial crisis hit the SEE region. Moody’s (2011a) underscores that, in line 
with the development of the Romanian banking sector, it is necessary for banking 
supervision to focus increasingly on the qualitative aspects of banking activity, and in 
particular on upgrading its risk-assessment capacity, closer monitoring of banks’ 
efforts to assess borrower indebtedness, as well as strengthening creditor rights and 
the effectiveness of the judicial system.  
A number of authors are in agreement that the stricter the measures, including lending 
growth limits and capital positions, the more noticeable their impact on credit and 
                                                 
18
 Among others, the key measures taken by the NBR were associated with tighter regulation of lending 
exposures, tougher criteria for sanctioning banks and for the authorisation of managers and 
shareholders of banks.  
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housing prices (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2011; Kraft and Galac, 2011; Vandenbussche et 
al., 2012). Vandenbussche et al. (2012) find that there are clear differences among 
countries in terms of their policy activism. The authors indicate that Bulgaria was 
among those countries where prudential regulation displays a clear countercyclical 
pattern while Romania appears to be mildly procyclical at times when some 
prudential policies were being relaxed upon joining the EU. In this respect, Munteanu 
and Göndör (2012) provide empirical evidence that the procyclical fiscal policy in 
Romania during 2008-2011 raises macroeconomic volatility, depresses investment 
and does not assist in repairing the banking sector.   
Although a number of studies deal with the CESEE region and include Bulgaria and 
Romania in their analysis, there is a paucity of studies that focus solely on the two 
economies. Among the handful of studies, Andreev (2009) explores the impact of the 
EU accession, Kalotay (2008) discusses the quality and development impact of FDI 
flows, Duenwald et al. (2005) deal with credit growth, Pelinescu and Caraiani (2006) 
study the monetary regime of inflation targeting and EU convergence, and Nenovsky 
et al. (2013) focus on the impact of the different monetary regimes that Bulgaria and 
Romania endorsed.  
The historical comparative analysis provides a fertile ground for reflection on the 
preferences for specific economic policies and choice of monetary regimes. In the 
1920s, Bulgaria adhered strictly to the gold standard while the monetary and exchange 
rate stabilization was significantly more protracted in Romania. Bulgaria and 
Romania experienced an economic crisis in 1996-1997 which marked the adoption of 
different regimes. In Romania, where the crisis was milder, the State pursued and 
enhanced a discretionary monetary policy, even introducing inflation targeting in 
2005. In contrast, Bulgaria which experienced a severe crisis, took radical steps by 
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adopting a currency board. Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2005) stress that this 
arrangement represents an ‘extremely orthodox’ monetary regime, similar to the gold-
exchange standard, that corresponds to the negation of monetary policy. Although the 
benefits of the currency board in Bulgaria during the global financial crisis are 
debatable (Nenovksy et al., 2013), it had a solid track record as it managed to survive 
the Russian and the East Asian crises.  
The two radically opposed monetary regimes had an impact on macroeconomic 
policies and macroeconomic policies play a central role in the study of banks’ risk 
appetite. Countries with floating exchange rates had an easier time dealing with large 
capital inflows than countries with fixed exchange rates (Bakker and Gulde, 2010). 
On the other hand, countries with fixed exchange rates cannot let the nominal 
exchange rate appreciate in the face of capital inflows, and are therefore less able to 
insulate domestic liquidity from capital inflows. By definition, currency boards have 
fewer instruments
19
. A comparison among the new EU member states suggests that 
exchange rate regimes and policies have greatly affected how these countries have 
fared in both the boom and the bust phase of the cycle. Overall, fixed exchange 
regimes in the SEE region seem on average to have amplified the excesses and 
imbalances in the boom, and contributed to more severe declines in the bust. 
Nonetheless, the exchange rate regime choice in itself is not a panacea, since there are  
good and bad examples with both fixed and flexible regimes (Becker et al., 2010). 
Cross border financial flows resulted in the built-up of vulnerabilities that influenced 
the cost of crisis in both focal countries. In retrospect, it appears that the pegged 
exchange rate made the adjustment more abrupt with greater costs to the real economy 
                                                 
19
 Fixed exchange rates restrain the operations of the central bank (lender of last resort). The absence of 
such a lender could promote bank runs and financial turmoil. Nonetheless, a strand of literature 
maintains that pursuing a fixed exchange regime reduces the probability of banking crises, especially in 
developing countries (Domaç and Martínez Pería, 2000).  
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for Bulgaria.       
 The key macroeconomic variables show that Romania’s economy is more than three 
times larger than Bulgaria’s. This was evident in the period from 1985-1995. In the 
wake of the 1996 crisis, Bulgaria’s inflation was much higher than that of Romania. 
Another crucial difference between the two countries was the accumulation of foreign 
debt. Bulgaria’s foreign debt has been increasing since 1985. The upward trend in 
debt accumulation reversed in 1994. In contrast Romania followed a different 
strategy. In 1972, it was the first country from the Communist bloc to join IMF. 
Bulgaria followed in 1990. In the early, transitional period, Romania begun 
accumulating foreign debt but, by the start of the crisis in 1996, it was significantly 
lower than Bulgaria’s. The severe crisis in Bulgaria coupled with the collapse of the 
banking system called for a radical change to restore macroeconomic stability, while 
Romania did not see any need to change its existing monetary regime (Nenovsky et 
al., 2013). Hence, two different models of conducting monetary policy emerged in 
Bulgaria and Romania. In Bulgaria the philosophy has been passive and conservative 
while in Romania it has been active, discretionary and less conservative. The adoption 
of the currency board in Bulgaria shifted economic activity as well as the associated 
risks with it in a different direction from that of Romania. The constraints imposed on 
public finances and monetary policy in Bulgaria had a profound effect on the private 
sector, which expanded as state-owned enterprises were privatized or shut down in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, the currency board forced the private 
sector to adjust to the hard budget constraints and restructure so that it could remain 
competitive in an open economy.  
More importantly, the restrictions on public finances in Bulgaria led to a shift from 
public to private debt. While the government was running budget surpluses and 
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paying off its external debt, private borrowing soared, leading to a sharp increase in 
private external debt, especially during the 2000s. The currency board reduced the 
foreign exchange risk and the sovereign risk and lowered the interest rates levels to 
those abroad, allowing the private sector to borrow at lower cost but also exposing the 
economy to external shocks. 
In Romania, the economic situation was the opposite of the Bulgarian case. Public 
finances were not subject to any restrictions, and the NBR was free to use a 
discretionary monetary policy. Accordingly, the government was running permanent 
budget deficits, which became unsustainable during the global economic crisis and 
forced Romania to seek help from the IMF. The lack of fiscal discipline, coupled with 
the fact that Romania’s economy is less open than Bulgaria’s, led to a rapid increase 
in hourly labour costs. Furthermore, as borrowing was concentrated in the public 
sector, credit to the private sector and private external debt were only a fraction of the 
corresponding levels in Bulgaria.  
The first period started in the late 1990s with the opening of accession negotiations 
with the EU; the disciplining effect of the monetary regime in Bulgaria was enhanced 
by the credibility effect from the prospects of EU accession. In 2004, the foreign 
reserves of the Bulgarian and Romanian governments exceeded their foreign 
liabilities for the first time since the start of the transition. The positive difference 
between reserves and liabilities could be viewed as collateral, offering a sort of 
insurance for private sector liabilities (Dooley, 2000). The constraints on fiscal and 
monetary policy imposed by a currency board in Bulgaria, coupled with large capital 
inflows in Bulgaria, translated into a rapid and dramatic rise in external private 
liabilities and since 2008 in NPLs. In response, the BNB raised the reserve 
requirements for banks and imposed restrictions on lending in 2005. While private 
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sector debt and NPLs in Romania increased as well, the weakening of the monetary 
anchor became especially evident in the area of public finances due to the 
discretionary monetary regime. The government budget deficit, which had been 
decreasing for several consecutive years, reversed its course in 2005. In the same 
year, the NBR introduced inflation targeting in an attempt to prevent the overheating 
of the economy and to slow down capital inflows. When the global financial crisis hit 
the Balkan economies in late 2008 and early 2009, the differences between the two 
monetary regimes became apparent again. In Romania, the worsening condition of 
public finances forced the country to seek financial support from the IMF in an 
attempt to provide a fiscal stimulus during the downturn. In contrast, Bulgaria 
implemented drastic austerity measures to safeguard the currency board arrangement 
but incurred budget deficits that were larger than usual. 
At first glance, the economies of Bulgaria and Romania have followed similar 
patterns of development with only minor deviations. However, fundamental 
differences between the two economies have emerged over the last 15 years as a result 
of a strategic choice of institutional arrangements in the late 1990s. In particular, the 
choice of monetary regimes in the aftermath of the 1996-1997 economic crises set 
Bulgaria and Romania on completely different trajectories. Bulgaria opted for a 
currency board arrangement that effectively eliminated the country’s monetary 
autonomy, while Romania chose discretionary monetary policy and inflation 
targeting. This difference was determined by the initial conditions of the two 
economies, particularly with regard to their external debt. Bulgaria accumulated a 
large debt in the late 1980s and early 1990s whereas Romania began the transition 
with virtually no external liabilities. Furthermore, the monetary regimes had 
implications for the entire economic system and policies of the two countries. With its 
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monetary and fiscal policies restricted, Bulgaria’s economic activity shifted towards 
the private sector, making it the focal point of economic shocks and response 
mechanisms. In contrast, the discretionary policies in Romania turned the government 
and public finances into both a contributing factor and a response mechanism to 
imbalances. Accession to the EU, coupled with global excess liquidity in the late 
2000s, amplified these differences by channelling moral hazard into the private sector 
in Bulgaria and the public sector in Romania. Accordingly, when the recent global 
economic crisis reached the SEE region, Bulgaria exhibited strong growth in private 
debt while Romania was compelled to seek financial help from the IMF as public 
finances deteriorated.  
The following section takes stock of the significant presence of Greek banks in 
Bulgaria and Romania and substantiates the Greek crisis hypothesis.  
2.5 The presence of Greek banks in Bulgaria and Romania and the risk of crisis 
contagion 
Measured in terms of FDI flows in the banking sector, the CESEE region constitutes a 
unique region worldwide. Nowhere else do foreigners wield such a high degree of 
control over banking systems (Barisitz, 2009). Yet, these strong banking networks and 
links heighten the danger of cross-border transmission of risks and economic 
contagion (ECB, 2005; Altmann, 2006). Due to the one-sided nature of investment, 
the crisis transmission channel is most likely to affect the SEE economies, rather than 
the investors’ home countries. And this issue becomes even tenser when the banking 
sector ownership of a host country is concentrated in one or a few home countries.  
In both focal countries, Greek banks command a remarkable share of the banking 
systems, thus making the transmission of shocks in Greece an immediate threat. 
Based on Bankscope data and IMF (2012b), the Greek banks controlled 25% of the 
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Bulgarian banking assets and 16.6% of the Romanian ones as at the end of 2011. 
Notably, the Greek banks accounted for a critical 33.8% of the Romanian system’s 
share capital on aggregate, followed by the Austrian banks that represented 21.9% 
(NBR, 2011). The ‘losers’ are usually countries whose economies are tightly linked to 
countries with fiscally-troubled economies and financial intermediaries that can 
become illiquid or insolvent by losses arising from write-down on defaulted or 
restructured sovereign debt and private sector lending. Hence, the Greek debt crisis 
has the potential to sow the seeds of vulnerability and derail the financial sectors in 
both Bulgaria and Romania.  
Crises typically involve contagion in banking. As the literature on bank contagion 
demonstrates, a propagation aspect of financial crises implies that there is a spillover 
dimension attached to them. Solvency, liquidity or problems faced by banks in one 
country can spread contagiously to banks in other countries via financial linkages 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). Then, the ability of a crisis to spread from one region to 
another depends crucially on the pattern of interconnectedness among banks (Freixas, 
et al. 2000). Contagion presents a systemic risk to financial institutions that goes 
beyond what their industrial counterparts can confront. Even Kaufman (1992), who 
argued that contagion is an overstated force in financial markets, concedes that, 
compared to other industries, it strikes financial institutions more often, unfolds more 
rapidly than in other sectors of the economy, spreads among a larger group of peer 
institutions and causes a larger number of failures. Effectively, contagion spills over 
into the real economy where it inflicts collateral damage on firms that depend on the 
financial sector as a source of long-term capital. Historical experience provides 
evidence that the problem of contagion is not a hypothetical one (Saunders and 
Wilson, 1996; Bernanke, 2007; Gorton, 2009).  
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Hence, contrary to the view that the entry of foreign banks in less developed banking 
markets brings in significant benefits and bolsters the banking stability of the host 
country (De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010; Cull and Martínez Pería, 2007), 
foreign banks can also be a source of risk. Fitch (2011) states that foreign bank 
ownership in the region became a potential contagion channel with the onset of the 
global financial crisis. On the same wavelength, Canales-Kriljenko et al. (2010) argue 
that during the global financial crunch, foreign banks were potential vehicles for 
spreading the crisis from advanced economies to emerging markets. Going deeper, 
Bruno and Shin (2013) suggest that banking sector capital flows and credit growth in 
recipient economies are explained in part by the fluctuations in global liquidity that 
follow the leverage cycle of global banks. Thus, the key difference between the 
opposite views has to do with the role that foreign banks play in sustaining strong 
credit growth during the pre-crisis period. In the case of emerging Europe, it was the 
foreign banks that fuelled a credit boom by transferring large amounts of borrowed 
short-term capital to their subsidiaries (Canales-Kriljenko et al., 2010).  
Not surprisingly, revenues from SEE markets delivered a healthy boost to the Greek 
banking sector, one of the key investors in the region. Historically, the Greek banks 
pursued a hybrid strategy of acquisitions and organic growth in SEE. Critics 
suggested an opportunistic approach by banker-desperadoes who paid astronomical 
prices to acquire SEE banks and then used funding from the parent or wholesale 
markets to lend in the local economies (Economist, 2009). However, Greek bankers 
argued that fairly traditional business models were followed in their expansion 
eastwards. In consensus with Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) and Herrero and Simón 
(2003), the main reasons that motivated the Greek expansion in the SEE region were:  
- The foreseen decline in profit margins in the domestic market 
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- The ‘follow your customer’ principle commonly found in banking business  
- A deep knowledge of the economies in the neighbourhood, and  
- An increased window of opportunity arising from the anticipated economic 
development of these countries. 
The end result has been “a very short history of a very rapid expansion”. Although the 
Greek banks’ presence in the region started around 1993-1994, a meaningful 
expansion was only initiated in the early 2000s. Between 2002 and 2008, banks 
assumed a wave of 17 acquisitions while the respective assets grew by 58% (BOG, 
2010; Papadogiannis, 2013). Very few studies attempt to explain the performance and 
profitability of the Greek banks’ foreign subsidiaries. Kosmidou et al. (2005) find that 
subsidiaries’ profits were closely linked to those of the parent bank, the difference in 
GDP growth and trade balance between Greece and the host country, and the years of 
operation in the host market. In another study, Athanasoglou et al. (2006) provide 
evidence that bank-specific variables are the key drivers of SEE banks’ profitability in 
the period 1998-2002. Although the effect of the macro-economy
20
 is not clear, the 
authors document a significant variation across the region in terms of macroeconomic 
conditions, providing the rationale that each country is a case study on its own.  
Bastian (2010) and Greek bankers argue that it would constitute a historical mistake 
for banks to abandon their operations in the SEE region. Although banks’ strategy 
remains expansionary, there are material constraints challenging the banking sector’s 
stability: 
- The negative developments in Greece.21 
                                                 
20
 The study captures the effect of the macroeconomic environment by variables such as inflation and 
real per capita income. 
 
21
 Greece has been compromised by challenging macroeconomics such as negative GDP growth and 
debt (as a % of GDP) and fiscal deficit (as a % of GDP) at record levels. 
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- Deteriorating asset quality across the Greek banking system. 
- Strained liquidity both in-house and abroad. The over reliance of subsidiaries 
on parent banks in terms of funding
22
 is a major concern.  
- Funding cost is elevated relative to European peers, and severely affected by 
the widening spread of the Greek sovereign bonds to the German ones. 
- Capital, an essential prerequisite for expansion, remains a longstanding issue.  
Thus, the Greek banks’ troubles at home create fears of a credit crunch or a financial 
meltdown in the neighboring countries, which in turn could endanger the functioning 
of their economies. Concerns have been raised that, faced with solvency or funding 
shocks, Greek banks may withdraw from cross-border banking activities and transmit 
these shocks to the host countries. Hence, the financial integration of the SEE 
countries, predisposed them to growing external imbalances, which in turn created a 
systemic risk to their banking sectors. Empirical evidence documents a positive 
correlation between parent banks’ and foreign subsidiaries’ default risk during the 
global financial crisis (Anginer et al., 2014). 
In contrast to other areas, research in contagion is new in economics (Edwards, 2000), 
which justifies the lack of a generally accepted interpretation of contagion. World 
Bank (2009) broadly defines contagion
23
 as the cross-country transmission of shocks 
or the general cross-country spillover effects, and Constancio (2012) considers 
contagion to be one of the mechanisms by which financial instability becomes 
widespread and reaches systemic dimensions. Given that, the empirical studies on 
contagion that emphasize financial links are limited, especially in the context of this 
thesis. Most of these studies use balance sheet information to estimate bilateral credit 
                                                 
22
 Capacity for further centralised funding was limited, given that Greek banks had to be weaned off 
their reliance on the ECB and also rollover substantial wholesale funding debt in the following years. 
In the meantime, the wholesale sources dried up. 
 
23
 Typically, the literature uses contagion as a synonym for spillover effects (World Bank, 2009). 
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relationships for different banking systems (Allen and Carletti, 2009). For instance, 
Schnabl (2012) shows how the Russian crisis in 1998 spilled over to Peru as banks, 
including multinational bank subsidiaries, saw their foreign funding decline and had 
to reduce lending. In their analysis of the German banking sector, Upper and Worms 
(2004) show that the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 
15% of the banking sector in terms of assets. 
Moreover, IMF (2013a) suggests that foreign ownership can help transmit 
international shocks. In this respect, a number of studies have shown how an external 
shock suffered by the parent bank can lead to reduced lending by the host country 
affiliate (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000). Using surveys of firms in 16 CESEE 
countries in 2005 and 2008, Popov and Udell (2012) provide evidence that firms’ 
access to credit was affected by changes in the financial condition of their bank, if 
domestically-owned, or their bank’s parent, if foreign-owned. Notably, the authors 
find that, in the spring of 2008, firms were more credit constrained if their bank or 
bank’s parent experienced a decline in equity, or a decline in assets between 2005 and 
2008. 
The unfolding of the Greek sovereign debt crisis was manifested in the spread 
between the Greek and German long-term bond yields but also the deteriorating asset 
quality of the Greek banking system, as reflected in the Greek banks’ loan loss 
provisions. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) use the spread differential between the 
Greek and German government bond yields to show that the majority of EMU 
countries have experienced contagion from Greece in the recent sovereign-debt crisis. 
Melander et al. (2011) use sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads to measure 
contagion risks from Greece and Ireland to the rest of Europe. The authors claim that:  
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“For the Eastern European countries, it is interesting to note that contagion 
risks at the end of 2010 were higher for the countries where Greek banks had 
a strong presence (Romania and Bulgaria) than for other countries”(p.355). 
 
In the same train of thought, Acharya et al. (2014) find that the high interdependence 
of bank and sovereign health is an important contributor to the severe economic 
downturn in Southern European economies during the sovereign debt crisis through 
the bank lending channel. Borrowers depending on banks affected by the debt crisis 
are financially constrained during the crisis. Equally, a number of studies provide 
evidence of the spillover effect of credit risk, proxied by NPLs or loan loss provisions, 
across financial institutions, banking systems or countries (Herrerias and Moreno, 
2012; Allen et al., 2011). Hence, it is straightforward that Greek banks, prior to their 
restructuring and recapitalization (BOG, 2012), were a key conduit of crisis in the 
SEE countries where they had a vital presence. Financial and trade channels are the 
main avenues, mutually reinforcing spillovers between Western Europe
24
 and CESEE 
(IMF, 2013a). A tightening or intensification of the crisis in Greece is expected to 
travel eastwards, elevating vulnerabilities in countries where there are financial ties in 
place. Markedly, the banking systems of Bulgaria and Romania are closely integrated 
with the Greek system both in terms of ownership and financing. Although there may 
be other crisis transmission channels, such as the FDI links and trade flows, the most 
pertinent one has to do with the presence of Greek banks in the region. Furthermore, 
the banking linkages as a conduit for spillovers merit attention, given their role in the 
financial and macroeconomic stability of these countries.   
The next section concludes the chapter.  
                                                 
24
 In IMF’s (2012b) report, Western Europe comprises Greece and CESEE comprises both Bulgaria 
and Romania. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
The last decades have been eventful for the banking systems of Bulgaria and 
Romania. Both systems have seen an unprecedented as well as unsustainable lending 
growth, fuelled by foreign banks that benefited from easy access to the liquid 
wholesale markets, in the context of wide open opportunities for business 
development. The booming period ended abruptly with the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis and left a legacy of NPLs. Although relatively poor compared with 
other countries in the euro area, both Bulgaria and Romania had a relatively speedy 
process of EU accession. Both countries are looking to join the euro but in terms of 
quantitative metrics, Bulgaria is arguably the more converged.  
In the autumn of 2008, the SEE region became one of the flashpoints of the global 
financial crisis as it was among those regions most severely affected by the crisis. 
Although many countries in the SEE region registered a sharp decline in output, the 
economies of Bulgaria and Romania were the most distressed. Despite the shocks and 
prior imbalances in both countries, it was only Romania that required bailout funds.  
In both countries’ banking systems, the Greek banks command a significant share of 
assets, making the transmission of shocks stemming from Greece an immediate threat. 
Then, as historical experience and a number of empirical studies purport, crises 
involve contagion, and the banking linkages are among the most critical channels in 
transmitting crises. In this respect, the chapter has provided an overview of the 
Bulgarian and Romanian economies and banking systems and also introduced and 
rationalized a key hypothesis of the thesis that relates to the potential spillover effect 
arising from the Greek crisis. 
The next chapter provides the theoretical framework of the research.  
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Chapter 3: The theoretical framework 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the research problem, the 
determinants of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania. For most of the post-World War 
II era, the execution of monetary policy by central banks culminated in a period of 
low volatility between the mid-1990s and 2007, known as the Great Moderation. 
However, while most economies were sailing on an ocean of calmness, a storm was 
brewing out in the credit market seas (Haldane, 2014). Low inflation and stable 
growth fostered complacency and risk-taking, and the Great Moderation turned 
abruptly to the Great Recession. The global financial crisis underlined the importance 
of financial stability and that of a well-functioning financial system in generating 
investment and innovation for a healthier and more prosperous society (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2012). Hence, the study of financial stability has become the cornerstone of 
macroeconomic policy, especially for developing countries. Against this background, 
the chapter builds upon two key research areas in economics: the drivers of credit risk 
which is closely related to the literature on the determinants of banking crises. Section 
3.1 provides the framework upon which the studies on credit risk have developed and 
Section 3.2 delineates the drivers of credit risk in the literature. In the light of this 
approach, Section 3.1.1 starts off the exploration of the research’s theoretical 
framework by looking at the role of financial intermediaries in developing economies 
with emphasis on the SEE region. Section 3.1.2 focuses on the banking crisis 
literature and Section 3.1.3 discusses the origins of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and the financial liberalization thesis. Building on the foundations of the first 
section of the chapter, Section 3.2 discusses the relationship between credit risk and 
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the business cycle and Section 3.3classifies the key factors affecting credit risks, as 
identified in the literature. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 The determinants of credit risk in the literature 
Before the financial crisis most central bankers focused on tempering the boom-bust 
cycle and keeping inflation low. However, monetary policy has been in a state of 
upheaval ever since. The financial chaos that followed the credit crunch in 2008 led to 
the most significant real-economy disaster of the post-World War II era. Central 
banks in many developed and developing economies faced a wave of recession, 
soaring unemployment and surging NPLs. A saga of unprecedented financial 
instability hit virtually every region of the globe. The literature that examines the 
endogenous relationship between macroeconomic indicators and the vulnerability of 
the financial sector has largely focused on analyzing the determinants of banking 
crises. Another strand of work has sought to analyze the relationship between 
macroeconomic or other variables (bank-specific, institutional) and indicators of 
financial instability over a sample of countries and period of time including, but not 
necessarily limited to, episodes of banking crises (Babihuga, 2007). Although the 
present research focuses on the latter category, both research strands are so closely 
related that one cannot disentangle their boundaries.  
Prior to embarking on the exploration of the contributions to the field, the essential 
definitions are given to frame the research context. A working definition of financial 
stability is critical in the process of developing analytical frameworks that can be used 
for examining any policy issues. In this case, a key policy objective is to avoid 
financial instability that sacrifices the private and social benefits of finance. Schinasi 
(2004) proposed a definition consistent with this broad view as follows: 
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“A financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of 
facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an economy, and of 
dissipating financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of 
significant adverse and unanticipated events” (p.8). 
 
Financial stability is broadly defined as a condition in which a financial system is 
capable of withstanding shocks, thereby reducing the likelihood of disruptions in the 
financial intermediation process that are severe enough to significantly impair the 
allocation of savings to productive investments. Ultimately the objective of financial 
stability is to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks, and absorb 
shocks (Schinasi, 2004). Hence, the financial system can be regarded as stable if it 
displays three key characteristics: 
- Efficient and smooth transferring of resources from savers to investors.  
- Reasonable and accurate assessment and management of financial risks.  
- Comfortable cushions to absorb financial and real economic shocks. 
If understood this way, the safeguarding of financial stability requires the 
identification of the main sources of vulnerability, such as inefficiencies in the 
allocation of financial resources and mismanagement of risks. Ideally, the monitoring 
of financial stability should be forward looking as inefficiencies in the allocation of 
capital or shortcomings in the management of risk can compromise future financial 
stability and therefore economic stability (ECB, 2005). Following a narrower, yet 
more practical view, Buiter (2008) defines financial stability as the absence of 
bubbles, the absence of illiquidity in financial institutions and markets, and the 
absence of insolvency of financial institutions. Hence, the value of financial stability 
is best illustrated by its absence. In a recent contribution, Arestis and Sawyer (2012) 
point out that financial stability has not been at the forefront of monetary 
policymakers. The authors suggest that: 
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“The focus of financial stability should be on proper control of the financial 
sector so that it becomes socially and economically useful to the economy as a 
whole and to the productive economy in particular. Banks should serve the 
needs of their customers rather than provide short-term gains for shareholders 
and huge profits for themselves”(p.6). 
 
In Buiter’s (2008) view, many central banks were to a varying degree ill-prepared for 
the global financial crisis as “central banking practice failed to keep up with key 
developments in the financial systems of advanced market economies” (p.495). IMF 
(2010c) attributes this practice of central banks to the widespread belief in the 
efficiency of markets that prevented a realistic approach to financial stability.
25
As a 
result, bank systemic risk was ignored and financial regulation and supervision “were 
increasingly light-touch and reliant on self-correcting market forces” (IMF, 2010c). 
The increased incidence of banking crises has triggered an active research agenda, not 
only on the underlying causes of crises, but also on their impact on the real economy. 
It is beyond any doubt that banking crises come at a painful social and economic cost. 
However, that is outside the scope of this research which focuses on the stability of 
the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems. In view of the vital role of financial 
intermediation in developing economies, the following section provides a brief survey 
of the related literature. The aim is to highlight the complementarities and tradeoffs 
between financial stability and economic development that need to be considered in 
the research process. 
3.1.1 The role of financial intermediation in developing economies 
Finance is critical to the functioning of the economy and the role of banks has always 
been central in the SEE developing economies. How well the financial system 
                                                 
25
 It is noteworthy that IMF published the first issue of the Global Stability Report not earlier than 2002 
in an effort to deepen the understanding of international capital flows and to strengthen the surveillance 
of developments in financial markets. The idea was to highlight issues of financial imbalances that 
could pose a risk to financial market stability and sustained market access by emerging market 
borrowers. 
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operates determines how the real economy functions, as was clearly manifested by the 
global financial crisis that plunged the SEE region into recession. In view of that, the 
repetitive nature of crises episodes forces a reassessment of the developmental role of 
the financial sector and its linkages with the real economy.  
Banks have been present since the earliest instances of pre-capitalist societies. Their 
intermediation role is so pervasive and ingrained in the functioning of economies that 
one almost wonders about the need to discuss their importance for the real economy 
(Miller, 1998; Demetriades and Andrianova, 2003; Cetorelli, 2009). However, the 
debate on the determinants of the process of economic growth through finance has 
been alive and kicking for more than a hundred years. The preponderance of evidence 
demonstrates that financial intermediaries matter for growth. However, economists 
disagree sharply about the role of the financial sector on economic growth (Levine, 
2005). Lin (1981) prophetically suggests that the direction of causality between 
finance and growth “will probably never be settled on either theoretical or empirical 
grounds” (p.44). Many authors suggest that financial intermediaries and markets drive 
the relationship, while their role has been readily dismissed by others (Robinson, 
1952; Lucas, 1988). Yet, there are authors (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; 
Demetriades and Andrianova, 2003; Arestis, 2006; Arestis and Sawyer, 2005; 
Haldane et al., 2010) who remain sceptical not only on the direction of causality, but 
also on a number of issues that need to be co-estimated, such as the case of financial 
liberalization, the role of the supervisory-regulatory framework as well as country-
specific features. 
At the core of the argument lies the question whether finance is a cause of growth or 
just a symptom. This question matters because if finance causes growth, then a 
country that wants to grow fast in a sustainable mode should reform and stabilize its 
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financial system, whereas if finance is just a symptom, then financial reform will 
probably provide the trappings of growth without giving the required growth (Aghion 
and Howitt, 2009). On the theoretical front, pioneering authors that point out the 
importance of the relationship between finance and growth include Bagehot (1873) 
and Schumpeter (1911). Bagehot (1873) emphasized the critical importance of the 
banking system in economic growth and highlighted the conditions under which 
banks could spur on innovation and growth by funding productive investments. In 
Schumpeter’s (1911) work the argument put forward was that financial services are 
paramount in promoting economic growth. The notable early works on finance and 
development along Schumpeterian lines include Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith 
(1969) and Hicks (1969). These authors argue that the development of a financial 
system is crucially important in stimulating economic growth; under-developed 
financial systems can retard economic growth. Broadly, the message of such studies is 
that the economic magnitude of increasing the overall scale of the banking industry is 
potentially very significant. The implication of this view points to the formulation of 
policies that aim to stabilize financial systems in fostering growth. Later, in surveying 
the status of knowledge in the finance-growth nexus, Levine (2005) concludes that:  
“While subject to ample qualifications and countervailing views, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that both financial intermediaries and 
markets matter for growth and that reverse causality alone is not driving this 
relationship”(p.866). 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that economists have not reached a consensus regarding the 
direction of causality between finance and growth, nor do they provide a solution to 
the issue of endogeneity between the variables used in their analyses. Furthermore, 
the empirical results vary considerably due to the different institutional and structural 
characteristics of each economy. Sceptics in the underlying debate have always 
maintained that while the empirical evidence clearly indicates a correlation between 
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finance and real economic activity, it cannot fully address the fundamental issue at 
stake, namely whether banking activity is exogenously determined and if it is, 
whether it exerts an independent impulse on real economic sectors (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997; Calomiris and Haber, 2014). In the light of this, the findings 
obtained from cross-country studies are at best fragile
26
 and ambiguous. This is 
because the relationship between the financial sector and the economy is largely 
determined by the nature and operation of the financial institutions and policies 
pursued in each country (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). Therefore, without an in-
depth understanding of the financial historical context and the macroeconomic 
environment of each individual country, the cross-country evidence yields little policy 
guidance. Equally, a lack of high quality data with a sufficient degree of 
comparability across countries is a fundamental hindrance to the applicability of the 
findings of broad comparative studies. Such analyses conducted at aggregate level 
may be unable to capture and account for the complexity of the financial 
environments and histories of each individual country (Ang, 2008).  
Arestis and Demetriades (1997) provide several accounts for the variation in causality 
results from country to country. Firstly, different financial systems may have different 
institutional structures and certain institutional structures may be more conducive to 
economic growth. Secondly, financial sector policies play an important role in 
determining whether financial development fosters economic growth. Thirdly, two 
countries with identical financial systems and policies may still differ due to the 
effectiveness of those institutions that design and implement policy making. Hence, 
apart from the distinction between bank-based and capital markets-based financial 
systems, the country-specific features are expected to influence the direction of the 
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 The results are subject to the sample countries included in the estimation, the control variables used, 
the time period covered and the econometric techniques employed.  
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relationship. The latter highlights the limitations of cross-country studies for treating 
different economies as a homogeneous entity (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; 
Arestis and Demetriades, 1999). This idea is developed further in Demetriades and 
Andrianova (2003), who argue that varying causal patterns may reflect differences in 
the quality of finance, which are, in turn, determined by the quality of financial 
regulation and the rule of law. In view of the limitations in cross-country studies, a 
number of researchers have put forward arguments for the use of time series country-
specific studies (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Edwards, 1996; Neusser and 
Kugler, 1998; Ericsson et al., 2001; Kenny and Williams, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 2005; 
Ang, 2008). 
Even though there is ample cross-country evidence pointing to the positive effect of 
financial development on growth, it becomes evident that there are significant 
discrepancies not only between developing and developed countries (Ahmed, 1998) 
but also within developing countries due to structural or institutional issues. The latter 
provides room for reviewing some indicative studies on the SEE region.A common 
measure frequently found in empirical studies that approximates financial 
development is the ratio of bank credit to GDP. Figure 7 displays the domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP
27
 in the euro area against the 
focal countries of the thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 The metric used is just for comparative purposes as it is well known that different measures of 
financial development can give rise to different conclusions in empirical studies (Stengos and Liang, 
2005; Ang, 2008). Thus, the usual disclaimer applies in describing Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. 
 
As Figure 7 illustrates, the level of financial intermediation in Bulgaria and Romania 
remained well below the Euro area average even at the peak of the pre-crisis credit 
boom. Several empirical studies suggest that the level of credit was below equilibrium 
in the pre-crisis period. In retrospect, it seems that the speed at which the equilibrium 
level of credit is reached matters for macroeconomic stability (Becker et al., 2010). 
Despite the trend of globalization, the importance of banks in SEE economies remains 
critical, given that their financial systems are bank-dominated. Since the collapse of 
the Russian Empire, the financial sectors of SEE have undergone major structural 
reforms. The financial architecture in these economies converged towards bank-based 
systems with the notable participation of foreign banks through privatizations.  
Although the empirical research on the finance-growth nexus has burgeoned in recent 
years, the evidence on the emerging SEE economies remains scarce. Among the 
limited related evidence, Fink et al. (2009) conclude that domestic, not private credit 
has a pronounced impact on growth for nine EU accession countries during the period 
1996-2000. Using data for the period 1995-2005, Hagmayr and Haiss (2007) 
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investigate the finance-growth nexus in four SEE countries.
28
 The authors conclude 
that financial intermediation, measured by private credit, has a negative effect on 
growth in the short-run which becomes positive, albeit insignificant, with the use of 
lags. Hence, the results provide support to the view that the widely accepted aggregate 
effect of finance on growth varies with the level of economic development. On the 
same wavelength, Yildirim et al.’s (2013) study concludes that the direction of 
causality in the growth-finance nexus exhibits considerable differences among 
emerging European economies and depends largely on the chosen indicators. 
Therefore, the effect of country-specific features needs to be hardwired in the 
equation (Arestis and Demetriades, 1999; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2005; Ang, 2008). 
On the other hand, Caporale et al.’s (2009) study that in essence extends the Hagmayr 
and Haiss (2007) timeline by a few years, on ten previously centrally planned 
economies of CEE, finds no causal linkages between credit and economic growth. 
Caporale et al. (2009) attribute their finding to the lack of financial depth in the 
sample countries that in turn limits the contribution of the ‘under-developed’ banking 
systems to growth. Recent research suggests that financial deepening can indeed be 
growth-positive but within limits. As Berkes et al. (2012) argue, there is a certain 
threshold at which the private credit-to-GDP ratio may begin to have a negative 
impact on GDP growth.
29
 This finding is consistent with earlier cross-country 
evidence suggesting that, at credit-to-GDP ratios above unity, output volatility tends 
to increase (Easterly et al., 2000). In a recent study of 150 countries for the period 
1975-2005, Barajas et al. (2013) confirm the contributions of Demetriades and 
                                                 
28
 The sample of  Hagmayr et al. (2007) includes Bulgaria and Romania and uses Greece as a reference 
point. 
 
29
 The authors find a non-linear growth impact of banking depth that progressively becomes weaker as 
the depth increases to high levels. Eventually, when the private sector credit exceeds 110% of GDP, the 
marginal effect of additional deepening on the economy becomes negative.   
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Hussein (1996) and Arestis and Demetriades (1999) by claiming that the beneficial 
effect of financial deepening on economic growth, in fact displays heterogeneity 
across regions and income levels and is driven by regulatory-supervisory 
characteristics.   
The aim of this section was to assess the state of knowledge on the developmental 
impact of finance focusing on the SEE region in order to ground the research problem 
and facilitate the subsequent empirical research. However, a complete coverage of this 
well-researched area is beyond the scope of the thesis. Nevertheless and despite the 
absence of unanimity of results, four tentative observations emerge that advance the 
research frontier: 
a. Financial intermediaries matter for growth; banks are important for the real 
economy and vice versa. Banks ease information and transaction costs and 
thereby improve resource mobilization and risk management. 
b. The second observation is that regulatory, monetary and macroeconomic 
policies, political, legal, even historical and geographical factors all influence 
a country’s financial sector (Arestis et al., 2004; Barajas et al., 2013). The 
results between studies and methodologies vary, given the different structural 
characteristics of each economy.  
c. The selection of variables to indicate the level of financial services produced 
in an economy and measuring the extent or efficiency of financial 
intermediation is a key issue in empirical studies that is more pronounced in 
developing economies (Demetriades and Andrianova, 2003; Ang, 2008). 
d. Although each of the different methodologies used in the literature has its 
shortcomings, country-specific time series studies appear superior to cross-
country panel studies when it comes to relating findings to policy implications.  
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Finance has a vital and statistically strong relationship with the economy; it can be an 
important enabler of economic development. Nevertheless, in order to investigate the 
role of finance and its interactions with the economy, one needs to take frictions into 
account (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Once frictions are considered, for instance 
country-specific factors, institutional framework, structure, governance, ownership 
and dynamics of a financial system, these enable a clearer view of the mechanisms in 
place. Clearly, banks provide an essential service to the economy that, under certain 
conditions, can work effectively but is subject to risk if some economic events trigger 
instability. Broadly, the evidence suggests that the economic damage from an unstable 
banking sector can be devastating, leaving little room for manoeuvre.  
Taking the inherent financial instability as given in modern economies, the next 
section explores the factors that propagate banking crises, putting emphasis on their 
ties with macro-economy and institutional settings.  
3.1.2 The determinants of banking crises in developing countries 
“Apparently as the system matures the likelihood of instability increases” 
 
Minsky (1986) 
 
The history of financial markets has not been a stable one. On the contrary, financial 
history is a roller-coaster ride of ups and downs, bubbles and busts, manias and 
panics, shocks and crashes (Neal, 2000). There have been numerous times when 
banks’ ability to serve their intermediation role was curtailed and banks actually 
elevated the risk level in the financial system. 
A critical step prior to reviewing the literature on the triggers of crises episodes is 
defining banking crises. Laeven and Valencia (2008) set forth that in a systemic 
banking crisis, a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number 
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of defaults, and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying 
contracts on time. As a result, NPLs increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate 
banking system capital is exhausted. Following Calomiris and Gorton (1991), banking 
crises consist either of panics or severe waves of bank failures. A panic is defined as a 
situation of temporary confusion about the unobservable incidence across the banking 
system of observable aggregate shocks that are severe enough to give rise to collective 
action by bankers. Severe waves of bank failures are defined as those resulting in the 
aggregate negative net worth of failed banks in excess of 1% of GDP (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996). Calomiris and Gorton (1991) document three types of bank 
insolvency. Those limited to a single or a small sample of banks, which clearly are not 
systemic, overt banking system runs and a more silent form of financial distress. 
Therefore a banking crisis is a situation in which actual or potential bank failures 
induce banks to suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or a situation that 
compels the government to intervene by extending assistance on a large scale (IMF, 
1998). In this respect a banking crisis can become as extensive as to assume systemic 
proportions. Under this definition, the banking crises are viewed as a subset within the 
broader set of phenomena known as financial crises
30
 (Calomiris, 2009). Banking 
crises tend to occur around the time of cyclical downturns; they are closely associated 
with prior rises in the liabilities of businesses and declines in asset prices. The waves 
of bank failures are traceable to large declines in banks’ loan portfolios and a surge in 
NPLs. Banking distress manifested in significant loan losses, typically poses 
substantial costs for the economy because of the contraction of loan and money 
supply. 
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 Typically, financial crises that include asset price bubbles, exchange rate collapses, and a host of 
other phenomena, as well as banking crises, appear to be a common feature of the economic cycle.  
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Just as a stable and efficient banking system is expected to promote growth, a weak 
system grappling with NPLs or insufficient capital, or firms and households whose 
creditworthiness has eroded, may induce a prolonged recession. Changes in financial 
conditions can also play a prominent role in the contraction and recovery phases of 
the business cycle (Bernanke et al., 1999).  
In recent years there has been a profusion of banking crises in both industrial and 
developing countries. But crises are neither new nor unique phenomena; history is 
replete with crises and many of the same forces have often been at work in different 
crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Allen 
and Gale, 1999; Duttagupta and Cashin, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). While 
each banking crisis has unique features, crises have a common root cause (Gorton, 
2012). The antecedents of banking crises both in developed countries and emerging 
markets have a surprising amount in common.
31
 Periods of high international capital 
mobility observed in emerging economies have repeatedly produced banking crises. 
When foreign capital comes to a sudden stop, economic activity goes into a tailspin 
(Calvo et al., 2006). Hence, lessons from past crises are insightful as there are 
similarities across crises episodes, even when the exact triggers and timing may vary 
(Claessens et al., 2013). 
Banking crises have been dated by researchers on the basis of a combination of 
events. The literature is, however, less clear on whether or not the banking sector is 
the main trigger of the economic slowdown, as it is difficult to separate cause and 
effect in the relationship between the financial sector and the real economy 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2005). The 
findings have re-ignited an interest both in academics and policy makers to assess, 
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 There are broadly similar patterns in housing and equity prices, unemployment, public revenues and 
debt. Other macroeconomic time series, such as income, consumption, government spending and 
interest rates, exhibit higher volatility in emerging markets. 
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from a theoretical point of view, the extent to which the macroeconomy and the 
soundness of banking systems depend on each other another (Benink and Benston, 
2005; ECB, 2006; Goodhart et al., 2006). Many authors argue that deteriorating 
market fundamentals lie at the core of banking crises (Gorton, 1988; Mishkin, 1996; 
Llewellyn, 2002). Gavin and Hausmann (1996) suggest that interest rates, anticipated 
inflation, credit growth and the monetary and exchange rate regime constrain 
borrowers’ loan servicing capacity. Although the authors do not imply that banking 
crises are always a macroeconomic phenomenon, they use the following analogy: 
“When macroeconomic forces place great strain on the banking system, the 
weakest banks are the ones most likely to fail, but it is the macroeconomic 
tension, as much as the weakness of individual banks, that causes the 
failures”(p. 27). 
 
On the same wavelength, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find that both macroeconomic 
and microeconomic factors triggered bank crises, as a macroeconomic shock has the 
potential to render banks’ net worth negative. For instance, a volatile fiscal policy can 
be an important shock to a banking sector. Llewellyn’s (2002) study of banking crises 
attests that an unstable economy reveals existing weaknesses within the respective 
banking system. Similarly to Llewellyn (2002), Cull and Martínez Pería (2007) 
provide evidence that banking crises in emerging markets have macroeconomic roots 
occurring in countries troubled by fiscal situations. In line with Gavin and Hausmann 
(1996), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) suggest that inflation and the real 
interest rates are positively associated with a banking crisis, while the economic 
growth appears to have an inverse relationship. Similarly, Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu 
(1998) find that the likelihood of banking distress increases with the declining 
economic growth. Further, credit expansion to the private sector, associated with 
rising consumption and real interest rates, typically precedes banking crises. 
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It appears that crises are endemic to financial systems, inherent to the business cycle 
(Minsky, 1977) and not random events (Calomiris, 2009) that occur in waves 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) were prominent 
advocates of the view that banking crises are part of the business cycle, and result 
from the propensity of market participants for irrational and myopic behaviour 
(Calomiris, 2009; Haldane, 2009). Minsky (1982b) suggests that financial instability 
which fuels the boom is the prelude to financial crisis. Hence, a key element in the 
escalation of individual financial distress to systemic risk is the onset of financial 
problems in banks. As Silipo (2011) points out, the risk appetite of financial 
intermediaries shapes the business cycle more than monetary policy. A perceived low 
credit risk environment induces banks to fuel more and more credit to the economy 
while at the same time the lending criteria are relaxed.  
The rich history of banking crises traces unusual bank fragility to risk-inviting rules of 
banking, usually supported by a number of factors. The database of Laeven and 
Valencia (2008, 2012) identifies 147 systemic banking crises over the period 1970 to 
2011, episodes in which bad debts soared across the economy and much of the 
banking sector was insolvent. Most of those episodes occurred in the developing 
world. All involved deep recessions, required massive government intervention to 
clean up bust banks, and led to substantial increases in public debt as economies 
shrank while government spending soared. Narrowing down to the focal countries of 
the research, Table 10 lists the systemic banking crises, currency crises, and sovereign 
debt crises of Bulgaria and Romania, along with the timing of those episodes. 
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Table 10 Timing of financial crises in Bulgaria and Romania (1980-2000) 
Country 
Systemic 
Banking Crisis 
Currency crisis 
Debt Crisis 
(default year) 
Debt 
restructuring 
Bulgaria 1996 1996 1990 1994 
Romania 1990 1996 1982 1987 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
 
Both focal countries experienced a variety of crises, albeit at different periods and in a 
different order. Notably, the banking crises in the SEE were accompanied or preceded 
by a steep rise in NPLs (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Bonin et al., 2009). Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003) record that in 1995 Bulgaria faced a systemic run and about 75% of 
bank loans were substandard. In Romania, the same authors indicate that in 1990, 
NPLs reached 25-30% in the six main state-owned banks. Several decades earlier, in 
1931, Bernanke and James (1990) cited in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document that 
German-controlled banks in Romania as well as other banks collapsed as there were 
heavy runs on banks. As in many earlier crises, the rapid expansion of credit played a 
key role in the run-up to the most recent crisis in SEE (Claessens et al., 2013). Credit 
aggregates grew fast, fuelling real estate booms in both Bulgaria and Romania. Hence, 
the problems associated with banking crises in developing countries are deep-rooted, 
and usually such episodes emerge from a property bubble and a credit boom. It is also 
well-documented in the literature that credit booms are often associated with 
deterioration in lending standards. In this setup, debt servicing becomes vulnerable to 
economic downturns and changes in credit or monetary conditions. The latter 
maximizes default correlations across loans and systemic exposure to macroeconomic 
shocks, generating loan books highly exposed to declines in house prices, confirmed 
ex-post through the large fraction of NPLs, especially in both focal countries 
(Claessens et al., 2013). 
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Many banking crises in developing countries seem endemic, displaying a recurrent 
pattern of distress with an interaction between banks’ insolvency and illiquidity. But 
the more interesting cases are those that involve endogenous macroeconomic 
disturbances, a boom-bust cycle, where banks, riding on a wave of optimism, 
overlend to risky projects which have poor prospects (Honohan, 1997; Minsky, 
1982a). The costly adjustments that economies undergo in the event of crises have 
stimulated an interest in studies designed to identify indicators that can serve as an 
early warning of banking crises (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Kaminsky, 1999; Vlaar, 2000). A commonly used approach is to construct an 
early warning system (EWS) by identifying a set of variables such as country 
fundamentals, developments in global economy and financial markets, whose 
behaviour prior to episodes of banking crises is systematically different from that 
during ‘tranquil’ periods. By closely monitoring these variables, it may be possible to 
detect patterns similar to those that in the past have preceded crises. Thus, the 
challenge of the endeavour lies in identifying these critical variables that need to be 
monitored.  
In a seminal paper, Kaminsky et al. (1998) find that the real exchange rate, the 
occurrence of a banking crisis, the growth rates of exports, the stock prices, the money 
supply and the domestic credit to GDP ratio are among the variables with explanatory 
power during 1970-1995 in a sample of 15 developing economies. Aligned with the 
research findings in the growth-finance studies, country-specific threshold levels for 
the economic variables should be established to account for heterogeneity. In an 
extensive study, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that most banking crises include 
multiple indicators, while excessive credit growth, recessions, and the burst of asset 
price bubbles tend to precede banking crises. In addition, the authors use a list of 
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indicators that are associated with financial liberalization such as the money supply 
(M2), the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, real interest-rate differentials, bank 
deposits, the terms of trade, reserves, output, and stock prices. In a study that uses 
balance sheet indicators of individual banks, Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) provides 
evidence that loan quality and equity deteriorate rapidly before a bank fails. However, 
the lack of consistent cross-country results and the scarcity or lack of timeliness of 
data on these variables in emerging markets make the individual bank failure quite 
difficult to predict (IMF, 2002).In an assessment of the EWS, Sahajwala and Van den 
Bergh (2000) indicate that aggregate data may conceal problems within individual 
banking institutions. Furthermore, the authors’ survey reveals that leading indicators 
of bank problems are the asset quality indicators. Solvency, liquidity, or profitability 
indicators also constitute either concurrent or lagging indicators of bank distress. But 
the first signs of bank problems are often detected in asset quality – credit risk 
indicators.  
Banking crises are more difficult to identify empirically compared to other types of 
crises because of the nature of the problem and partly because of data non-
availability. Unlike currency crises,
32
 the lack of high-frequency and quality data that 
could be used to mark the onset of banking distress in a consistent manner makes the 
construction of leading indicators more difficult. The previous argument highlights 
the difficulty in identifying a set of indicators that could detect future banking crises 
in a timely manner and with a reasonable degree of certainty (Berg et al., 2004). The 
authors propose a thorough country-specific assessment
33
 that relies on all available 
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 In currency crises the availability of high-frequency data such as interest rates and exchange rate 
movements make the dating of crises relatively straightforward. 
 
33
 These could derive from the analysis of country experts who utilize a broad set of quantitative and 
qualitative factors, ranging from macroeconomic variables to the strength of the banking system and 
the political stability. 
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qualitative and quantitative information. Table A1 in Appendix A provides a synoptic 
overview of the financial - banking crises indicators found in the literature.
34
 
There are various characteristics found in a banking crisis, which include periods of 
high international capital mobility, periods of surges in capital inflows, lending boom 
and rising real housing prices, and a preceding expansion in the number of financial 
intermediaries on a country level (World Bank, 2010). Yet, some indicators have a 
recurring and persistent pattern behind most banking crises, as is well-documented in 
the studies shown in Table A1. For instance, the property-asset boom along with a 
credit spree are among the most common and significant predictors in the long 
chronicle of banking crises (Minsky, 1982a; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Gourinchas 
and Obstfeld, 2011). Interestingly, these indicators remain robust, irrespective of 
whether a country is in an emerging or advanced stage (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2011). Banking crises share several common determinants 
with other financial crises; for instance, sovereign debt or currency crises and many 
times a banking crisis are closely intertwined with other types of crises, as was the 
case in the past crises in the SEE region. Banking crises are intimately linked to 
borrowers’ financial distress, and tools need to be developed to explain in a 
systematic and consistent way credit risk that could be used complementarily to the 
EWS framework.  
So far, the theoretical framework of the research has considered the developmental 
role of finance in economic growth and the banking crises literature by focusing on 
the SEE developing countries. Although these strands of the literature do not attempt 
to explain banks’ risk taking, they highlight a wide array of issues and variables that 
need to be accounted for in the estimation of credit risk. Moving forward, the next 
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 Table A1 provides an indicative account of some of the milestones of the crisis-related literature. The 
aim is to identify the key variables and the findings, along with ensuring that previous work is 
recognized without claiming to be extensive.  
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section discusses the triggers of the Great Recession focusing on the financial 
liberalization thesis. 
3.1.3 The origins of the Great Recession and the financial liberalization thesis 
The recent turmoil of 2007 that put the global financial system under enormous stress 
has re-ignited the debate on crises’ driving forces. A key lesson of the global financial 
crisis was, clearly, to re-emphasize the significance of financial stability. International 
evidence documents that several common elements and recurring patterns are at the 
heart of international crises episodes and this section sets out to identify the culprits in 
the occurrence of the global financial crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). For instance, 
Åslund (2010) claims that the crisis experienced in the SEE region is a repetition of 
the East Asian crisis of 1997.  
The global financial crisis hit the financial markets and the real economy of Europe 
severely, substantiating the evidence that the relationship between finance and growth 
is complex and not necessarily stable over time (Grochowska et al., 2014). Although 
financial markets are crucial for the functioning of the real economy, the exact 
contribution to growth is uncertain and varies over the cycle. Engaging in a 
comparative analysis of almost all post-war banking crises, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) convey a simple message: “We’ve been here before since the development of 
money and financial markets”. Each new crisis bears remarkable similarities to past 
events. Excessive debt accumulation, whether by governments, banks, corporations or 
consumers, often poses increased credit risk that serves as a prelude to greater 
systemic risks. Even though the search for reliable crisis predictors may seem a 
hopeless task, it is worthwhile exploring which are the variables systematically 
associated with vulnerability in the more recent financial crisis. 
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) investigate the early warning indicators for both banking 
and currency crises. Among the meaningful banking crisis indicators, the authors 
discern the real exchange rates, the real housing prices, short-term capital inflows to 
GDP, and the stock prices. Rose and Spiegel (2009) model the causes of the global 
financial crisis along with its manifestations in a sample of 107 countries. Although a 
number of possible causes have been used, the authors were unable to link most of the 
commonly cited crises’ causes to their incidence across countries. In a study that 
covers around 160 economies, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) find that the severity 
of the 2008-2009 global recession is systematically related to pre-crisis 
macroeconomic and financial factors. The authors document that increases in the ratio 
of private credit to GDP, current account deficits, and openness to trade are helpful in 
understanding the intensity of the global financial crisis. The latter explains why the 
SEE region was among the most severely hit regions at an international level. 
Drehmann and Juselius (2013) analyse a wide range of potential indicators covering 
macroeconomic variables, market indicators and banking sector conditions. In line 
with the theoretical proposition of Minsky (1982a), the authors provide evidence that 
the measures of excessive credit and asset prices booms perform well as early warning 
indicators. On the other hand the signalling quality of real GDP in banking crises is 
poor. 
Besides the scepticism that rises on the accuracy of EWSs, the findings of Rose and 
Spiegel (2009) suggest that the causes of crises differ among countries, making it 
difficult to establish a common statistical tool to predict them. It follows then, that any 
analysis of banking sectors in individual countries, or any comparison of financial 
institutions across a range of different countries, needs to account for the various 
exogenous factors specific to those sectors and countries (Drake et al., 2006). And 
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this is the case with the SEE region, where many external factors appear to affect each 
country’s economy and banking system as highlighted in Chapter 2. Thus any 
modelling attempt should incorporate the potential impact of economic, regulatory, 
and geopolitical factors in the region and in each country separately. 
Increasingly, financial liberalization is mentioned as a cause of bank insolvency and 
in many cases a variety of regulatory and bank-specific management factors creep in 
behind banks’ distress (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). In an analysis on the 
determinants of banking crises in 53 countries during 1980-1995, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) find that financial liberalization yields a large and significant 
positive effect on banking crises, even after controlling for other possible 
determinants of banking crises. In the wake of the Mexican and Asian twin crises, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) also find that financial liberalization and increased 
access to international capital markets play a key role in explaining crises. The 
authors examine the empirical regularities and sources of 76 currency crises and 26 
banking crises and point out that both types of crises are closely linked with financial 
liberalization that in turn triggers lending booms. Stiglitz’s (2000) insight into a 
number of crises such as the Asian one in 1997-8 but also the Russian and the Latin 
American crises, suggests that premature financial liberalization was at the heart of 
these crises. Such linkages can be found in many empirical models (Allen and Gale, 
1999; Morris and Shin, 1999; Shin, 2005) in which it is argued that financial 
liberalization has led to asset price bubbles in numerous countries around the world, 
and the banking crises are the end result of the burst of the asset bubbles.  
It follows that a main factor of the Great Recession is the financial liberalization that 
took place with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and emerged hand in hand with 
light-touch regulation worldwide. 
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Undoubtedly, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 that was triggered by the US housing 
market, spread internationally and developed into the deepest recession since the 
Great Depression. Claessens et al.’s (2013) contribution suggests that the recent 
financial crisis shared at least four major features with earlier episodes: increases in 
asset prices, credit booms, a dramatic expansion in marginal loans, and regulation – 
supervision that failed to keep up with the developments. Arestis and Karakitsos 
(2014) state that three main factors, namely the distributional effects, the financial 
liberalization and financial innovation, along with the contribution of the international 
imbalances, the impact of the monetary policy and the role of the credit rating 
agencies, accentuated the process that led to the paralysis of the global financial 
system in 2007. Hence, it seems that risk spread in normal times transforms to risk 
concentration in crisis times (Berg, 2011).  
In Arestis and Sawyer (2005), the financial liberalization thesis, can be summarized as 
amounting to freeing financial markets from any intervention and letting the market 
determine the allocation of credit. Other economists refer to financial liberalization as 
the transition process away from a financial system characterized by state intervention 
and ownership, towards a more market-oriented one. This phase is commonly 
associated with the expansion of liquidity in high-income countries and the 
consequent fall in the pricing of risk that dramatically changes developing-country 
finance (IMF, 2010c). This liquidity over-supply facilitates an easy access to finance 
that leads to excessive consumption, unproductive investments, and the formation of 
asset price bubbles in many developing countries, especially those in the SEE region. 
Yet, financial liberalization needs to be viewed in discrete historical phases that differ 
by region, country and level of development. What is common ground though, is that 
financial liberalization involves the lifting of State controls on the flow of finance 
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between the country in question and international financial markets. Usually, a 
simultaneous stage involves the relaxing of banking regulation and the removal of 
restrictions on business practices including allowing for stiff competition among 
foreign banks operating within a country’s financial system. Then, an over-supply of 
credit, foreign in origin in the case of SEE, becomes a source of vulnerability that 
exceeds the absorptive capacity of the economic units and reinforces a vicious circle 
from financial instability to economic recession and vice versa. Hence, financial 
liberalization as a key euphoria-inducing factor has actually been at the root of many 
cases of financial fragility and crises. It is the chief factor that “intensifies the threat 
by adding further major stresses to the financial infrastructure” (Arestis and 
Glickman, 2002). So the focus seems to be on systemic bank stability, as it is argued 
that liberalization is accompanied by insufficient prudential supervision of the 
banking sector which results in excessive risk-taking (Noy, 2004). In the light of this, 
there is a compelling case for strengthening banking regulation and supervision to 
“allow countries to sail smoothly through the perilous waters of financial 
liberalization” (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Mason (2009) posits that financial 
innovation creates conditions of asymmetric information that can lead to banking 
crises.  
“When the incentive of bankers to do their homework on borrowers is 
removed, institutions make many poor choices in lending”  
 
The credit boom that led to the housing bubble was the result of the excessive 
liquidity that was created and passed through the channel of ‘financial liberalization’. 
In this setup, the worst affected developing countries by the burst of the credit bubble 
worldwide, essentially ‘pay the price’ of encouraging financial liberalization policies 
in a speedy, not a gradual process, without safeguarding the behaviour of the banks. 
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These conditions were conducive to excessive risk-taking by the banks, a form of 
moral hazard that also resulted in a loss in transparency (Gorton, 2008). The onset of 
the global financial crisis has been described by many authors as a Minskian moment: 
the euphoria of the credit and house price bubbles in the US and many other places, 
turned into panic, resulting in a major recession. Against this background, asymmetric 
information, resulting in adverse selection and moral hazard, explains the freezing of 
credit once the crisis has been set in motion (Ali and Daly, 2010). The global financial 
crisis that left the edifice of the global financial system  in a state of coma, contributed 
to an intensive debate on how better financial regulation frameworks should be 
designed. It emerges that financial liberalization has a dual effect as a trade-off 
mechanism between economic development and crises episodes. On the one hand 
financial liberalization, if properly managed, can lead to financial deepening and 
higher growth. On the other hand, it can lead to disastrous crises episodes.  
Building on the foundations conveyed in the first part of this chapter, the next section 
traces the determinants of credit risk in the literature. Section 3.2 discusses the 
relationship between credit risk and the business cycle and Section 3.3 surfaces the 
key factors identified in the literature, hence enables formulating the research 
hypotheses.  
3.2 The relationship between credit risk and the business cycle 
The literature on banking crises reveals that NPLs acted as a catalyst in inducing such 
episodes. Most banking problems in recent years have not originated on the liability 
side of balance sheets. The subprime turmoil as well as past banking crises has 
demonstrated that the roots of financial problems remain the same and that banking 
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crises generally stem from the asset side of banks’ balance sheets,35 usually from a 
protracted deterioration in asset quality (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). In 33 banking crises from 1977 to 2002 studied by Hoggarth et al. 
(2003), NPLs ranged between 17% and 33% of total loans. Similarly, in Japan’s 
crisis, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) record that NPLs peaked at about 35% of total 
loans. Nakaso (2001) describes the banks’ behaviour leading up to Japan’s crisis, by 
suggesting that banks engaged in risky operations are driven by intense competition 
for market shares. It seems that the role of credit in the banking crisis literature is 
overwhelming; credit lies at the heart of crises as they are typically preceded by credit 
booms (Aikman et al., 2011). This is the well-known “lending booms often end in 
tears” as the prosperous times are usually bad times for learning. It becomes evident 
that a long record of banking crises supports that credit is among the predictors of 
crises and economic downturns (Loayza and Ranciere, 2005). 
The Great Moderation saw European banks expanding rapidly into emerging 
economies. Within these economies, the SEE countries were among those hardest hit 
by the global financial crisis that left banks’ balance sheets saddled with high NPLs 
(Berg, 2011). Although there are many different kinds of risk against which banks’ 
management and supervisory authorities need to guard, for most banks the key risk is 
credit risk, the risk of counterparty failure. Directly implicated in the global financial 
crisis, credit risk remains a critical field of top priority in banking (Gavalas and 
Syriopoulos, 2014). 
The literature on the determinants of credit risk and the interaction with the 
macroeconomic conditions is grounded in theoretical models as well as empirical 
regularities that deal with the business cycle with an explicit role for financial 
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 This needs to be considered in the light of the role of banks in maturity transformation. Banks 
transform short-term deposits into long-term loans. The latter makes banks uniquely vulnerable to bank 
runs or asset quality problems in the case of sudden liquidity stops. 
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intermediation. These theoretical business cycle models offer the background for 
modelling credit risk as they highlight the counter-cyclicality of bank risk and 
business defaults. In the spirit of these models, the financial accelerator theory as 
discussed in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) has become the most influential theoretical framework for modelling 
macro-financial linkages. 
Initially, Minsky (1964) theorized that financial fragility, which is related to the 
business cycle and to financial leverage, is a typical feature of any capitalist economy. 
As Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis suggests, when optimism is high and 
ample funds are available for investment, investors tend to migrate from the safe 
hedge end to the risky, speculative and Ponzi end. The potential for financial crises is 
generated endogenously by the interplay of real and financial factors and crises can be 
sparked by exogenous or endogenous shocks, such as the shifts in Keynesian ‘animal 
spirits’. One of the critical features of Minsky’s worldview is that borrowers, lenders, 
and regulators are lulled into complacency as asset prices rise (Yellen, 2010). 
Essentially, Minsky builds on Keynes (1936) who attempted to highlight the general 
theory’s basic ingredients and explain why output and employment are so liable to 
fluctuations. Broadly, Keynes’ (1936) general theory explains the capitalist process 
and the instability of the financial and real sector as a result of market behaviour in 
the face of uncertainty. Normally, the cycle is originated in real factors but money and 
credit play a significant role in the propagation of the cycle and are primarily 
responsible for speculative booms and crises. “Money enters into the economic 
scheme in an essential and peculiar manner” (Keynes, 1936, p.vii), as a “financing 
veil” (Minsky 1982a, p.61) interposed between the real asset and the wealth owner, 
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i.e. the banks
36
 (Mullineux, 2011). The Minskian path-breaking hypothesis suggests 
that economies with modern financial systems are built on commitments to pay cash 
today and in the future. Money today is exchanged for money in the future by loan 
contracts and commitments to pay. Hence, cash in the future is exchanged for cash 
today. The viability of such relations rests upon cash flows received as a result of 
income-generating activities. Minsky focuses particularly on business debt, which is 
an essential characteristic of capitalist economies. To service debt, firms must 
generate sufficient reserves to meet payments due or to refinance. Therefore, an 
economy with an ever-increasing private debt becomes vulnerable to changes in the 
pace of investment, which is an important determinant of both aggregate demand and 
the viability of debt structures (Minsky, 1982a, 1986; Mullineux, 2011). In Minsky’s 
view, in an economy in which debt finance prevails, instability follows from the 
expectations of the future level of investment and profits arising from it, and the 
determination by banks of the appropriate liability structure for financing positions in 
different types of capital assets. Thus, uncertainty becomes a major determinant of 
cycles and instability is inevitable, like a system attribute (Flanders, 2015). 
The prevailing view before the crisis was that central banking had mastered the 
management of the business cycle, and the application of modern risk management 
tools had greatly increased the stability of the financial system (Yellen, 2010). The 
underlying notion posed by the School of Chicago was that financial markets should 
be as free as possible from regulatory fetters. Markets never fail, or to a considerable 
extent, can police themselves (Androulakis, 2008). But, regardless of how well 
prudential supervision is executed, it will never be adequate to safeguard the economy 
from the destructive boom and bust cycles that Minsky considered endemic in 
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 Typically, wealth owners have claims on money rather than real assets.  
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capitalistic systems. The cult of risky behaviour is deeply engrained not only in 
financial institutions but also within households and corporations that, during the 
euphoric times, enthusiastically become highly leveraged. Then, changes in the 
macroeconomic outlook can play a key role in the contraction and recovery phases of 
the business cycle (Bernanke et al., 1999). The authors refer to the amplification 
mechanism of initial shocks through changes in credit market conditions as the 
‘financial accelerator’ effect37. In essence, this theory suggests that financial cycles 
are likely to have a larger amplitude than real activity cycles and that the financial 
accelerator effects tend to amplify real economic cycles owing to the pro-cyclicality 
of bank lending. Such pro-cyclicality arises because changes in asset prices affect the 
external finance premium (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), the value of collateral 
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) or banks’ leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009).  
In more detail, Bernanke et al. (1999) combine nominal rigidities with agency cost to 
investigate the interaction between credit market factors and price stickiness. Frictions 
in credit markets are widely known to amplify business cycles. The presence of 
market frictions gives rise to the financial accelerator mechanism that typically works 
via leverage of the borrower and affects output dynamically (Fuerst et al., 2014). An 
adverse macroeconomic shock reduces the value of the assets of credit constrained 
borrowers. The resulting fall in borrowers’ net worth increases leverage. In turn, 
higher leverage makes an underlying credit friction more severe and raises credit 
spreads. As a consequence, demand for investment falls by more than would happen 
in a world without credit market frictions, depressing asset values further. This sets in 
motion a feedback loop between rising spreads and falling asset prices that lies at the 
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 The financial accelerator model of  Bernanke et al. (1999) is widely used as a convenient mechanism 
for integrating financial factors into an otherwise standard DSGE model.   
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heart of the financial accelerator. More formally, the market friction creates a wedge 
between uncollateralized external finance and internal finance. The external finance 
premium that affects the overall cost of capital and investment decisions is inversely 
correlated with the financial condition of potential borrowers. Firms or households 
use assets as collateral when borrowing in order to ameliorate information and agency 
costs that otherwise would prevent the extension of credit. Thus, the pro-cyclical 
movements of a potential borrower’s net worth translate into counter-cyclical 
movements of the external finance premium, which in turn amplifies the fluctuation in 
investment and output. For instance, a positive output shock increases asset prices, 
reduces the external finance premium and boosts investment. Then, the increase in 
investment will lift asset prices and cash flows up, inducing feedback effects on 
spending. In this set up, the financial accelerator mechanism implies that a positive 
output shock will have a negative impact on banks’ credit risk.   
A rich theoretical literature has studied the spillovers from the financial system to the 
economy using models with financial imperfections. Concretely, this literature 
focuses on the ‘financial accelerator’, arguing that the amplification and propagation 
of a credit shock operates through information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers and a balance sheet effect. An increase in asset prices pushes up the net 
worth of firms, households or countries, and improves the capacity to borrow. 
Through general equilibrium effects, this dynamic then leads to further increases in 
asset prices. In this way, strong balance sheets in boom periods may lead to lending 
against inflated values of collateral. Therefore, the development of the financial 
accelerator framework (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1999) provides 
the theoretical framework of the studies on credit risk or alternatively, a model in 
which endogenous variations in the banks’ asset quality amplify fluctuations in 
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business cycles and vice versa. In principle, a real shock to financial conditions could 
lead to persistent fluctuations in the economy, even if the initiating shock had little or 
no intrinsic persistence (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke, 2007). The inverse 
relationship of the external finance premium
38
 and the financial condition of 
borrowers creates a channel through which otherwise short-lived economic shocks 
may have long-lasting effects on banks’ risk-taking. A variant of the financial 
accelerator is the collateral channel that captures how an increase in housing prices 
can introduce a relaxation of lending conditions and oversupply of credit (Arestis and 
Gonzalez, 2013). The increasing value of the collateral during the good times and the 
related wealth effect contributes to boosting the demand for credit. In principle, the 
financial accelerator effect applies to any shock that affects borrowers’ balance sheets 
or cash flows (Bernanke, 2007). From a financial perspective, the most striking 
developments of the Great Recession experienced in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis have been a series of corporate bankruptcies and sharp declines in 
asset values affecting many financial systems around the world.    
Taking stock of the preceding analysis, the analytical framework used for assessing 
the effect of the business cycle on banks’ credit risk is based on a three components 
transmission mechanism. The first step is represented by the effect of credit growth on 
the dynamics of NPLs, given that the volatility of credit flow has a direct effect on the 
quality of bank portfolios. The second step is represented by the deterioration of the 
Greek sovereign risk and the effect of the global financial crisis on the loan quality of 
the banking systems in the focal countries. The dynamics of the transmission channel 
is based on the premise that both strong accelerations in lending as well as sudden 
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 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) define the finance premium as the difference between the cost to a 
borrower of raising funds externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds. External finance, i.e. 
raising funds from lenders, is virtually always more expensive than internal finance because of the 
costs that lenders bear in evaluating borrowers’ prospects and monitoring their actions. 
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deceleration feed the increase of credit risk. The conceptual model for the dynamics 
of non-performing loans assumes an initially linear relationship, where the set of 
determinants also includes macroeconomic and monetary variables, such as 
unemployment or money supply
39
. These indicators are expected to influence the 
borrowers’ repayment capacity, hence ultimately banks’ credit risk. Other indicators, 
for instance financial variables or institutional factors may enter this conceptual 
framework, which could affect directly or indirectly borrowers’ financial burden. The 
conceptual framework is presented schematically in Figure 7, which is a modified 
version of  Jakubik  and Moinescu (2012). 
 
Figure 7 Transmission mechanism of credit accelerator to credit risk 
 
The first component of the credit accelerator mechanism concerns the interaction 
between credit and macroeconomic dynamics. Additional pressure could arise from 
external factors (Greek crisis) or institutional ones (monetary policy regime, 
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impact on macroeconomic policies, which in turn affect credit risk.  
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regulation) that could affect through direct or indirect channels credit risk in the focal 
countries.   
Summing up, theoretical as well as empirical considerations in credit risk modelling 
lie at the heart of the literature propagated by the Great Depression (Bernanke et al., 
1999; Calomiris and Mason, 2003). In shaping the underlying relationships of NPLs 
with the macroeconomy, researchers tend to substantiate the financial accelerator 
theory. Typically, the modelling regularities include the cyclical nature of bank credit, 
NPLs and loan loss provisions (LLPs).
40
 Thus, in the upturn of the cycle, 
contemporaneous NPLs tend to be low and provisioning subdued. Also, the pressure 
from competition and the optimism about the macroeconomy can lead to a loosening 
of lending standards and an accelerating credit expansion, thus sowing the seeds of 
borrowers’ and lenders’ financial distress later. Certainly, the loosening of lending 
standards during the upturn depends crucially on the regulatory and supervisory 
framework. In the downturn, the higher than expected NPLs, coupled with the 
declining value of collaterals, lead to a tightening of credit with an adverse impact on 
domestic demand.  
A strand of literature that is usually found under the ‘balance sheet effect’ type of 
studies, maintains that banking fragility is the end result of a chain of events (Beim 
and Calomiris, 2001; Allen et al., 2002; Borio, 2004; Goldstein, 2007). The balance 
sheet approach suggests that banking distress emerges from weaknesses in banks’ 
balance sheets, vulnerabilities in corporate and household balance sheets, and 
problems in the government’s balance sheet. Although this chain of events can begin 
anywhere, the end result is a vicious circle. Hence, the balance sheet approach 
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 The measures of credit risk, typically met in related studies, are NPLs, LLPs, loan losses - write offs, 
or corporate bankruptcies. 
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suggests that variables such as the proportion of NPLs in banks’ loan portfolios,41 
large fluctuations in asset prices, or indicators of business failures, could be used to 
assess banking stability and disentangle its key drivers. As IMF (2007) states: 
“Surveillance in financial systems with a large foreign-owned component needs to pay 
close attention to actual or potential macroeconomic and financial interactions”. 
 
The role of macroeconomic instability, reflected in policies that have spurred on 
lending booms, has been already discussed. For instance, one fundamental reason 
documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) is the strong link between pre-crisis 
fast private credit growth, current account deficits and the decline in the growth rate 
of output. The authors indicated that a key channel of crisis transmission operated 
through the reliance on those financial systems
42
 that were hit hardest by the crisis.  
Usually, in countries that experience accelerating credit growth during the booming 
years, there is a high risk that NPLs will rise sharply during the economic downturn, 
destabilizing the banking sector which, in turn, would adversely impact the real 
sector. Rising domestic NPLs and inadequate provisioning thereof pose significant 
risks to growth by restricting capital availability as the banking systems remain 
practically frozen. The damage that financial instability can cause in poor and 
developing economies can be particularly severe as the long chronicle of crises in the 
SEE region purports. It is also argued that the NPLs are one of the major causes of 
economic stagnation (Hou and Dickinson, 2007). From this point of view, the 
eradication of NPLs is a necessary condition to improve the state of an economy. If 
NPLs are kept and continuously rolled over, then valuable resources are locked up in 
unprofitable sectors, hindering economic growth and efficiency. One striking fact 
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 The ratio of NPLs to total gross loans is widely acknowledged as a standard measure of banking 
distress, either on an individual bank or at a system-wide level.  
 
42
 By pulling back funds and curtailing lending, foreign banks can become an obvious channel of crisis 
transmission (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010). 
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about recessions associated with banking crises is that credit demand becomes muted 
and growth takes longer to pick up, due to the overhang of debt and high leverage 
built up by households, small businesses and corporations, but also banks, during the 
boom cycle of the economy. Banks turn their back on otherwise productive as well as 
profitable investment projects proposed by firms.  
The phenomenon that banks become reluctant to take on new risks and commit to new 
loans is described as a ‘credit crunch’;43 this is a situation in which the supply of credit 
is restricted to below the range usually identified with prevailing market interest rates 
and the profitability of investment projects. The idea of a credit crunch has received 
attention when the traditional views failed to explain the economic state of the 
countries that suffered from the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The term was adopted 
from a discussion in the US that related to contractions in credit and the slowdown of 
economic activity (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Then a number of authors attributed 
the credit crunch phenomenon to surging NPLs (Krueger and Tornell, 1999; Agung et 
al., 2001). Agung et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between loan supply and 
real lending capacity, lending rates, real output, bank’s capital ratio, and NPLs. The 
authors’ results show negative and significant coefficients on NPLs, which indicate 
that as credit supply declines the NPLs’ problems heighten. Hence, NPLs constitute 
one of the most important factors that make banks unwilling to provide credit. Hou 
and Dickinson (2007) suggest that in a high NPL environment, banks’ primary focus 
is to consolidate internally in their aim to improve asset quality rather than providing 
credit. In addition, the regulator usually requires banks to raise provisions for 
potential loan losses that in turn decrease the banks’ revenue as well as their available 
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 A ‘credit crunch’ is essentially a disequilibrium phenomenon that is present when banks are 
unwilling to lend. Under this framework, a firm that generates profitable projects cannot obtain credit 
in spite of low interest rates prevailing in the market. A credit crunch results in excessive demand for 
credit and hence credit rationing, where loans are allocated through a non-price-based mechanism. 
Effectively, the credit crunch phenomenon imposes additional pressure on monetary policy. 
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loanable funds. The cutback on loans impairs the corporate sector and blocks any 
chance of resuming normal operations and growing. Unavailability of credit to 
finance firms’ needs for working capital or investment might well trigger a second-
round business failure which in turn exacerbates the quality of bank loans, resulting in 
re-emerging banking crises. In essence, this process triggers a vicious spiral, as 
depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 The effect of a credit crunch on banks and the economy 
 
Theories of credit have been developed by several schools of thought including the 
Monetarism, the Post Keynesians and the DSGE model among others. However, Ali 
and Daly (2010) argue that the existing theories do not provide an adequate account
44
 
of the key empirical features of the recent credit cycle. Broadly, theoretical models 
have not explicitly studied the effects of macroeconomic conditions including 
monetary policy or institutional factors on bank credit risk (De Nicolo et al., 2010). 
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 The authors suggest that the macroeconomic models developed are more interested in quantity rather 
than quality of credit. 
The level of 
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A weak 
corporate sector 
makes banks 
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production and 
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conditions 
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creating more 
problem loans  
 103 
 
On the same train of thought, Zhang (2009) states that theoretical models assuming 
financial contracts that isolate banks from macroeconomic shocks miss the 
interactions between banks and the macroeconomy. As banks operate under 
asymmetric information and limited liability they tend to assume more risk than is 
optimal. Since banks are typically highly leveraged, the moral hazard problem 
provides the rationale for prudential banking regulation. 
Taking stock of the theoretical considerations on credit risk, the following section 
aims to classify the determinants of credit risk found in the literature.  
3.3 Classification of credit risk determinants 
There is a great deal of literature that covers the determinants of credit risk. These can 
be macroeconomic, bank-specific, institutional or a combination of factors of these 
three categories. This section identifies and classifies the determinants of credit risk 
found in the literature. Table A2 in Appendix A provides the theoretical background 
of the SEE-related studies by presenting a brief account of the potential explanatory 
variables of credit risk.  
The first category describes the factors related to the macroeconomic environment.   
a. Macroeconomic indicators 
The literature studying the relationship between credit risk and the business cycle 
focuses on the banks’ cyclical behaviour. A wealth of studies uses loan loss 
provisions to proxy credit risk while other authors use NPLs or problem loans. In line 
with Borio and Lowe (2002), Quagliariello’s (2008) survey finds that models using 
macroeconomic variables tend to perform better than those that only use bank-specific 
ones. Broadly, studies conclude that declining economic activity remains the most 
important risk factor for banks’ asset quality. Also, factors such as GDP, 
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consumption, investment, unemployment, capital accumulation or inflows are 
associated with credit risk that builds up during the boom but materializes in the 
downturn. Adverse macroeconomic shocks make it difficult for borrowers to repay 
their debts in full or on time, thus threatening the solvency of banks (Gavin and 
Hausmann, 1996). Babihuga (2007) demonstrates that NPLs fluctuate strongly with 
both the business cycle and the inflation rate. Notably, she documents a considerable 
degree of heterogeneity in the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and 
NPLs across the sample of countries used in the study. Figure 9 illustrates the 
relationship between NPLs and the business cycle, proxied by the cyclical component 
of real GDP.  
 
 
Figure 9 NPLs and the business cycle, 1998-2005. 
 
Sources: Babihuga (2007) and sources cited therein. 
 
Despite the degree of heterogeneity across Babihuga’s (2007) sample, which includes 
96 countries, NPLs appear to have a strong negative relationship with the business 
cycle. Interestingly, the author underscores that NPLs appear to behave 
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countercyclically in emerging Europe while in Western Europe their relationship with 
the business cycle appears flat. In line with the collateral channel, Hilbers et al. (2001) 
who extend the study of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), document that a downturn in 
property prices increases financial instability. Hilbers et al. (2001) find that banks 
tend to lend more to real estate projects in booming periods, since the collateral value 
rises and the perceived risk diminishes. In effect higher property prices are associated 
with increased indebtedness of the non-financial sector which becomes more 
vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, hence credit risk increases. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) find a negative effect of the business cycle on problem loans. In the same 
spirit, ECB (2001), Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) 
document a negative relation between loan loss provisions and the economic cycle. 
These studies confirm the procyclicality of banks’ behaviour by using the income-
smoothing hypothesis and suggest that banks’ provisioning policy magnifies the effect 
of the negative phase of the cycle.  
Overall, it appears that credit risk is associated with a wide set of regressors that 
proxy economic activity. For instance, a fall in GDP growth, rising unemployment, 
swings in inflation, rising interest rates or volatile real exchange rates, all signal 
weaknesses in borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity and increasing credit risk (Arpa et 
al., 2001; Bikker and Hu, 2002). In countries with developed capital markets, the 
stock market activity can potentially affect banks’ credit risk, as found by Beck et al. 
(2013), as stock market indices tend to follow or lead the cyclical trends of the 
macroeconomy (Kalirai and Scheicher, 2002). Hence, the finding of a negative 
relationship between credit risk and economic growth is a common thread among the 
surveyed studies (Pain, 2003; Nkusu, 2011; Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). While 
macroeconomic developments can lead to financial vulnerability, it is equally true that 
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imperfections in the intermediation process can contribute to instability of the banking 
sector. Hence, economic activity cannot fully explain the evolution of credit risk 
(Beck et al., 2013). Additional factors may affect asset quality, especially in countries 
where their banking systems are fragile in the sense that present idiosyncratic 
vulnerabilities.  
b. Bank-specific indicators 
Most studies have been developed in relatively favourable economic conditions when 
bank-specific factors were likely to be more relevant in explaining credit risk. Against 
this backdrop, Quagliariello (2008) suggests that bank-specific indicators can 
outperform macroeconomic ones especially when the reliability of balance sheet data 
is high. It is well documented in studies that inefficient institutions tend to have large 
proportions of NPLs prior to failure. This strand of literature suggests that the major 
risks facing financial institutions are caused internally. In a prominent study that 
builds upon four key hypotheses, Berger and DeYoung (1997) document that cost 
efficiency is an important indicator of future problem loans. Cost-inefficient banks 
may tend to have high NPLs for a number of reasons: bad luck, bad management, 
skimping or moral hazard. Essentially the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis reverts to exogenous 
factors including operating conditions. Under the ‘bad management’ hypothesis, 
credit risk is attributed to poor management practices reflected in reduced cost 
efficiency and poor underwriting and monitoring practices. The ‘skimping hypothesis’ 
deals with the trade-off between short-term operating costs and future problem loans 
while the ‘moral hazard’ one refers to the classical problem of excessive risk-taking 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Banks tend to assume more risk when another party – 
depositors, investors, taxpayers – bears part of the risk and cannot charge or prevent 
that risk-taking. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that Berger and DeYoung’s 
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(1997) hypotheses are not mutually exclusive but also that neither hypothesis clearly 
dominates the other. Yet, almost unanimously, studies indicate that banks’ asset 
quality is a statistically significant predictor of insolvency (Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989). 
Within the bank-specific indicators, many studies use the stock or growth of loans 
(Salas and Saurina, 2002; De Bock and Demyanets, 2012; Klein, 2013). In this setup 
the decline or increase in bank lending is perceived to be the result of supply and 
demand factors. On the supply side, the combination of protracted economic 
weaknesses with legacy balance sheet problems is causing credit risk to rise. This, in 
turn, hampers the ability and willingness of banks to lend. A high level of NPLs ties 
up capital and funding, and reduces the capacity of banks to extend new loans, 
causing the credit crunch problem. On the demand side, the high level of corporate 
indebtedness, matched with deteriorating economic conditions, weigh on borrowers’ 
debt-servicing capacity and demand for new credit. However, the effect of the 
protracted credit boom during the global financial crisis has already been extensively 
discussed. According to Keeton (1999), loan growth leads to higher problem loans 
when there is a shift in supply, i.e. loan interests and credit standards are relaxed, 
lending soars and latent credit risks accumulate. Keeton (1999) suggests that the 
association between loan growth and loan loss provisions turns negative when the 
loan growth relates to borrowers’ demand shift and improved creditworthiness or an 
increase in the return on investment. 
Several recent studies use Berger and DeYoung’s (1997) hypotheses along with 
economic activity factors in their attempt to explain credit risk (Espinosa and Prasad, 
2010; Louzis et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the research that uses both types of credit risk 
determinants (macroeconomic and bank-specific) is the exception and includes Salas 
and Saurina (2002) for Spain and Louzis et al. (2012) for Greece.  
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A third branch of studies focuses on explaining NPLs in the context of institutional 
factors without excluding macroeconomic indicators.  
c. Institutional Factors 
 
The institutional or structural factors pertain to regulation and supervision, and the 
incentive structure therein (Nkusu, 2011; Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Disparities in 
regulation can affect banks’ lending behaviour and risk appetite, and as such credit 
risk. Podpiera’s (2004) study is concerned with the effects of the quality of regulation 
and supervision on the banking sector’s asset quality. The author also controls for 
macroeconomic and structural factors, as well as the level of development of the 
economy and the financial system. In this respect, his study builds bridges with the 
well-documented literature strand on finance-growth nexus.   
The effect of the institutional-structural factors that relate to liberalization and 
supervision has been thoroughly explored in previous sections. Several studies 
document that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed 
and developing countries as it expands opportunities for banks to take on risk 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Cubillas and González, 2014). Typically, 
financial liberalization unleashes competition that does not merely increases 
efficiency. Competitive pressure also carries risks as it raises the incentive for bankers 
to adopt excessively risky lending strategies and incur large loan losses. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that a strong institutional framework can curb the 
adverse effects of liberalization on the financial sector. Cubillas and González (2014) 
find that bank liberalization increases bank risk-taking through different channels, 
depending on each country’s specificities. In this respect, the authors indicate that the 
effectiveness of supervision and regulation varies across countries. Hence, a banking 
sector’s shortcomings are the consequences of political bargains structured by the 
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country’s fundamental political institutions. In this respect, each country has a 
banking system that is consistent with the political institutions of the society that 
structures the incentives of politicians, bankers, shareholders, debtors, depositors and 
taxpayers in order to shape policies and regulations in their favour (Calomiris and 
Haber, 2014). 
Overall, good economic conditions jointly with healthy financial metrics – capital, 
efficiency – affect positively the banks’ asset quality. The theoretical background 
documents that macroeconomic forces and banks’ credit risk are closely related and 
that macroeconomic factors are among the key determinants of financial vulnerability. 
Furthermore, banks present cyclical behaviour as, typically, NPLs and loan loss 
provisions are low during booms and rise in the downturn (Quagliariello, 2008).  
Summarizing so far the key points of the previous sections, it is evident that managing 
credit risk is the cornerstone of preserving a country’s financial stability. In turn, 
financial stability is paramount for economic growth, as most transactions in the real 
economy are processed through the financial system. If policies that ensure financial 
stability are not pursued, then the growth that comes in the upturn of the credit cycle 
will be dissipated in the bust phase. Then, the consequences for the stability of the 
financial sector and the functioning of the real economy are dramatic (Sinha, 2012). 
These are usually manifested in the form of large output losses, sluggish growth, 
rising unemployment, non-functional financial markets, weak banks, impaired 
monetary policy transmission and a sense of pessimism in society. In view of the 
costly effects of the banking crises, it appears that the banks’ contribution to the 
economy may have been overstated by their proponents. A key lesson from the global 
financial crisis is that a banking system that does not accurately assess risk is adding 
little to the economy (Haldane et al., 2010). This is a serious problem as it seems that 
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the banks, not only in the US or other developed economies, but also in the research’s 
focal countries, have systematically underpriced or mismanaged risk in the boom 
period leading up to the crisis. Such behaviour casts doubts on the raison d’être of 
banks, especially if we consider that only a small portion of bank activity concerns the 
channelling of savings to productive investments (Turner, 2010). But it also calls for a 
closer look at the determinants of NPLs as the key culprits of financial instability.  
The next section provides the concluding remarks of the chapter.  
3.4 Conclusions 
The role of banks is critical in facilitating the efficient deployment and allocation of 
economic resources over time, and bringing about a positive impact in the society, 
under conditions of uncertainty. The well-researched finance-growth area 
demonstrates that the role of finance is indeed associated with growth. Yet, a number 
of country-specific factors need to be embedded in the equation to allow for 
macroeconomic and monetary policies, regulatory, legal, historical and even 
geographical considerations.  
A healthy and efficient financial system is integral to the sound fundamentals of an 
economy. Hence, designing policies for economic development and at the same time 
ignoring the stability of the banking system can have disastrous results. Although 
predicting the timing of crises may still be an elusive goal, the identification of 
indicators that signal financial vulnerability, provides a valuable insight for research 
development. A lengthy chronicle of banking crises internationally, including the 
crisis-prone countries of the SEE region, purports that prior to or during these 
episodes, banks’ asset quality deteriorates sharply and NPLs surge, thus exhausting 
the aggregate banking system capital. Typically, problems associated with banking 
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crises in developing countries emerge from a credit boom and a property bubble. It is 
also plausible to conclude that comprehensive, country-specific assessments based on 
all available qualitative and quantitative information, should be used in sync with any 
modelling endeavour, given the complexity of the financial stability problem and the 
inherent difficulty to ‘see’ behind the banks’ veil.  
At the heart of the global financial crisis, there has been a financial liberalization 
credit spree that has gone haywire, usually abated by lax fiscal or monetary policy, or 
a lack of supervision that has brought mounting NPLs and financial instability in 
many developing countries, resulting in a deep recession. The chapter has made clear 
that a key warning indicator of banking crises is the deteriorating asset quality in 
banks’ loan books that usually occurs after a boom-bust cycle, spurred on by an 
overheated economy through accelerating credit. The task for cleaning up banks’ 
balance sheets then becomes huge as it typically involves public funds, while the 
subsequent recession is amplified by stagnant pro-cyclical credit policies in the 
framework of the credit crunch. A key lesson from the global financial crisis is that a 
banking system that does not accurately assess risk may add little to the well-being of 
the economy. The latter calls for a closer look at credit risk as the key culprit of 
financial instability.  
The financial accelerator model, which provides the theoretical underpinnings on the 
determinants of credit risk is a framework where endogenous variations in banks’ 
asset quality amplify fluctuations in the business cycle and vice versa. Against this 
background, the sources of credit risk can be macroeconomic, bank-specific or 
institutional, or a combination of factors of these three categories.   
The next chapter delves into the quantitative approaches, as applied in the empirical 
literature on banks’ credit risk.  
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Chapter 4: Empirical studies on credit risk 
“Over the past 30 years, we have had rather too much Merton (1990) and rather too 
little Minsky (1982) in our thinking about the roles of money and finance in the 
business cycle” 
        Buiter (2008) 
Introduction 
The deterioration in the quality of banks’ loan books has been at the epicentre of 
costly episodes of bank distress and crises in both transitional and advanced 
economies. The bitter reality is that elevating NPLs dampen growth
45
 (World Bank, 
2013). Hence, a degenerating asset quality has been generally considered as the 
channel for macroeconomic shocks to banks’ balance sheets. This explains why the 
assessment of credit risk in the financial sector is a key element of macro-prudential 
surveillance (ECB, 2012). This chapter takes stock of the empirical studies on banks’ 
asset quality, usually met as credit risk, and builds on the theoretical foundations 
touched upon previously. Within this framework, this chapter reviews the most 
influential studies that lie at the core of the empirical work developed in modelling 
credit risk, by focusing on the different methodologies used. Hence, Section 4.1 
embarks on an exploration of the quantitative approaches widely used in studies that 
investigate the determinants of banks’ asset quality. Next, Section 4.2 presents the 
time series models while Section 4.3 the panel data ones. Both sections 4.2 and 4.3 
put emphasis on the timeframe and the methodology employed in the empirical 
literature as well as the paucity of related studies on SEE emerging economies. 
Section 4.4 identifies the gaps found in the empirical studies with the explicit aim of 
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 Reflecting the challenging macroeconomic situation, NPLs reached worrying levels of above 15% in 
Bulgaria and Romania by the end of 2012. Their rise was driven by a mix of weak economic activity 
and borrower vulnerabilities, and loans to the construction and retail sectors. 
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establishing linkages to the case study under investigation: the credit risk of the 
Bulgarian and Romanian bank sectors and the effect of the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
on them. The last section concludes the chapter. 
4.1 Modelling credit risk 
Although the empirical literature on banks’ credit risk has a relatively short history, a 
substantial number of studies have been produced on the stability of the banking 
systems in the aftermath of crises episodes. However, as pointed out by Schinasi 
(2005), compared with the analysis of monetary and macroeconomic stability, the 
analysis of financial stability is still in the developing stage. The events leading to the 
Great Recession testify to the importance of this requirement. Radical measures 
proposed to increase the stability of the financial sector seem to have been bypassed 
or fiercely objected to. In response to the global financial crisis, the authorities in the 
UK, Europe and the US tried to introduce new legislation and regulation in an attempt 
to make banks more resilient to shocks, easier to fix when they get into difficulties, 
and to reduce the severity of future financial crises. In the UK, the Vickers 
Commission recommended ring-fencing banks’ retail-utility operations from their 
investment banking activities. In Europe and the US similar initiatives
46
 were aimed at 
assuring the solvency of large banks and financial institutions, and avoiding the 
necessity of future bailouts. Even though the global financial crisis has revealed 
significant deficiencies in the institutional framework, financial institutions retain 
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 In Europe, the Basel III regulatory framework introduced bank capital and liquidity standards. In the 
US the Congress passed the Dodd-Frank bill aimed at increasing the oversight of large financial 
institutions. This bill included the Volcker rule, a modern version of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 
attempting to restrict riskier investment bank activities and insulating such activities from commercial 
banking loans financed by bank deposits. The core idea of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 was to promote financial stability by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to protect taxpayers by ending bailouts and consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, in an attempt to end the ‘too big to fail’ concept.  
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excessive incentives for risk-taking associated with the ‘moral hazard’ problem 
(Arestis and Karakitsos, 2014). According to the authors “financial stability has not 
been addressed properly and as such it requires further investigation”. Focusing on 
the solvency of individual institutions is not enough; authorities need to take a system-
wide perspective in regulation and supervision (Cecchetti, 2011). In this respect, a 
supervisory viewpoint that focuses on the financial system as a whole – macro-
prudential – is of utmost importance. The global crisis has highlighted the need for 
constructing a system that reduces the risk of financial institutions, new crises as well 
as spillover in the event of an international or regional crisis. A number of 
econometric models have been developed aimed at analysing banks’ resilience to 
shocks and detecting those indicators that cause vulnerability and the action needs to 
be taken. 
Assessing credit risk varies from country to country with the changing characteristics 
of each financial system. Accordingly, the data requirements are broader for countries 
with developed financial markets than for those with less developed markets 
(Howard, 2009). The literature that relates financial to macroeconomic shocks is 
closely linked to macro-stress testing.  
A separate stream of studies derives from the stress testing approach formalized by 
the FSAP,
47
 and analyses the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and 
financial stability. Stress testing is usually country-specific and aimed at calibrating 
potential financial system risks from macroeconomic shocks. Notable studies in this 
area include stress tests of UK banks (Hoggarth et al., 2005a,b) and Austrian banks 
(Arpa et al., 2001). This stream of studies adopts two broad methodologies: 
                                                 
47
 The acronym stands for the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), established in 1999 by 
IMF, as a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s financial sector. 
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a. The balance sheet models that explore the link between banks’ accounting 
measures of vulnerability, such as NPLs and LLPs and the business cycle, and 
b. The value-at-risk models, combining the analysis of multiple risk factors into a 
probability distribution of mark-to-market losses that the banking system 
could face under a stress scenario. 
Typically, the latter methodology that is more data-intensive, analyses the impact of 
macroeconomic factors on the corporate or household sector default risk and maps 
those developments into banks’ loan losses under a mark-to-market framework. Since 
the exploration of this methodology is beyond the scope of the present research, the 
former one is considered next. The econometric models following the balance sheet 
methodology can be further classified into two main categories: 
a. Time-series or panel data techniques, and 
b. Models that analyse the vulnerability of the banking system to changing 
macro-fundamentals in the context of economy-wide or inter-industry 
structural models. 
The second category essentially involves embedding the reduced form equation of the 
first category into structural macroeconomic models developed and used by central 
banks in the monetary policy decision-making (Sorge, 2004). In view of that, the 
review of the empirical studies continues by considering the time series and panel data 
modelling techniques.  
In these models the key dependent variable is either the ratio of NPLs or the ratio of 
LLPs. Other measures of credit risk have also been used in empirical studies, such as 
the historical default rate of loans, but on a limited scale. Hence, the general 
framework of these methodologies differs from the literature on early warning 
systems as the risk measures are not leading indicators of the probability of a crisis, 
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but actual metrics to be estimated as a linear function of relevant macroeconomic and 
bank-specific variables. Time series analysis is useful in assessing the build-up of 
financial sector vulnerabilities over time while panel studies can also evaluate the role 
of country-specific or bank-specific factors. On the other hand, studies that use 
structural macro-econometric models allow studying the repercussions of an 
exogenous shock on all macroeconomic variables. As such, they allow the evaluation 
of trade-offs and potential conflicts between the pursuit of monetary and financial 
stability or the assessment of structural interdependencies and production flows 
among industries (Sorge and Virolainen, 2006). Broadly, both reduced-form and 
structural econometric models are appealing for being intuitive and relatively 
straightforward to implement. On the other hand, this approach has the limitation that 
it relates to rigid linear relationships. 
The use of the appropriate methodology depends not only on the type of study, 
country-specific or cross-country, but also on data availability since the data 
requirements are one of the main hindrances for many countries when trying to assess 
the vulnerabilities within their financial systems (Sorge, 2004; Howard, 2009; Gorton, 
2012). A wealth of studies adopts each of the modelling options described. 
The following section reviews the time series models on the determinants of credit 
risk. 
4.2 Time series models 
Studies analysing the macroeconomic determinants of banks’ NPLs or loan losses 
include Arpa et al. (2001), Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Boss (2002) for Austria, 
Delgado and Saurina (2004) for Spain, Baboucek and Jancar (2005) for the Czech 
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Republic, Zeman and Jurca (2008) for Slovakia, Bhattacharya and Roy (2008) for 
India, Filosa (2007) for Italy, and Hoggarth et al. (2005a,b) for the UK. 
Typically, these studies find a negative association between the measure of credit risk 
and the GDP growth or money supply, a positive one with interest rates and 
unemployment, while evidence on the effect of loan growth is mixed. The framework 
for studying the impact of GDP growth, and consequently the loan growth on credit 
risk, is represented by two competing theories. The first stresses that credit risk is pro-
cyclical while the second theory defends the counter-cyclical view. The common view 
implies that an economic upswing reduces the likelihood of loan defaults, whereas a 
recession will have the opposite effect (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Accordingly, 
the banks’ provisioning policy is pro-cyclical,48 meaning that it reinforces the 
development of the business cycle. Hence, banks are expected to reflect this feature in 
their decision-making by lowering provisions during an economic boom and 
increasing them in a downturn. The alternative counter-cyclical view states that credit 
risk is built up in a boom and materializes in the downturn (Borio et al., 2001; Lowe, 
2002). The favourable conditions of an economic expansion could lead to an 
excessive increase in credit lending coupled with relaxed credit criteria. The counter-
cyclical view associates the latter with higher risks and the build-up of financial 
imbalances that increase the likelihood of economic contraction (Borio et al., 2001; 
Lowe, 2002). However, there are other factors that can reasonably explain the bank’s 
lending behaviour vis-à-vis credit risk, such as income smoothing,
49
 economic policy 
and banking regulation (Athanasoglou and Daniilidis, 2011).   
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 A common explanation for the pro-cyclicality of the financial system is rooted in the information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. When economic conditions are depressed and collateral 
values are low, information asymmetries can mean that even borrowers with profitable projects find it 
difficult to obtain funding. 
 
49
 For instance, Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) and Laeven and Majnoni (2003) suggest that bank risk 
management is imprudent if loan provisions are negatively associated with loan growth.  
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Arpa et al. (2001) and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) model the aggregate LLPs of the 
Austrian banking system as a function of an extensive array of macroeconomic 
variables. Arpa et al. (2001) find that risk provisions rise when the growth in real 
GDP declines, real interest rates fall and real estate prices increase. Kalirai and 
Scheicher’s (2002) study in addition, finds that a fall in business confidence, a decline 
in the stock market and in industrial production, all affect negatively the LLPs. In the 
same spirit, Boss (2002) estimates a macroeconomic credit risk model for the 
aggregate corporate default rate in Austria. Boss’s findings that are broadly aligned 
with Arpa et al. (2001) and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), suggest that industrial 
production, inflation, and the price of oil are among the important determinants of 
corporate default rates. 
Similarly to Boss (2002), Kalfaoglou (2006) provides evidence that credit risk 
prevails among all other risks in the Greek banking sector. Despite the satisfactory 
results of the Greek banks’ stress-tests, Kalfaoglou (2006) highlights that their cross-
border operations can become a source of vulnerability, and in effect, require 
intensive risk management. The IMF’s (2010b) assessment of the Bulgarian banking 
system views the reversal of parent funding to their domestic subsidiaries as a 
material risk for the banking system. The macroeconomic variables found by the IMF 
(2010b) to be econometrically significant are the output gap and the loan growth 
during 1998-2002, which reduced the classified loan ratio of corporations as the share 
of legacy NPLs in that segment gradually shrank. Furthermore, the study that is based 
on quarterly data spanning 1998-2009 uses an autoregressive term as it is strongly 
suggested by the data and dummy variables to account for a change in the definition 
of the series in 2006, the loosening of loan classification rules in 2009, and the output 
gap. However, the estimation of the output gap is among the caveats attached to the 
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IMF’s (2010b) results, together with the fact that the sample does not include a full 
economic cycle. 
Still, it is possible that the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the evolution of 
the quality of banks’ loan portfolio are asymmetric during recessions and recoveries 
as well as the fact that some banks are ever-greening loans and under-reporting 
restructured loans, similarly to other countries of the region (IMF, 2010b). On the 
other hand, the IMF’s (2010a) assessment of Romanian banks that is based on data up 
to the end of June 2008, finds them vulnerable to the country’s output gap, a 
slowdown or reversal of capital inflows,
50
and an associated downward pressure on the 
exchange rate.
51
 The latter study does not explicitly assess the impact of the sharp 
slowing of lending, either as a result of tightening credit standards or in response to 
reduced funding from foreign parent banks. As Romanian banks are dependent on 
external sources of liquidity, a significant contraction in sources of funds would lead 
to a credit crunch in Romania. Furthermore, IMF’s (2010a) study does not account for 
external spillovers arising from the pressure on Greek banks amidst concerns over the 
Greek public debt sustainability. 
Summing up both studies, i.e. IMF (2010a,b), it emerges that credit risk is the major 
risk factor for both the Bulgarian and the Romanian banking systems. While the effect 
of the output gap is dominant in both countries’ credit risk, there are ambiguities over 
its estimation. Other key determinants depend on each country’s distinctive features.   
Since the seminal work of Sims (1980) on the investigation of monetary policy 
shocks, the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach has gained momentum. Several 
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 IMF (2010b) indicates that a sharp contraction in capital inflows could lead to a major slump in the 
Romanian property market and a substantial rise in unemployment, particularly in the construction 
sector, with adverse consequences for the asset quality of the banking system. 
 
51
 The effect of the exchange risk in Romania is indirectly incorporated in credit risk, since most loans 
are denominated in euros. 
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studies apply VAR models to investigate the macro-fundamentals’ transmission 
mechanisms in the US, Japan and many other countries.
52
 Foglia’s (2008) survey 
indicates that researchers in the area of financial stability adopt VAR models because 
they are more flexible and retain several of the desirable policy-analysis features of a 
structural model. Typically, these models include various macroeconomic factors, 
ranging from two to five, depending on the country. In some cases, variables more 
directly related to the asset quality of banks are added, such as measures of household 
indebtedness or firms’ financial leverage; in other cases, market-based indicators of 
credit risk, such as equity prices and corporate bond spreads, are used.
53
 
The estimation process normally requires the selection of a set of macroeconomic and 
financial variables that, according to economic theory and empirical evidence, are 
expected to affect credit risk. In this regard, variables such as economic growth, 
unemployment, interest rates, equity prices and corporate bond spreads, contribute to 
explaining credit risk (Foglia, 2008). Gambera (2000) uses univariate VAR models to 
investigate the impact of regional- and national-wide macroeconomic variables on the 
quality of loan portfolios measured by NPLs and loan delinquencies, of a large sample 
of US banks using quarterly data for 1987-1999. He reports that unemployment rate, 
farming income, housing permits, bankruptcy filings were among the significant 
predictors of bank asset quality. 
Blaschke et al. (2001) propose the use of VAR methodology to investigate the impact 
of inflation, nominal interest rate, output and changes in terms of trade to the ratio of 
NPLs to total loans or total assets of the banking sector. The estimated coefficients of 
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These models are used in the studies developed at the Central Banks of the UK, Spain and the 
Netherlands, and also at the European Central Bank, among others. 
 
53
 Introducing market variables such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and equity and real estate 
price indices into credit risk models is a way of explicitly integrating the analysis of market and credit 
risks. 
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the regressions provide an estimate of the sensitivity of loan performance to 
macroeconomic factors.  
Similarly, Hoggarth et al. (2005b) focus on the link between loan write-offs and the 
UK output gap, retail and house price inflation, nominal short-term interest rate and 
the real exchange rate. They employ quarterly data for the period 1988-2004 and 
provide evidence of a significant and negative relationship between the output gap 
and the write‐off ratio, with the maximum impact occurring after one year. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that the banks’ write‐off ratio increases after an 
increase in retail price inflation and nominal interest rates. 
Baboucek and Jancar (2005) apply an unrestricted VAR
54
 model to investigate the 
effects of macroeconomic shocks on the loan quality of the Czech banking sector 
using monthly series from 1993-2006. Employing the NPL ratio as an indicator of 
loan quality, the authors find robust causal relationships in place between loan quality 
and a number of macroeconomic variables based on impulse response analysis.
55
 
Unemployment and inflation were found to affect positively the NPL ratio, both cited 
as early warning indicators of credit portfolio deterioration. However, other variables, 
such as loan stock and money supply failed to concur with other empirical studies. 
Notably, Baboucek and Jancar’s (2005) simulations fail to support the hypothesis that 
a slowdown in credit expansion is a response to deteriorating credit risk. In contrast 
they indicate a weak feedback between the NPL ratio and lending growth, suggesting 
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 The VAR model is based on transmission that includes the following nine endogenous variables: the 
real effective exchange rate, exports, monetary aggregate M2, imports, aggregate bank loans to clients, 
unemployment rate, consumer price index, domestic real three-month interest rate and the share of 
NPLs in aggregate bank loans to clients. 
 
55
 The analysis of feedback effects is a core concern for financial stability, as the global financial crisis 
has aggravated the downside risks to growth. The typical econometric framework that allows for 
feedback effects between a banking system and the real economy is the VAR methodology, in which a 
vector of endogenous variables includes both a measure of credit risk and the economic variables 
associated with the state of the business cycle.  
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that faster loan growth decreases NPLs. Equally, they provide evidence that an 
accelerating economic activity goes hand in hand with a rising NPL ratio, noting that 
failure to support a hypothesis can be reasonably explained by country-specific 
features revealing the evolving nature of a developing economy. 
Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008) employed a reduced‐form VAR to explore the 
effect of business cycle conditions on the default ratesof customers in Italian banks 
over the period 1990-2004. Their results show that default rates follow a cyclical 
pattern, falling during macroeconomic expansions and increasing during downturns. 
Several studies (e.g. Boss, 2002; Virolainen, 2004) analyse the impact of 
macroeconomic fundamentals on the credit quality of banks’ debtors using Wilson’s 
(1997a,b) framework. For instance, Virolainen (2004) estimates a macroeconomic 
credit risk model for the Finnish corporate sector over the period 1986-2003.
56
 The 
results of Virolainen’s (2004) SUR model suggest a significant relationship between 
corporate sector default rates and key macroeconomic factors including GDP, interest 
rates and corporate indebtedness. Similar to many other studies, the model of 
Virolainen (2004) is used to analyse the corporate credit risk conditional on the 
prevailing macroeconomic setting. In the spirit of Virolainen (2004), Trenca and 
Benyovszki (2008) estimate a macroeconomic credit risk model for the Romanian 
corporate sector over the period 2002-2008.They find a significant relationship 
between industry-specific default rates and macroeconomic factors such as GDP 
growth rate, consumer price index, real interest rate charged on loans, the exchange 
rate and industry-specific indebtedness. 
Contrary to the VAR methodology, cointegration analysis has received less attention 
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 A distinguishing feature of the study is that the sample period used to estimate the model includes 
both a severe recession and a banking crisis. 
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in the credit risk related literature, although several methods are available for 
conducting cointegration tests, such as the Engle-Granger approach, the maximum 
likelihood based Johansen test and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag(ARDL) 
approach to cointegration. The latter approach, as re-examined by Pesaran and Shin 
(1999), has become increasingly popular in recent years because of its flexibility and 
several other appealing features
57
 that are hardly found in other cointegration 
techniques. In the literature on the determinants of credit risk, the use of cointegration 
analysis is generally limited, with the ARDL approach to cointegration being almost 
non-existent, although it has been utilised in other research areas of economics, such 
as the finance-growth nexus. The latter is attributed to the fact that the ARDL 
approach is a relatively new technique compared to other econometric techniques, as 
is also the case with the literature on the relationship between credit risk and the 
macroeconomy. Among the few studies traced in the literature that apply 
cointegration techniques to study the relationship between NPLs and a set of 
macroeconomic variables, are those of Zeman and Jurca (2008), Greenidge and 
Grosvenor (2009), Bofondi and Ropele (2011) and Abedola et al. (2011). Zeman and 
Jurca (2008) employ the vector error correction model (VECM) to assess the impact 
of a slowdown in real GDP, interest rate and exchange rate on the NPLs of the Slovak 
banking system. Using quarterly data over the period 1996-2006, the authors report a 
negative association between NPLs and GDP growth and a positive one between 
NPLs and nominal interest rate in the long-run. Turning to the scarce studies that 
apply the ARDL approach to cointegration, Greenidge and Grosvenor (2009) forecast 
the NPLs in Barbados, Bofondi and Ropele (2011) examine the drivers of bad debts in 
Italy, and Abedola et al. (2011) those in the Islamic banking system of Malaysia. 
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 Pesaran and Shin (1999) demonstrate that the appropriate lags in the ARDL model correct for both 
serial correlation and endogeneity problems. 
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Bofondi and Ropele (2011) use a quarterly sample spanning 1990-2010 and report 
that the loan quality to households and firms can be explained by a small number of 
macroeconomic variables
58
 which enter the cointegrating equation with different lags, 
cost of borrowing and level of indebtedness. Abedola et al. (2011) provide evidence 
of a significant positive long-run effect of interest rates on NPLs.  
As for the studies that use Markov-switching models in the credit determinants’ 
literature, there is also a paucity of related work. Among the most relevant, in a 
broader sense, studies on the context of the thesis are those of Frömmel and 
Karagyozova (2008) and Eller et al. (2010), both driven by Kiss et al. (2006). In the 
former study, the authors examine the relationship between bank lending and asset 
prices in Bulgaria by using a Markov-switching error correction model to control for 
regime changes. The authors find a positive relationship between real estate prices and 
banks’ lending to households, and provide evidence of regime switches linked to 
regulatory measures for curbing credit expansion. Instead of looking at the excessive 
credit growth in terms of the distance to equilibrium,
59
 Frömmel and Karagyozova 
(2008) examine the adjustment process towards equilibrium levels through the error 
correction coefficients. A regime is then interpreted as unstable if cointegration 
between credit growth and its determinants is not evidenced for particular sub-
periods,
60
 which does not necessarily coincide with the error exceeding a particular 
threshold. In their study, Eller et al. (2010) explore the long- and short-run 
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 In particular, the Italian bad debts of households are found to be negatively correlated with GDP 
growth and positively with the unemployment rate and the short‐term nominal interest rate. As for the 
firms, bad debts increase in line with unemployment and diminish as the consumption of durables 
increases. 
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 Kiss et al. (2006) define a credit boom as one of the following two cases: (a) the observed credit 
growth exceeds the one implied by the long-run equilibrium relationship on the basis of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, or (b) the observed credit growth rate is higher than the speed of 
adjustment to the credit equilibrium in the error correction model.  
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 In the wording of the Markov-switching models, the identified sub-periods are called regimes. 
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determinants of bank lending to the private sector in eleven CESEE countries. Based 
on the identified regime shifts for the observation period 1997-2009, they find that the 
sub-periods are characterized by a different impact of the credit growth determinants. 
Eller et al. (2010) conclude that, for most of the countries in their sample, there is a 
cointegrating relationship between credit and economic activity in the long-run. Also, 
the inflation shows the expected negative relation to lending growth for most 
countries, whereas the lending rate displays, in some cases, a counter intuitively 
positive sign. In exploring the short-run dynamics, the authors apply both a linear and 
a non-linear Markov-switching error correction model. They suggest that the 
identified regime switches in the short-run relation are driven primarily by differences 
in the credit supply factors rather than by the adjustment towards the credit 
equilibrium. In terms of regime switching, Eller et al. (2010) distinguish between two 
groups of countries
61
: those with one dominant regime, which is briefly interrupted by 
a second one, and those with two equally pronounced regimes where a marked switch 
occurs just before or when the global crisis hits the CESEE region, i.e. in the second 
half of 2008.  
Having reviewed the literature of time series models, the following section focuses on 
the country-specific and cross-country studies that explore the determinants of credit 
risk using panel models.  
4.3 Panel data models 
The literature that uses panel estimations to model the linkages between banks’ asset 
quality and macroeconomic conditions at a cross-country bank-system level has 
grown rapidly, especially in the years following the global financial crisis (Nkusu, 
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 Eller et al. (2010) suggest that while Bulgaria shows clear and long-lasting regimes, Romania stays 
mainly in one regime with only short-lived switches.  
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2011; De Bock and Demyanets, 2012; Beck et al., 2013). Previously most studies 
dealt with a country’s individual financial institutions (Berger and DeYoung, 1997, 
for the US; Pain, 2003, for the UK; Jiménez and Saurina, 2006, for Spain; 
Quagliariello, 2007 for Italy) but also with individual financial institutions in a cross-
country context (Bikker and Hu, 2002, for 29 OECD countries; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008, for 15 European countries). Broadly, the studies that analyse the phenomenon at 
a country level use an adequate sample of the country’s banks balance sheets. 
Similarly, the studies performed on a cross-country level either use a broad sample of 
individual banks, or aggregate data of the banking systems of the countries involved 
in the study. 
In essence, the strand of literature that uses panel models seeks to exploit the time and 
cross‐sectional dimensions of macroeconomic variables and bank‐specific data to 
explain credit risk. Most studies underscore the linkages between financial and 
macroeconomic shocks, thus build upon the relationship between the business cycle 
and credit frictions denoted by rising NPLs, LLPs or other proxies. Usually, the 
literature associates episodes of sharp increases in NPLs with asset price declines and 
disruptions to the supply of credit. Overall, the findings suggest that the determinants 
of NPLs can be macroeconomic, financial, or institutional. The macroeconomic 
environment influences borrowers’ balance sheets and their debt servicing capacity. 
The set of macroeconomic variables used varies across studies, but broad indicators of 
macroeconomic performance, such as GDP growth and unemployment, are generally 
included in the panel data literature. Disparities in regulation and supervision affect 
banks’ behaviour and are important in explaining cross-country differences in NPLs.  
In a study of 186 European banks from 1992-2004, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) find 
that LLPs amplify credit fluctuations, while Jiménez and Saurina (2006) provide 
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evidence of a positive relationship between rapid credit growth and loan losses, 
confirming theoretical models based on disaster myopia and herd behaviour 
(Guttentag and Herring, 1984; Rajan, 1994). Foos et al. (2010) examine a broad 
sample of banks from 1997-2007 to test the loan-seasoning
62
 hypothesis in line with 
Berger and Udell (2004). Foos et al.’s (2010) findings are in consensus with Jiménez 
and Saurina (2006) but in sharp contrast to those of Laeven and Majnoni (2003), 
which find a negative contemporaneous relationship between loan growth and loan 
losses.  Espinosa and Prasad (2010), using bank level data for a sample of 80 banks in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council region, show that NPLs increase as economic growth 
decelerates and interest rates increase. Nkusu (2011) estimates a panel VAR model 
and applies cointegration techniques on a sample of 26 advanced economies that span 
the period 1998-2009. The analysis of the impulse responses underscores the 
importance but also the persistence of NPLs in the macro-financial linkages. 
Specifically, Nkusu (2011) suggests that the confluence of adverse responses in key 
macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP and unemployment, leads to a downward 
spiral in which banking system distress and the deterioration in economic activity 
reinforce each other. Broadly, Nkusu’s (2011) results are in agreement with those of 
Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008) which also rely on the VAR approach to highlight 
the feedback loop between NPL and macro-financial performance. 
Louzis et al.’s (2012) study that covers Greece’s nine largest banks during 2003-2009, 
uses NPLs decomposed by type of loan, i.e. business, consumer, and mortgages. 
Utilising quarterly data, the authors suggest that management quality and 
macroeconomic fundamentals explain the NPLs of the Greek banks. In line with 
Espinosa and Prasad (2010), Louzis et al. (2012) provide evidence of a positive 
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 According to the loan-seasoning hypothesis, the loan growth translates into an increase in credit risk 
but with some lag in the light of experience, saying that borrowers do not immediately default after 
receiving a loan.    
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relationship between NPLs and real lending rates. As for the bank-specific 
characteristics, Louzis et al. (2012) find that management inefficiency is positively 
associated with NPLs, a result that is also in consensus with Espinosa and Prasad 
(2010). 
Rinaldi and Sanchis Arellano (2006) model NPLs arising from households’ debt for a 
panel of seven euro area countries. Using panel cointegration techniques, the authors 
find that a higher ratio of debt-to-income is associated with a higher level of NPL 
later. A noteworthy finding in Rinaldi and Sanchis Arellano (2006) is that, in the 
short-run, house prices are negatively related to NPL, lending support to the view that 
borrowers’ wealth can play the role of a buffer in case of unexpected shocks. 
In an exploration of the credit risk drivers in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Ireland, Castro (2013) finds that the macroeconomic environment significantly affects 
banks’ credit risk. Using dynamic panel estimations over the period 1997-2011, the 
author documents that credit risk increases as GDP growth and real estate price 
indices decrease, and rises when unemployment rate, loan growth, and the real 
exchange rate increase. 
While numerous empirical studies are devoted to other geographical areas, the credit 
risk of the SEE transition economies is less closely examined, despite the legacy of 
high NPLs either historically, or as a bitter memory of the recent boom-bust cycle. 
Notably, the banking sectors of Bulgaria and Romania participate in only a few panel 
studies (Festić et al., 2011; De Bock and Demyanets, 2012; Klein, 2013; Jakubík and 
Reininger, 2013). In effect, these studies do not always account for the fact that the 
SEE economies form a rather heterogeneous set of countries with a clear division 
between front-runners and late reformers (Zinkovskaya, 2008). For instance, 
Cottarelli et al. (2003) provide evidence that, in the ‘early bird’ countries, the bank 
 129 
 
credit to the private sector has been rising considerably faster than GDP, while in 
other countries, i.e. ‘the late risers’, the credit started flowing later. Finally, in a third 
group of countries ‘the sleeping beauties’, Cottarelli et al. (2003) do not find a clear 
increase in credit. Bulgaria is among the early bird countries that registered an 
average annual real growth rate in credit of 33% in the period 1998-2002, while the 
respective growth for the sleeping beauty Romania was just 4.7%. They assert that the 
acceleration in credit and, most importantly, the differences across countries reflect 
primarily the overall financial deepening, the speed of privatization, crowding-in 
forces, and the overall progress towards market institutions. The observed differences 
across the countries as highlighted in Cottarelli et al. (2003) are also evidenced in 
Mannasso and Mayes (2005)
63
 and Backe et al. (2006). In line with Cottarelli et al. 
(2003), Backe et al. (2006) use a quarterly dataset that covers 43 countries in the 
period 1975-2004. They provide evidence that while Romania’s ratio of credit-to-
GDP is below the level justified by the country’s fundamentals, Bulgaria might have 
surpassed the equilibrium by 2004, a case that perpetuates boom-bust cycles and can 
trigger unsustainable current deficits. Notably, Backe et al. (2006) assert that the rapid 
pace of credit expansion does not in itself pose a risk of deterioration in banks’ asset 
quality.    
In a panel study across 75 countries, Beck et al. (2013) find that the real GDP growth 
is the main driver of NPLs. Other important factors linked with increasing NPLs are 
exchange rate depreciations – especially in countries with a high degree of lending in 
foreign exchange – and also equity prices, in countries with large stock markets 
relative to the size of the economy, and interest rates. Nevertheless, Beck et al. (2013) 
disclose that the results should be treated cautiously in the context of individual 
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 In a study of 21 CEE countries over the period 1996-2003, Mannasso and Mayes (2005) provide 
evidence that problem loans are the clearest indicator of banks’ distress.  
 
 130 
 
countries as country- or sector-specific factors may have an impact on NPLs. The 
latter is also a clear-cut result in the country-specific comparative studies of Ali and 
Daly (2010) and Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) that investigate the credit risk determinants of 
the US and Australia,
64
 and Germany and France respectively. Employing quarterly 
time series over the period 1995-2009, Ali and Daly (2010) indicate that the same set 
of macroeconomic variables, i.e. GDP, short-term interest rates and total debt, display 
different default rates for both countries. They find that compared to Australia, the US 
economy is much more susceptible to adverse macroeconomic shocks. On the same 
wavelength, Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) document that the credit risk of the French banks 
is more susceptible to bank-specific variables and the inflation rate, compared to the 
German ones. The latter provides support to the argument that each country has its 
own distinguishing features that cannot be fully captured in a panel framework.  
In a recent study that unfolds along the lines of Beck et al. (2013), Jakubík and 
Reininger (2013) focus on the nine CESEE countries and use quarterly data over the 
period 2004-2012. Their results that are in broad agreement with Beck et al. (2013), 
present an inverse relation between credit risk and the stock market index, and a 
strong positive one with past credit growth. On the same wavelength as Ali and Daly 
(2010), Jakubík and Reininger (2013) conclude that, despite their geographic 
proximity, a number of differences are manifest among the countries in their panel, 
including for instance, the quality of institutions, repayment culture and market 
standards. Therefore, these factors “may still influence the country-specific strength of 
response to shocks of the same variable” (Jakubík and Reininger, 2013). Given that, 
the authors maintain that while their panel model may still be useful for identifying 
economic processes that are relevant for all the countries in their sample, it can be 
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 It is noteworthy that both countries witnessed an above average historically high increase in credit 
lending, over an unusually prolonged period. 
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considered less reliable for each individual country. In the light of this, further topical 
research is required. 
Using quarterly data for the period 1995-2008 for the Baltic States, Bulgaria and 
Romania, Festić et al.’s (2011) findings support the hypothesis that accelerating 
lending growth harms banks’ performance. They explain that this result could be due 
to soft loan constraints, ample liquidity of the banking systems as a result of capital 
inflows and overheating economies. Essentially, Festić et al. (2011) confirm the 
theory of pro-cyclicality by showing that increasing exports or investments improve 
the NPL ratio. Overall, a rising economic activity positively affects the loan portfolio 
quality of the sample countries’ banking sectors as NPLs decelerate. Furthermore, 
Festić et al. (2011) document that the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate 
improves loan quality, due to the high share of loans denominated in foreign currency, 
as well as productivity increases. The results of Athanasoglou’s (2011) research that 
makes use of a panel of SEE banks spanning 2001-2009, provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between capital and credit risk. Nevertheless, the statistical 
significance of those results and the causation depends on the level of banks’ capital 
profiles. Hence, in less-than-adequately capitalized banks there is a two-way 
relationship between bank capital and risk, while in well-capitalized banks the 
relationship is not significant.  
Among the most recent studies, De Bock and Demyanets (2012) cover 25 emerging 
markets during 1996-2010 while Klein (2013) uses a sample of 16 CESEE economies 
over the period 1998-2011. In agreement with De Bock and Demyanets (2012), the 
results of Klein (2013) confirm the responsiveness of NPLs to macroeconomic 
conditions such as GDP growth, unemployment, exchange rate and inflation. 
Furthermore, Klein (2013) provides evidence of a less pronounced effect of bank-
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specific factors.  
The panel model literature provides sufficient evidence that the determinants of credit 
risk can be macroeconomic, bank-level or institutional. Episodes of rising NPLs are 
associated with declines in asset prices and declines or disruptions in the supply of 
credit. Broadly, the stylized facts suggest that good economic conditions positively 
affect the quality of banks’ loan portfolios, whereas disturbances anywhere in the 
business cycle and the macro-economy are likely to have repercussions for the 
banking system (Arpa et al., 2001; Quagliariello, 2004). Overall, studies concur that 
during prosperous times, banks may underestimate their exposures, relax credit 
criteria and report lower than needed provisions for loan losses. Empirical evidence 
suggests that any improvement in the real economy translates into lower corporate 
defaults (Borio et al., 2001; Ghosh, 2005; Beck et al., 2013; Packer and Zhu, 2012). 
During recessions, this relationship could magnify the effect of the negative phase of 
the business cycle (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Quagliariello, 2004). Also, many 
studies reveal that bank-specific variables are informative of banks’ credit risk (Pain, 
2003; Quagliariello, 2004; Louzis et al., 2012). Furthermore, models that include 
macroeconomic variables as regressors perform better than those that employ solely 
bank-specific variables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hardy and 
Pazarbaşioğlu, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Hilbers et al., 2001; 
Quagliariello, 2008). This section provided a concise account of the empirical studies 
and the methodological approaches used in the literature on credit risks determinants. 
The next section underscores the gaps identified in the empirical studies.  
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4.4 Identified gaps in empirical studies 
It becomes obvious from the preceding discussion that a wealth of studies deals with 
the drivers of credit risk while the literature continues to evolve, given the importance 
of a healthy financial system for the economy and society. A variety of time-series 
and panel models have been developed that extract from historical data an ex-post 
relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic indicators that inevitably 
incorporate past behavioural responses. Against this background, the determinants of 
NPLs are found to be macroeconomic, bank-specific and institutional. The use of the 
appropriate methodology depends not only on the type of study, country-specific or 
cross-country, but also on data quality and availability issues, since the data 
requirements are one of the main hindrances for many countries when trying to assess 
the vulnerabilities of their financial systems. However, a number of gaps have been 
identified in reviewing the empirical literature. These are the following:  
a. Although Bulgaria and Romania participated in several panel estimations, 
there is a notable absence of country-specific studies for both countries. Yet, 
as the authors of many studies purport, panel estimations can account for a 
heterogeneous sample to a certain extent. By design, panel studies do not 
narrow down to each individual country’s idiosyncratic features. Equally, the 
reviewed panel studies do not usually account for structural breaks. In some 
studies, researchers avoid the problems of structural breaks by focusing on 
sub-samples which are assumed to have the same data generated process. But, 
this approach decreases drastically the time span of the studies. 
b. The use of the ARDL approach to cointegration is scarce among the studies 
that use cointegration techniques in exploring the short and long run 
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relationships of the credit risk drivers. In any case, no studies were found to 
apply the ARDL approach to the focal SEE countries. 
c. The lack of studies that use the Markov switching framework in modelling 
credit risk in the research’s context. Most empirical studies use data up to the 
recent financial crisis. This is so because a broader sample that includes post 
or around the crisis data is subject to regime shifts. On the other hand reduced-
form models that assume and estimate a time-invariant relationship between 
macroeconomic factors and financial vulnerability indicators may encounter 
problems due to parameter instability, as large macroeconomic shocks usually 
lead to structural breaks. In other words, endogenous responses of economic 
agents, instead of following similar reaction functions as in the past, might 
change altogether. As many authors suggest, substantial changes in the 
properties of a series can be attributed to large-scale events, such as financial 
crises (Ang and Timmermann, 2011; Gorton, 2012).In the same line of 
argument, the existing literature on the relationship between credit risk and the 
macroeconomy broadly uses linear models. A frequently mentioned concern is 
the inability of linear models to capture relationships between macroeconomic 
variables that may become non-linear at times of stress (Foglia, 2008). Thus, 
statistical models that overlook the presence of non-linearities in the data 
generating process may yield misleading results. 
d. The role of credit growth on credit risk does not present a clear-cut picture in 
the empirical literature. There are several studies that find a statistically 
significant negative coefficient for credit growth, for instance Nkusu (2011), 
while other studies report a positive relationship (Festić and Beko, 2008; De 
Bock and Demyanets, 2012). Similar is the case of the lagged effect, i.e. time 
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persistence of credit growth on credit risk. Some authors stress the lagged 
effect of loan growth on credit risk while others find a contemporaneous 
effect. The country-specific effect of both those issues is usually ‘hidden’ in a 
cross-country panel framework. 
e. The effect of money supply on credit risk does not present a clear-cut picture 
in the empirical literature. The global financial crisis in 2007-2008 made it 
clear that the monetary transmission mechanism might be a more complex 
process than earlier thought. For instance, Angeloni et al. (2010), among 
others, argue that if monetary policy contributes to the formation of banks’ 
risk, and if the latter feeds back on macroeconomic variables with an unknown 
lag, then monetary policy has to co-estimate the implication of financial 
stability. Thus, it is important to gain an understanding of the linkages in place 
between credit risk, monetary policy and the business cycle in the focal 
countries. 
f. Existing studies in the SEE region do not account for cross-border 
transmission channels of risk. In the face of the Greek debt crisis that ensued 
after the global financial crisis, the existence of any spillover effects has not 
yet been researched. Given the strong banking linkages in place between 
Greece and the neighbouring countries of Bulgaria and Romania, any crisis 
transmission mechanism, for instance through the credit risk channel, is worth 
investigating since it could have an adverse impact on the banking stability of 
these countries. 
g. Last but equally important is the lack of cross-validation of the results reported 
in the literature. Typically, the studies make use of a single methodological 
framework without accounting for the possibility that the results may be 
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influenced by the model specification, the econometric methodology applied, 
and the country samples used. As shown in Cuaresma et al. (2011), these latter 
cases can materialize. In a meta-analysis study on the determinants of foreign 
currency loans in the CESEE countries, they collected nearly 300 estimation 
equations providing roughly 800 coefficients on the seven most common 
determinants. Among other issues, Cuaresma et al. (2011) find that roughly 
half of the published coefficients are actually significant. Moreover, the 
economic significance of the coefficients differs widely. The authors assert 
that these differences are not surprising considering the heterogeneity of the 
analysed data and the methods applied. The panel data literature analyses 
developments in usually highly heterogeneous countries, including EU 
Member States and Western Balkan countries or even CIS States. There are 
even studies that choose a more general focus and additionally include 
developing countries from Latin America. Given that, the level of data 
aggregation is highly different and diverse to produce meaningful country-
specific conclusions. 
Following the identification of the gaps in the empirical literature the next section 
concludes the chapter. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter provided a critical review of the empirical studies that deal with the 
determinants of credit risk. The surveyed literature presents relatively consistent ways 
of estimating the relationships shaped between asset quality and economic activity, 
and uses diverse aspects of samples covering different geographic areas and country 
groups. Both time-series and panel models extract from historical data an ex-post 
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relationship between macroeconomic and financial stability indicators that inevitably 
incorporates past behavioural responses. Yet, the vast majority of empirical evidence 
for the SEE region arrives from panel cross-country studies. Hence, the paucity of 
country-specific studies is evident.  
Both countries under investigation in this thesis provide interesting case studies of 
open, emerging economies that were hit hardly by the global crisis. Despite their 
proximity, those countries cannot be treated as a homogeneous group. Among the 
shared features is the accelerating credit growth prior to the crisis followed by a stark 
deterioration in credit risk. In this respect, adverse shocks to the economy may be 
amplified by worsening credit conditions in the spirit of the financial accelerator 
theory. The aforementioned studies highlight the significant interactions between 
credit risk and macroeconomic conditions. Besides the lack of country-specific studies 
in the crisis-prone Bulgarian and Romanian context, there is also a lack of empirical 
evidence on the drivers of credit risk that apply the ARDL approach to cointegration 
and the Markov regime switching framework. The latter reiterates a key contribution 
of the thesis.  
The next chapter paves the way for the empirical research. Building upon the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research and equipped with the empirical studies 
reviewed as well as the identified country-specific features, the following chapter 
discusses the data and the methodological framework and enables a smooth 
deployment of the empirical part of the thesis through the formulation of testable 
hypotheses. 
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Chapter 5: Data and Empirical Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the dataset and provides a concise account of the 
methodological approaches used in conducting the empirical research of the thesis. A 
variety of time series econometric techniques have been used in an attempt to 
demystify the puzzle of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania and to explore any 
spillover effects arising from the Greek debt crisis. The comprehensive dataset 
collected, along with the use of reasonable econometric methodologies, allows 
capturing the drivers of credit risk in the banking systems of both countries. Founded 
on the theoretical underpinnings and the review of empirical studies, the chapter aims 
to relate the research questions posed earlier to testable hypotheses and facilitate the 
empirical research. Section 5.1 details the data employed in the research, discloses the 
data constraints and formulates the set of hypotheses under investigation. Next, 
Section 5.2 presents the methodological framework emphasising the rationale of the 
econometrics techniques applied, instead of outlining them in a textbook approach. 
Hence, this section critically discusses and evaluates the limitations of each 
econometric technique. The last section concludes the chapter. 
5.1 The dataset and the formulation of testable hypotheses 
Taking stock from the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical studies reviewed, 
the primary hypothesis under investigation addresses the linkages between credit risk 
and a set of macroeconomic-cyclical, financial, monetary and bank-related factors. 
Thus, the variables’ selection relies to some extent on indicators that emerge from the 
literature review to ensure comparability of results. The availability and quality of 
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data are central to most econometric studies, and the present research is no exception 
to this rule. The issue becomes even more crucial in the case of the SEE countries, 
given the lack of studies and the weaknesses in problem loan reporting.   
In both Bulgaria and Romania, deteriorating asset quality
65
 is by far the greatest risk 
faced by banks (IMF, 2010a,b). A rapid lending growth over the last decade, a high 
exposure to the construction and real estate sectors, growing consumer indebtedness, 
relatively weak enforcement of credit rights, competitive pressures and looser lending 
policies, can all easily lead to asset quality deterioration in a sharply worsening 
macroeconomic environment (Åslund, 2010). Credit risk is simply defined as the 
potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in line 
with the pre-agreed terms (BIS, 2000). Given that, banks need to actively manage 
credit risk that is inherent in their intermediation role but also embed in their models 
any interconnections between credit risk and other sources of risks. Hence, the 
effective management of credit risk is an essential ingredient to the long-term success 
of any financial institution or sector. 
The typical proxies of banks’ credit risk used in related studies are the ratios of either 
NPLs or LLPs to total loans. By definition, an NPL is an extension of credit for which 
there are valid concerns on the borrower’s ability to repay the principal or the interest 
in line with the original contractual terms of the loan. 
The most widely known international definition of NPLs is the one developed by the 
IMF (2006). According to this definition a loan should be classified as non-
performing when: 
                                                 
65
 The terms asset quality and credit risk are used interchangeably throughout the thesis to denote the 
vulnerability in banks’ loan portfolios arising from the impaired conditions of borrowers. Equally, the 
terms NPLs and problem loans are used interchangeably to denote the indicator used to measure banks’ 
asset quality.  
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- Payment of principal or interest is past-due by three months (90 days) or 
more, 
- Interest payments equal to three months’ interest or more have been 
capitalized (re-invested into the principal amount), refinanced or rolled 
over (payment has been delayed by arrangement), or  
- Payments are less than 90 days past-due but sufficient evidence exists to 
classify a loan as non-performing, i.e. when the debtor files for 
bankruptcy.  
For such loans, bank supervisory authorities require banks to set aside sizeable 
provisions against loan losses. Cross-country comparisons are inherently difficult 
because there is no universal definition of problem loans. Especially in the SEE 
region, the banking sectors’ data should be viewed in the light of inconsistencies 
between banks (Fitch, 2014b). But differences exist also across countries in their 
provisioning standards and practices. In short, it is difficult to make cross-country 
comparisons on the basis of the relative magnitude of problem loans, irrespective of 
the credit risk metric used, i.e. NPL ratios or the level of provisioning. A number of 
other proxies for credit risk have also been used in the literature such as loan write-
offs (Hoggarth et al.,2005a,b), credit default swap spreads (Casu and Chiaramonte, 
2011), equity prices or composite indices, corporate or household bankruptcies or loan 
defaults (Carling et al., 2003; Jacobson et al., 2005). 
Despite the reporting weaknesses, the credit risk indicators and especially the NPLs 
and the LLPs convey meaningful information in assessing the vulnerability of a 
banking system and in fostering financial stability. A strand of studies, for instance 
the literature on EWS, denotes that the credit risk indicators can also provide signals 
on the state of the economy or a particular economic sector. In this respect Čihák 
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(2007) divides the bank stress-test approaches into two classes: one based on data on 
loan performance, such as NPLs, LLPs and historical default rates, and the other 
based on micro-level data related to the default risk of the household or corporate 
sector. Although the NPLs and the LLPs are most frequently used in empirical 
studies, the choice of a reasonable credit risk proxy is by and large driven by the 
availability and quality of data. The NPL ratio that is a clear-cut measure of the credit 
quality of banks’ loans is classified among the core set of FSIs (IMF, 2006) while the 
LLPs to total gross loans has been extensively used in the empirical literature in the 
absence of other more accurate measures of credit risk (Arpa et al. 2001; Cavallo and 
Majnoni, 2001; Bikker and Hu, 2002; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Pain, 2003; 
Quagliariello, 2004). 
Financial institutions typically cover expected losses through appropriate 
provisioning. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the respective central bank 
provides the guidelines and directives on provisioning policies. Provisions appear as 
both a flow and a stock measure in banks’ reporting statements. As doubtful debts 
arise, a new charge (flow) is posted to the profit and loss account and this is added to 
the stock of provisions, typically reported as a contra asset account in the balance 
sheet. When bad debts are actually written off in future periods, these loans are not 
charged off directly against net income but instead reduce the balance in the stock-of-
provisions account. If the bank subsequently recovers part of a loan that it had 
previously written off, the recovery is added back to the stock of provisions. 
Formally, the accounting treatment as described by Pain (2003) is provided in the 
following equation: 
 
Stock of provisionst = Stock of provisionst-1 + New charge to P&Lt – (Write-offst – Recoveriest) 
+ any adjustments 
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Given this accounting identity, the stock measure of provisions may give a misleading 
picture of current developments in ex post credit risk.
66
 Yet, each measure comes with 
its limitations. As Sorge (2004) underlines, a number of studies indicate that LLPs or 
NPLs could be imperfect proxies of the evolution of credit risk in a banking sector 
over the business cycle. For instance, the accumulation of LLPs may not only be due 
to credit risk and loan impairment since LLPs are tax deductible in most countries. 
Also they can be used to meet regulatory capital requirements. Foglia’s (2008) survey 
suggests that loan loss provisioning rules may vary across jurisdictions and legal 
protocols may determine whether or not banks actually write off NPLs or keep them 
on their financial statements with appropriate provisioning. Another opaque area has 
to do with the restructured loans that can be classified either as performing or problem 
loans, given the diversity of measures applied by banks. Equally, variations in LLPs 
may be driven by changes in credit risk or other bank-specific factors, such as 
income-smoothing policies.  
In principle, many variables are potentially able to convey signals about the evolution 
of banks’ health over the business cycle. However, NPLs and LLPs have generally 
been considered to be the transmission channels of the macroeconomic shocks to 
banks’ balance sheets (Quagliariello, 2004). 
Following the preliminary discussion on the credit risk indicators, the next section 
discusses the data used in the case of Bulgaria. 
5.1.1 Description of the Bulgarian dataset 
The Bulgarian dataset consists of aggregate time series sourced from the Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB), the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, and the European 
                                                 
66
 In particular, large write-offs in any one period may falsely signal that the stock of provisions falls, 
even though significant new bad debts have arisen.  
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Central Bank (ECB), spanning from December 2001 to December 2010. Table B1 in 
the Appendix presents the dataset used in modelling the Bulgarian credit risk. 
The proxy used for the Bulgarian banks’ credit risk is the system’s aggregate ratio of 
loss and doubtful loans to total loans
67
 (non-performing loans or NPLs). The chosen 
proxy for credit risk is aligned to a substantial body of literature on NPLs. Notably, 
the IMF reports the Bulgarian NPLs and regulatory capital ratios starting from 1998. 
The analysis of the Bulgarian credit risk does not use other proxies, such as LLPs, as 
these series were not available.
68
 Table 11 presents the asset classification 
requirements of the Bulgarian banks in accordance with the BNB directives. 
 
Table 11 Asset classification requirements of Bulgarian banks 
 
Standard 
 
Principal and interest repaid on a timely basis or with a delay of 
up to 30 days when justified or accidental. The debtors provide 
the bank with the required information on their financial state 
and the sources of loan repayment. 
Watch 
 
Principal or interest is overdue from 31 up to 60 days or the 
debtor uses the loan for purposes other than those specified in 
the loan agreement, or there is evidence that the financial 
position–debt servicing capacity of the debtor worsens. 
Substandard 
 
Principal or interest is overdue from 61 to 90 days or the 
debtor’s financial position has substantially deteriorated and 
could hinder the loan repayment. 
Non-performing 
 
Principal or interest is overdue by more than 90 days or the 
debtor suffers a permanent shortage of funds or has been 
declared bankrupt or is in liquidation or the claim on the debtor 
is subject to court proceedings or the claim has been awarded to 
the bank by the court but has yet to be collected, or there is 
evidence of significant deterioration in a debtor’s financial 
condition which could hinder the repayment of obligations. 
        Source: BNB and Fitch (2007) 
                                                 
67
 In accordance with the BNB, the doubtful loans include all past-due loans (91 to 180 days) as well as 
those loans where the debtor’s financial standing has substantially deteriorated. Loss loans are defined 
as past-due loans over 181 days and credit exposures in which there are valid grounds to consider a 
permanent financial inability of the borrower to repay their obligation. 
 
68
 Even if the data on LLPs were available, other limitations would have limited the use of this time 
series. For instance, in 2004, the BNB introduced a new loan classification methodology and loan 
classification categories were reduced to four from five previously. 
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Figure 10 presents the evolution of the Bulgarian credit risk in the sample’s period 
(2001-2010).  
 
 
 
Figure 10 Credit risk for the Bulgarian banking system (2001-2010) 
 
Source: BNB. 
 
Bulgaria appears to be saddled with rather high NPLs in the beginning of the sample 
period that, in the run up to 2006, exhibits a steadily downward trend. Then, around 
mid-2006, this trend is interrupted and a hike in NPLs is evident. Thereafter the level 
of NPLs starts declining again up to the onset of the financial crisis at the end of 2008 
where the trend reverses and NPLs start picking up steeply. Notably, the pattern 
evidenced in the Bulgarian NPLs is almost uniform across the countries of the SEE 
region (Barisitz, 2011). Moreover, the slope of the crisis-triggered line in NPLs, i.e. 
after 2008 is sharper than that of the downward sloping line during the euphoria 
period that is broadly defined up to the end of 2008. 
In line with the findings in the theoretical and empirical literature review, the next 
step involves the selection of the bank-specific dataset. In both focal countries, the 
loan growth is used as a potential driving force of credit risk. This is because a key 
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lesson of past financial crashes is that credit lies at the heart of crises (Kindleberger, 
1978; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Aikman et al., 2011) fuelled by the expansion of 
liquidity in high-income countries and a fall in the price of risk. The latter 
development has changed dramatically the supply of finance in the developing 
countries since 2000 and up to the end of 2007 (World Bank, 2010). Hence, an insight 
into the dynamics of the credit cycle is important in assembling the pieces of the 
credit risk puzzle in both Bulgaria and Romania. Continuing with this argument, a 
shortage of credit is likely to affect adversely Bulgaria’s critical economic sectors, 
such as manufacturing and construction.
69
 Figure 11 displays the evolution of credit in 
the Bulgarian banking system.  
 
 
 
Figure 11 Bank loans to the non-bank sector in Bulgaria (2001-2010) 
 
Source: BNB. 
Figure 11 shows that the period 2001-2008 is marked by an accelerating upward trend 
in credit with a spike at the beginning of 2005. Then, the Bulgarian loans follow an 
even steeper hike that becomes flat, implying a stagnation in lending growth by the 
                                                 
69
 Real estate surveys as well as studies indicate that the property market and the construction activity 
in both countries have slowed down drastically in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (De Haas 
and Knobloch, 2010). A sharp contraction in the construction sector could ignite a major economic 
downward spiral with adverse consequences for banks’ loan portfolios. 
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end of 2008 when the global financial crisis hits the country. The aggressive credit 
expansion, especially during the period 2005-2007, has been actively encouraged by 
the foreign banks in both Bulgaria and Romania (De Haas and Naaborg, 2007; 
Åslund, 2010). In several emerging European economies, deposit growth was lagging 
behind, since the evidence suggests that foreign borrowing mainly fuelled the credit 
growth. Apart from the lending growth, several other bank-specific variables 
complement the Bulgarian dataset in an attempt to explore the potential effect of 
endogenous factors on credit risk. For instance, the dataset comprises of capital-
leverage and liquidity indicators, such as the capital ratio and the loans to deposit 
ratio. 
Broadly, the Bulgarian dataset consists of a wide selection of indicators grouped into 
four broad categories: macroeconomic-cyclical, monetary, financial and bank-specific 
indicators. A variety of indicators can measure the impact of macroeconomic shocks 
on the asset quality of a country’s banking system. In line with the literature and 
utilizing the insight into the structure of the Bulgarian economy, the research 
considers an extensive set of indicators in the data collection activity. As such, the 
research considers among the macroeconomic indicators the real GDP, the 
unemployment rate and consumer price index, construction indices,
70
 foreign trade as 
captured by the country’s imports and exports, the ratio of current account to real 
GDP,
71
 the industrial production index (IPI), the real effective exchange rate (REEL) 
and the average monthly wage (AMW). As Åslund (2010) points out, prior to the 
                                                 
70
 The construction index is an indicator of the construction production activity and includes building 
construction - residential and non-residential buildings - and civil engineering infrastructure 
construction such as roads, telecoms and other types of construction. 
 
71
 Duenwald et al. (2005) argue that the credit growth in Bulgaria has been driven by the perceived 
macroeconomic stabilization and capital inflows. Nevertheless, the credit boom over the period 2001-
2008 contributed significantly to widening macroeconomic imbalances. 
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crisis the Eastern Europe region was in a state of severe overheating. And lending in 
Bulgaria was dominated by the residential property cycle
72
 (IMF, 2012c). Then, as the 
crisis erupted, economic output plunged and unemployment soared. The inflation 
surged, reaching double digits in Bulgaria, wages and real estate prices skyrocketed, 
rendering the economy less competitive, which further undermined Bulgaria’s current 
account balance. The ‘bad habit’ of debt growth is also included in the dataset as its 
growth dynamics may affect the real economy and subsequently the credit risk. The 
effect of the money supply on credit risk is explored through the monetary aggregates 
M1, M2
73
 and M3. Other indicators used to capture the effect of the financial markets 
are the price of Brent crude oil, the oil imports as a share of GDP, and the stock 
markets’ composite indices as forward looking indicators of the economy. The 
Euribor and Sofibor
74
 rates cover the effect of interest rates on NPLs as well as the 
yield of the long-term Bulgarian government bond yield and its differential with the 
Greek and the German bond yield. The interest rates’ dataset is further complemented 
by the average lending-deposit rate applied by Bulgarian banks to non-financial 
corporations and households. 
Taking into account the limitations, the Bulgarian dataset can be considered as a 
comprehensive one that captures adequately the business cycle as it uses a substantial 
range of macroeconomic, financial, market and bank-specific indicators. 
                                                 
72
 IMF (2012c) includes Bulgaria among the boom-bust countries, suggesting that real house prices 
increased by more than 10% in the run-up to the global financial crisis and have declined since then. 
 
73
 The growth in the monetary aggregates, M1 and M2,is often met in empirical studies as measures of 
the liquidity in the system. High growth of these indicators might indicate excess liquidity in the 
system that under certain conditions can lead to financial crises (Eichengreen etal., 1995; 
Bhattacharyay, 2003). Equally, there are studies that associate the M2 with financial liberalization 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000). Other studies use the money supply 
indicators as proxies for GDP (Baboucek and Jancar, 2005).  
 
74
 The Euribor rates are considered to be the most important reference rates in the European money 
market. The interest rates provide the basis for the price and interest rates of all kinds of financial 
products. Sofibor rates that are the reference rates in Bulgaria are based on a contract between the 
Association of Bulgarian Banks and the BNB. In detail, the Sofibor reference rate is a fixing of the 
quotes for unsecured deposits in domestic currency offered in the Bulgarian interbank market. 
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The next section discusses the Romanian dataset. 
5.1.2 Description of the Romanian dataset 
The Romanian dataset consists of aggregate time series sourced from the NBR, the 
National Institute of Statistics in Romania and the ECB. The dataset used in 
modelling credit risk that uses monthly observations spanning from 2001 to 2010 is 
presented in Table B2 in the Appendix. 
In the case of Romania, three different aggregate indicators were considered to 
approximate the credit risk of the banking system. These are the ratio of loan 
provisions to total gross loans (LLPs), the credit risk ratio and the ratio of total loan 
defaulters to total debtors. The LLP ratio uses as nominator the provisions set aside 
for loans classified as doubtful and loss on an aggregated system level. Then, credit 
risk is defined by the NBR as the ratio of unadjusted bank exposure – capital plus 
interest – for loan exposures categorized as doubtful, and loss, to total gross loans. 
The third metric is constructed as a ratio in which the nominator, the defaulters, 
comprises the legal entities and private individuals that have defaulted on their loan 
obligation while the denominator, the debtors, comprises all types of borrowers, i.e. 
legal entities or private individuals. The plots of the three indicators are presented in 
Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Credit risk metrics for the Romanian banking system (2001-2010) 
 
Source: NBR and author’s calculations. 
Broadly all three measures move in tandem and start rising steeply by the end of 2008 
reflecting the deteriorating asset quality of the Romanian banking system as the veil 
of the global financial crisis covers the region. Despite being overshadowed by the 
rapid lending growth, the share of problem loans begins to pick up by the end of 2006. 
The share of NPLs
75
 in total loans in Romania reached 9.7% at the end of 2007 and 
accelerated in the second half of 2008 reaching a staggering 13.8% at the end of 2008 
due to the adverse economic conditions. Notably, the trend evidenced in Romanian 
credit risk metrics resembles the one observed for Bulgaria in Figure 10. The 
Romanian banking system also appears to be plagued by high NPLs at the beginning 
of the data sample.  
However, the use of NPLs as a measure of the Romanian credit risk was not feasible 
because of the small number of observations. The Romanian authorities began 
                                                 
75
 The NPLs reflect the unadjusted exposure to loans classified as loss, doubtful, and substandard, 
according to the NBR’s loan classification regulations, as a percentage of total loans using the balance 
sheet approach, which may differ from the data published in the NBR’s Monthly Bulletin. Notably, the 
numbers reported deviate significantly from those in the IMF Statistics, as shown in Table 7 of Chapter 
2. The latter manifests the data constraints and concerns that may arise on the quality of data.   
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reporting NPLs, defined as loans past-due over 90 days, in 2004 while the IMF 
database reports Romanian NPLs from 2003 onwards on a quarterly basis. Hence, the 
use of NPLs as credit risk proxy would have limited considerably the sample’s size in 
the research. Moreover, a series of changes in the regulatory framework
76
 on loan 
classification prohibited the use of the credit risk ratio. Besides the changes in 
regulation, both the ratios of credit risk and defaulters to debtors do not account for 
the entire system’s loans while the reported series that refer to foreign currency loans 
are updated with a month’s lag. The plots of both these indicators in Figure 12, 
present a certain degree of instability over time, suggesting the possibility of a number 
of breaks or potential reporting problems (Barisitz, 2011). It is worth noting that the 
preliminary empirical results produced through the use of the credit risk ratio or the 
ratio of defaulters to debtors were inconsistent and unstable, possibly owing to the 
frequent changes in the regulatory framework. 
Another issue encountered in the selection of an appropriate credit risk proxy for the 
Romanian banking system is that the NBR’s loan classification is not fully aligned 
with the treatment of loans under the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). In this respect, a study by Fitch (2009) indicates that the provision coverage 
of problem loans in Romania may be low, in the light of the potential difficulty of 
banks to recover the collateral in times of borrowers’ stress. The latter underlines a 
backward looking property of the LLP series as the provisioning policy of banks may 
not reflect the actual size of the problem loans in a timely manner. However, in view 
of the structural problems in using other indicators, the LLP ratio is chosen as the best 
                                                 
76
 In the timeframe of the research, the classification of Romanian loans changed several times. 
Initially, the classification followed the NBR’s Regulation no. 2/2000 that was subsequently amended 
by Regulation no. 5/2002. Thereafter several amendments followed as introduced by the Regulations 
nos. 7/2002, 8/2005, 12/2006, 4/2007, 5/2007, 4/2008, 3/2009, 7/2009, 13/2009 and NBR Order no. 
5/2009. The respective changes in the calculation method of the ratio prevent any practical use of the 
NBR’s credit risk series. 
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alternative proxy for the Romanian credit risk. The choice is justified to some extent 
by the empirical evidence that suggests a high correlation between LLPs and NPLs 
(Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001; Quagliariello, 2004).  
As the literature purports, the determinants of credit risk in a country’s banking 
system should not focus exclusively on macroeconomic variables. Hence, in line with 
the Bulgarian case, the dataset involves abroad set of Romanian bank-specific 
indicators, as shown in Table B2 in the Appendix. These are measures of banks’ 
leverage and liquidity, such as the loan to deposits ratio that provides a crude 
indication of the ability and the extent to which the banking system mobilizes deposits 
to meet credit demand, highlighting also the banks’ risk attitude. Furthermore, the 
leverage ratio is used to validate the moral hazard hypothesis that suggests a positive 
relationship between low capitalized banks and increasing NPLs. The system’s loans 
were also incorporated in the dataset as the credit growth dynamics may interact with 
the economy and affect the banks’ credit risk, as the Minskian hypothesis suggests. 
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the loans granted on an aggregate level in Romania 
in the timeframe of the research. 
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Figure 13 Bank loans to the non-bank sector in Romania (2001-2010) 
 
Source:  NBR and author’s calculations. 
 
Since the beginning of the sample period, the euphoric trend in loan volumes is 
evident. Notably the upward trend in 2005 becomes even sharper as the system’s 
reforms were largely completed. This can be also explained in the light of Romania’s 
late start in credit growth relative to the GDP growth, as compared to other CESEE 
economies (Cottarelli et al., 2003). Once the credit started flowing, its growth rate 
soon exceeded that of other transition countries raising concerns about the supervision 
implications. In about the second half of 2008 the upward trend reverses drastically 
and in 2009 the outstanding loans stabilize at considerably lower levels compared to 
the pre-crisis period. 
In the country’s report, IMF (2010a) reiterates that credit deterioration is the primary 
risk to the Romanian banking sector. A sharp rise in NPLs, coupled with weak growth 
prospects and exchange rate depreciation, is expected to impair the ability of 
households and corporations to service their loans. 
Similarly to Bulgaria, the Romanian data consist of an extensive set of indicators 
aimed at capturing all potential variables with explanatory power on the country’s 
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credit risk. The indicators were again grouped into four broad categories: 
macroeconomic-cyclical, monetary, financial and bank-specific indicators. The 
macroeconomic indicators include, among others, the real GDP,
77
 unemployment rate, 
consumer price index, FDI, investment expenditure, construction activity,
78
 
consumption, and foreign trade as captured by the country’s imports and exports. The 
choice of meaningful indicators is driven by their representativeness of the Romanian 
economic cycle. As such, the FDI and the country’s debt ratios have also been 
included in the data.  
The literature indicates that risks to financial stability may be increasing in emerging 
banking systems because of rapid credit growth that typically goes hand in hand with 
rising asset prices. Many studies and market reports indicate that lending in Romania 
was dominated by the residential/real estate boom, thus providing the rationale for 
including the construction indices in the dataset. This cycle is self-reinforcing, as 
theory and evidence suggests that more lending pushes up property prices which 
encourages more lending. At the onset, any modest benefits from the construction 
boom in the SEE region are outweighed by the accompanying financial and economic 
instability. The current account also serves as a meaningful variable in most transition 
countries in view of its sensitivity to workers’ inward remittances that may save the 
current account from becoming an unmanageable deficit. A sharp contraction or 
reversal of inflows could threaten the financial stability through a drying up of credit 
to the private sector, resulting in a slump in economic activity, along with increasing 
                                                 
77
 An inherent difficulty in using the GDP series in the research emanates from the quarterly frequency 
of reporting. To overcome the problem, an interpolation method was used to transform the series 
frequency from quarterly to monthly. However, the process did not go far enough in view of the debate 
in the empirical literature on transforming a series frequency.  
 
78
 The construction activity in Romania was measured by two indices: the construction production 
index (CON) and the building construction index (BCON). Broadly, these indices measure the volume 
of output in construction. BCON includes residential and non-residential building activity whereas 
CON considers civil engineering works.  
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loan defaults. On the same wavelength, almost all emerging regions experienced 
expansions, such as the FDI ‘bonanzas’ in 2001-2005, with emerging Europe 
economies being among the key beneficiaries.  
The monetary aggregates are included in the dataset as rough measures of liquidity in 
the system, also signalling potential pressure on the exchange rate. Deteriorating 
market confidence can lead to downward pressure on the free-floating exchange rate 
of the Romanian currency, a possible upward pressure on interest rates, and volatility 
in equity values, with the overall result being a degeneration of the Romanian credit 
quality. Although the stock exchange markets in the SEE region are less developed 
compared to the euro area counterparts, the dataset includes financial markets’ 
indicators such as indices BET and BET-C of the Bucharest Stock Exchange, and the 
over-the-counter market index RASDAQ. Typically, a sharp decline in stock prices 
globally signals adverse market perceptions of the financial markets’ health. Given 
the sensitivity of small, open, emerging economies in financial markets’ turbulence, 
the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 equity index is used as a forward-looking indicator of 
the economic prospects in the euro area and the markets’ expectations. Through the 
price of Brent oil, a commodity is introduced in the data, as fluctuations in oil prices 
affect the economic activity in most SEE countries. A sharp weakening of the 
Romanian national currency against the euro would adversely affect the households’ 
and businesses’ balance sheets, thus leading to a substantial increase in NPLs (IMF, 
2010a; Brown and De Haas, 2012). The latter is further supported by the tendency in 
Romania to borrow and lend in foreign currency. Given that, a substantial proportion 
of the loans granted to households and corporations in the euphoria times were 
denominated in euros. Brown and De Haas (2012) find that the foreign banks in 
Romania have been driving foreign currency lending as a result of easier access to 
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foreign wholesale funding. In view of its fluctuation historically, the exchange rate 
between the Romanian currency and the euro is also considered in the dataset. 
Similarly is the case of the Euribor and Robor reference rates that broadly determine 
the cost of borrowing in foreign and domestic currency respectively. As with 
Bulgaria, an equally comprehensive dataset has been collected for Romania to 
facilitate the investigation of the credit risk determinants in these countries.  
Table 12 summarizes the credit risk measures employed in the empirical research for 
each country.  
Table 12 Credit risk metrics considered per country 
 
Bulgaria  Romania 
Non-performing loans Credit risk 
 Loan loss provisions 
 Defaulters to debtors 
 
The ideal case would have been to use a common credit risk proxy in both focal 
countries. Such an approach would facilitate comparison between the two SEE 
countries but it was not feasible due to data limitations.
79
In most SEE countries, the 
local supervisory authority (Central Bank) issues prudential regulations with respect 
to loan classification. Certainly, such local-level legislation is liable to frequent 
changes, challenging the consistency of time series. Yet, as Barisitz (2011) indicates, 
the definitions of problem loans based on the national credit quality classifications of 
CESEE countries appear largely comparable.   
The rapid credit growth in the SEE region, driven mainly by foreign banks, poses a 
material risk factor in banking stability. In other words, the dominance of foreign 
                                                 
79
 The empirical research could not consider the LLPs for the Bulgarian banking sector as they were not 
available and, as already mentioned, the Romanian NPLs are only available since 2004.  
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banks in both Bulgaria and Romania has been a mixed blessing in view of the banking 
linkages in place that considerably increase the possibility of intra-regional contagion 
risk. Typically, these banks, in pursuing aggressive credit expansion strategies, expose 
themselves to similar risks in both home and host countries. In view of the critical 
presence of Greek banks in both countries, and in the endeavour to investigate any 
spillover effects of the Greek crisis to the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems, 
the next section discusses the indicators used to approximate the Greek debt crisis. 
5.1.3 Description of the Greek crisis dataset 
A substantial part of both the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems’ assets 
belongs to Greek banks. As the parent banks suffer severe shocks because of the 
Greek sovereign debt turmoil, the Greek subsidiaries in Bulgaria and Romania, albeit 
liquid and well capitalized (NBR, 2011; IMF, 2010a,b) encounter the material risk of 
coming under pressure and even collapsing. Equally, these banks are considered as 
crisis transmission channels through their close ties with the parent banks. Many 
authors suggest that the Greek banking system was negatively affected by the Greek 
fiscal crisis (Dalianes and Vayanos, 2011; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis; 2011; Bank of 
Greece, 2012). The long record of bank crises documents that such episodes are 
contagious as the crisis in one country can cause a loss of confidence in the 
neighbouring countries’ banks.  
A key contribution of the thesis has to do with the inclusion of a set of indicators that 
capture the Greek debt crisis and the distress situation experienced by the Greek 
banking system.
80
 In view of that, the research uses a representative set of Greek 
bank-specific, financial and market indicators in an endeavour to explore the spillover 
                                                 
80
 Reference is made to Type II banking crises as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). This is a 
milder banking crisis, also known as financial distress. That was the case with Greek banks’ financial 
profiles in the timeframe of the research.   
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effect of the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian and Romanian credit risk. The set of 
indicators that spans from 2001 to 2010 is sourced from the Bank of Greece (BOG) 
and the ECB. This dataset can be viewed in Table B3 in the Appendix. The plots of 
the three key variables used to approximate the impact of the Greek crisis are 
presented in Figures 14, 15 and 16. These are the Greek banks’ credit risks that are 
captured by the ratio of the aggregate loan loss provisions to total system’s loans81 
(LLPGR), the yield of the Greek long-term government bond as well as its spread to 
the German one (SPGD), and the ratio of assistance financing granted by ECB to total 
liabilities of the Greek banks (ECBI). The latter constitutes an emergency measure 
that was adopted by the European authorities to support the liquidity of the Greek 
banking system. As the Greek crisis became aggravated, the financial institutions in 
Greece experienced a severe liquidity shock stemming from the lending expansion 
prior to the crisis and exacerbated by a deposit flight that reflected a loss of 
confidence in the system and fears of a Greek default. 
 
                                                 
81
 Retrospectively the aggregate balance sheet of the Greek banking system went through several 
changes thus, affecting the data series. For instance, starting from June 2010 Greek banks reported the 
securitized assets that were not disclosed previously. Subsequently, the Greek banks had to reduce the 
value of the government bonds held in their portfolio of Greek government securities several times; in 
August 2011 by the amount of euro 4 billion, in January 2012 by euro 5.8 billion, in March 2012 by 
euro 15.2 billion, and in April 2012 by euro 4.1 billion on a system wide level. As the empirical 
research had to establish a cut-off point, only the initially accessed series in January 2011 is considered. 
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Figure 14 Credit risk metric for the Greek banking system, 2001-2010. 
 
Source: BOG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Spread between the Greek and German 10-year government bond 
yield, 2001-2010. 
 
Source: ECB. 
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Figure 16 Greek banks’ borrowing from the ECB, 2004-2011. 
 
Source: ECB and European Commission. 
 
The plots present a steeply upward trend, visible in all variables, that begins in 2008. 
The LLPGR ratio presents more unstable and volatile behaviour over time. Prior to 
the crisis, the LLPs in Greece were driven by tax considerations rather than the 
underlying economic realities. Fitch (2007) underscores that the calculated provisions 
are generally significantly higher than the corresponding expected loss figures. In the 
light of this and given the lack of data
82
 on Greek NPLs, the LLPGR ratio is 
considered to be an adequate proxy of the Greek banks’ distress. Overall, the variables 
presented in Figures 14-16 are expected to capture the potential spillover effect of the 
Greek crisis in the SEE banking systems under investigation. The main reasons for 
selecting the specific variables to approximate the Greek crisis are the following:   
                                                 
82
 The series on Greek banks’ NPLs is not available in the statistics database of the Bank of Greece.  
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a. The rapid expansion of Greek banks in both Bulgaria and Romania has 
resulted in imbalances and funding deficits
83
. In turn, these could have been 
transmitted in both SEE countries through the Greek subsidiaries that 
represent a critical maze in both banking systems. Then, the Greek banks’ 
credit risk is expected to convey meaningful information of the sovereign debt 
and banking crisis in Greece and as such to be viewed as a crisis transmission 
mechanism.
84
 
b. The unfolding of the Greek debt crisis can be evidenced in the volatile yield 
spread between the Greek and German long-term government bonds as a 
number of studies indicate (Tavlas et al., 2011, Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 
2012). 
c. The deteriorating asset quality of the Greek banking system, together with the 
drained liquidity is marked by the banks’ over-reliance on rescue funds 
provided by the ECB. Hence, it makes sense to employ a ratio that captures 
this monetary phenomenon which displays bank distress. 
d. The Greek banks offered investors a good emerging-market exposure 
platform. Consequently, the prospects of Greek banks in the region as well as 
the turbulent times in Greece may be reflected in stock market indices. 
A large body of literature shows that the macroeconomic or banking sector conditions 
have explanatory power at the level of the credit risk (Festić et al., 2011). Importantly, 
other authors provide evidence of the spillover effect and long-run diffusion of credit 
risk across financial institutions or regions (Herrerias and Moreno, 2012). Similarly, 
                                                 
83
 Domestic banks in SEE region have built up large negative net foreign positions vis-à-vis parent 
banks and international lenders, as credit growth has far outpaced growth in domestic deposits (IMF, 
2012b). 
 
84
 For instance, see Herrerias and Moreno (2012) on the spillover effects of credit risk. 
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the IMF (2013a) finds that the euro area market is highly integrated. Given that, the 
yield spread of the 10-year euro area government bonds over the German ones is 
influenced by country-specific risks. Other empirical studies document a strong link 
between financial stress in advanced and emerging economies where transmission is 
stronger to emerging economies with tighter financial links to advanced economies 
(Balakrishnan et al., 2009). Hence, through the Greek crisis indicators’ dataset, the 
research sets out to investigate whether the Greek debt and banking crises have had an 
impact on the stability of the Bulgarian and Romanian banking sectors.  
So far, the research activity has identified the dataset of both SEE countries as well as 
the indicators that approximate the Greek crisis. A comprehensive set of explanatory 
variables has been drawn from various sources in line with theoretical propositions 
and the findings from empirical studies in other geographical areas or time-periods.  
The following section sets forth the testable hypotheses and maps them to the research 
questions. It also defines the timeframe of the empirical research and discusses issues 
pertaining to data quality. 
5.1.4 Formulation of hypotheses 
 
In line with the theoretical framework of the research and past empirical studies, the 
research develops with the formulation of testable hypotheses in accordance with the 
standard econometric methodology. In essence, this activity links the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research with testable hypotheses. Table 13 lists the set of 
hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of the research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
 
Table 13 The set of testable hypotheses in the research 
 
Hypothesis Evidence: theory or empirical background 
1. Deteriorating credit risk is negatively 
related to with good economic 
conditions (pro-cyclicality hypothesis). 
Financial accelerator effects (Bernanke et 
al., 1999; Bernanke, 2007; Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997), Quagliariello (2008), 
Babihuga (2007), Festić et al. (2011). 
2. Credit risk is positively (negatively85) 
related to increasing lending growth 
(excess lending/financial liberalization 
hypothesis). 
Banking crises literature (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu, 
1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), Nkusu 
(2011), De Bock and Demyanets (2012). 
3. Regulation (lending restrictions) 
decreases credit risk (regulation 
hypothesis). 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. (1998), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), Podpiera, (2004). 
4. Credit risk is negatively (positively) 
related to increasing money supply 
(monetary transmission hypothesis). 
Financial accelerator effects (Bernanke et 
al., 1999; Bernanke, 2007), De Graeve et 
al. (2007), Zhang (2009), Angeloni et al. 
(2010). 
5. Credit risk is positively related to the 
Greek crisis - global financial crisis 
(crisis spillover hypothesis). 
Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), Allen 
and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000); 
Herrerias and Moreno, 2012, Bruno and 
Shin (2013), Shostya (2014). 
 
Table 13 summarizes the hypotheses to be tested by econometric analysis and maps 
each hypothesis with evidence arising from theory or studies. In this respect it 
addresses the aims and objectives of the research and puts the terms of reference in 
context to facilitate the data analysis and the estimation of regressions.  
The empirical research uses monthly observations spanning from December 2001 to 
December 2010. The following arguments are decisive in defining the timeframe of 
the research: 
a. The starting point of the research coincides with the completion of the 
privatization process of commercial banks in Bulgaria and Romania. In the 
former case the process was virtually completed in 2001-2002 (Frömmel and 
                                                 
85
 Denotes that literature has not reached a clear-cut conclusion on the influence of credit growth and 
money supply on credit risk. 
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Karagyozova, 2008). Previously, the competition in the banking market was 
distorted by state-owned banks. In the same spirit, the Romanian authorities 
initiated the first privatizations in the banking system by 1999-2000 following 
a restructuring programme launched by the NBR (2001). Therefore, the 
expansion of foreign banks in both Bulgaria and Romania took place around 
2001 concurrently with the introduction of the euro and the subsequent decline 
in interest margins in the foreign banks’ homelands.      
b. Although it is not feasible to capture a full business cycle, the dataset attempts 
to cover, at least partially, the boom-bust period up to the onset of the global 
financial crisis and the subsequent Greek one. Evidence suggests that the SEE 
region imported the crisis by 2008 through a sudden shrinkage of capital 
inflows, thus with a lag, compared to more developed economies. 
c. The need to establish a cut-off point in the empirical research. The supervisory 
authorities in the SEE region by mid-2010 began to impose emergency rules to 
prevent local banks from being drained by the parent banks in Athens 
(Economist, 2010). Contagion fears receded as drastic measures were taken to 
avert a financial and banking meltdown in Greece through rescue funds 
supplied by the IMF, EU and ECB. Similarly, in 2009 the ‘Vienna initiative’86 
was launched with the aim of supporting several banking systems of Central 
and Eastern Europe.  
Many authors suggest that the data requirements for modelling credit risk are the main 
hindrances in many countries when trying to assess the vulnerabilities of their 
                                                 
86
 The ‘Vienna Initiative’, a joint International Financial Institution action plan was a response to the 
continuing impact of the euro area’s problems, sparked by the rising debts and deficit of Greece, on the 
economies of emerging Europe. The EIB Group, the World Bank Group and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development together committed funds to avert a systemic banking crisis and a 
collapse in credit to the real economy (De Haas et al., 2012).  By the beginning of 2011 the situation in 
the region had stabilized as significant funds were mobilized in support of banking stability. 
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financial sectors (Segoviano and Padilla, 2006; Howard, 2009). Clearly, modelling 
credit risk, regardless of the methodology chosen, requires a great deal of good quality 
data as the review of the empirical studies identifies. Often what prevents a country 
from including banks’ stress tests within their surveillance toolkits is some form of 
data constraint (Howard, 2009). For example, the required information may present 
inconsistencies or there may be concerns over the accuracy of the data. Equally, 
countries are occasionally forced to compromise when it comes to data and this can 
affect the results of the research. The lack of adequate data may make it difficult to 
calibrate the assumed distributions of the data. In turn, the calibrated distributions 
may not be consistent with the analysed data generating processes. Clearly, if such 
shortcomings are evidenced and not addressed adequately, erroneous statistical 
inferences may result and interpretations would be incorrect, undermining the validity 
and reliability of the research findings. As already discussed, the credit risk time 
series in the SEE countries are relatively short or present interruptions and breaks 
(Barisitz, 2011). The lack of adequate and quality data represents a central problem 
for researchers who attempt to evaluate the impact of specific macroeconomic, 
financial indicators and events such as crises in banks’ credit risk. Given that, the 
measurement and subsequently the modelling of credit risk can be affected by data 
constraints. 
The previous section defined and discussed the datasets collected and formulated the 
testable hypotheses for the empirical research. The timeframe of the research has been 
justified and the issues related to the availability and quality of data have been 
disclosed and addressed.  
The next section provides the methodological roadmap of the empirical research and 
presents the econometric techniques utilized. 
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5.2 The methodological approach 
 
The underlying notion that dictates the choice of an appropriate methodological 
framework has to be consistent with the a priori expectations from economic theory 
and the empirical evidence but also has to provide modelling flexibility within data 
constrained environments. It has been defended since the early chapters of the thesis 
that the focal SEE countries would be best explored using a country-specific research 
design. On the other hand, several recent studies that focus on the region have used 
cross-country modelling techniques, running the risk of paying little attention to the 
distinctive aspects of each country’s economy and banking system. Equally the 
variation in the definition of problem loans as well as the diverse institutional 
environments among countries can cast doubt on the findings of cross-country panels. 
It could be argued that the collection of individual banks’ data for each country would 
solve the issue and at the same time exploit both the time series and the cross-
sectional dimensions of the sample. However, individual banks’ data could not be 
assessed for both countries for a number of reasons (Morosan, 2011), including the 
financial reporting framework. Still, if that were possible, it would have resulted in a 
considerable loss of observations, as banks report on a quarterly basis. The aims and 
objectives of the research, and the collected data, lead to time series modelling 
techniques in assessing the building up of a specific financial sector’s vulnerabilities 
over time. The estimation process requires the selection of a set of variables that, 
according to economic theory and empirical studies are expected to reasonably 
explain each country’s credit risk. The crude form of the model adopted for analysing 
the determinants of credit risk is defined as follows:  
Credit riskt = f (macrot , bank-specifict, structuralt, Greek crisist)   (1) 
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Where t denotes time. Credit risk is modelled as a function of macroeconomic, bank-
specific, institutional-structural and Greek-crisis related variables. The model controls 
for variables that capture the macroeconomic environment in which banks operate. 
The bank-specific variables included in the model have been shown in the literature 
review to be instrumental in explaining credit risk. The structural variables that 
usually take the form of dummy variables are related to the supervisory-regulatory 
policies. Lastly, the Greek crisis indicators are variables that proxy the effect of the 
Greek sovereign and banking crisis on the banking sectors of Bulgaria and Romania. 
In this setting, the research hypotheses will be tested. At the same time, the research 
sets out to investigate whether the Greek crises are associated with credit risk and 
subsequently the stability of the banking sectors of the focal countries.  
Broadly, the empirical research consists of five stages, performed for each country 
separately. These are the following: 
a. Unit root tests: standard as well as tests that account for the presence of 
endogenous structural breaks; 
b. Univariate OLS regressions to identify the variables that have explanatory 
powers for Bulgarian and Romanian credit risk; 
c. Multivariate regressions using OLS and GMM estimators that are based on the 
variables identified by the univariate regressions; 
d. Estimation of cointegration models: autoregressive distributed lag models 
(ARDL) and vector error correction models (VECM);  and 
e. Estimation of Markov switching structural vector autoregressive models (MS-
SVAR), combined with the estimation of time varying structural vector 
autoregressive models (TV-SVAR). 
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In formal modelling terms, in stages (b) to (d) the reduced-form relationships rather 
than structural models are estimated as the aim is to uncover the statistical linkages in 
place as well as explore the cointegrating relationships shaped between the key 
explanatory variables and credit risk for each country. In this respect, a relationship is 
posited between credit risk and a host of potential explanatory variables that is 
assumed to be exogenous or at least pre-determined. Then, the models are qualified 
and their robustness validated using specification and diagnostic tests, as suggested by 
econometric theory. The functionality offered by Eviews 7.1 software is employed for 
the unit root tests, the estimations of the linear regression models and the VECM 
models. The ARLD models were estimated using Microfit 3.1 software. Lastly, the 
estimations of the MS-SVAR and TV-SVAR models were based on the use of 
routines, kindly provided by Dr. Karoglou, that identify the regime switches, 
developed in the Ox 6.2 platform.  
Prior to any modelling attempt, the time series were tested for unit roots to determine 
their order of integration and avoid spurious regressions. The next subsection 
describes this activity. 
5.2.1 The unit root tests 
Having defined the modelling setup and gained some insight from the data plots that 
are studied in line with the institutional context of each country, the next step involves 
the unit root tests since it is well known that macroeconomic variables are usually 
non-stationary in their levels. Unit root testing has become mandatory in modern time 
series analysis, as the application of classical methods of estimation to models with 
non-stationary time series can give rise to spurious results and misleading inferences 
(Phillips, 1986; Stock and Watson, 1989). The order of integration is critical in the 
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application of cointegration modelling techniques. However, while the application of 
VECM requires pre-testing the variables to determine their order of integration, such a 
condition is not always necessary when applying the ARDL approach to 
cointegration. Thus, the empirical research proceeds with the standard unit root 
testing, although most macroeconomic time series can typically be described as I(1) 
with the imposition of a deterministic seasonal pattern (Osborn, 1990). 
The findings of Nelson and Plosser (1982) spawned a wave of research that emerged 
on the unit root hypothesis. Specifically, the traditional view that the current shocks 
only have a temporary effect and the long-run movement in the series is unaltered by 
such shocks was challenged by Nelson and Plosser (1982) who consider that random 
shocks are bound to have permanent, as distinct from transitory, effects on the long-
run level of macroeconomics. In view of the developments in the literature, a testing 
strategy that incorporates all available information is required as opposed to mere 
calculation of test statistics.  
Judging from the empirical studies, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1979) test 
has become the most popular of many competing unit root tests in the literature. In the 
light of this, the time series were initially tested using the ADF test as proposed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) and refined in Dickey and Fuller (1981). Next, the tests 
proposed by Phillips and Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) are applied to 
increase the validity and reliability of the ADF results. Technically speaking, the 
series entering this thesis models should present a constant long-run mean and a finite 
variance that do not depend on time, i.e. the model is stationary. On the other hand, 
non-stationary series present changing means and variances over time, thus series do 
not return to their long-term averages after short-run deviations. Nevertheless, if 
properly differenced, time series that are initially non-stationary can be turned into 
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stationary ones (Granger, 1986). The unit root tests are performed using the general 
form of the equations
87
 as Campbell and Perron (1991) argue that the improper 
exclusion of either the intercept or trend can jeopardize the power of the test.  
The Phillips and Perron (PP) (1988) test, considered next, is an alternative unit root 
test that is also frequently used in empirical studies. In addition, the test proposed by 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), known as the KPSS test is considered. The choice of the 
KPSS test to complement the widely employed ADF and PP tests is motivated by the 
argument that tests designed on the basis of the null hypothesis that a series is 
integrated of order one, have a low power of rejecting the null. Since economic series 
are not very informative about whether or not there is a unit root, it would be useful to 
perform tests of the null hypothesis of stationarity as well as tests of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). Moreover, a common pitfall of 
the ADF and PP tests relates to their sensitivity to different functional forms. Hence, 
these tests can provide misleading results if an inappropriate number of lagged 
coefficients is introduced into the model. To this end, the selection of the appropriate 
model is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) proposed by Akaike (1974) 
and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) introduced by Schwarz (1978). 
More recent studies, however, have generated evidence indicating that in the presence 
of a structural break, the standard unit root tests are biased towards the non-rejection 
of the null hypothesis (Perron, 1989). The visual inspection of the plots of the 
Bulgarian and Romanian credit risk metrics as well as the loan growth in both 
countries and the Greek crisis proxies suggest the possibility of breaks in the data. For 
instance, the plot of NPLs in Bulgaria presents a hike by mid-2006 while the plot of 
growth in loans appears to have a break in early 2005. A number of scholars tried to 
                                                 
87
 On the general form of the equations used in the unit root tests, see Maddala (2001), Harris and Sollis 
(2003) and Asteriou and Hall (2007). 
 170 
 
overcome the issue of breaks by proposing a specific treatment, which is the 
endogenous determination of the break point using the existing data (Banerjee et al., 
1992; Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Perron and Vogelsang, 1992; Perron, 1997; 
Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997). It should be stressed, however, that the proposed 
endogenous tests have received criticism for their treatment of breaks under the null 
hypothesis (Lee and Strazicich,2003). In view of the criticism surrounding the 
conventional unit root tests, the unit root tests continued by testing if the previous 
results are biased because possible breaks in the series have been ignored (Perron 
1997; Zivot and Andrews, 1992). In passing, it is worth mentioning that the model 
developed by Perron (1997) slightly differs from the one coined by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) in that the latter is devoid of the one-time break dummy. 
Overall, the advantages emanating from utilizing this procedure for testing the unit 
root hypothesis while allowing for the possible presence of structural breaks are 
twofold. This procedure generates results free from bias towards non-rejection as well 
as tracing the possible presence of a structural break. Clearly, a problem faced when 
applying unit root tests relates to their poor size and power properties, i.e. the 
tendency to over-reject the null when it is true and under-reject the null when it is 
false (Harris and Sollis, 2003). The latter justifies the extensive unit root testing 
strategy followed in the research.  
Having established the order of integration, next the estimation of univariate and 
multivariate OLS regressions follows. This modelling activity is discussed in the 
following subsection. 
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5.2.2 The univariate and multivariate models 
Even today, the core methods of applied econometrics remain largely unchanged as 
the most important tools that an applied econometrician can use are regression 
models. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) state, “regressions, carefully applied to 
coherent research questions, almost always make sense”. Following an approach that 
is analogous to Arpa et al. (2001), Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Boss (2002), 
initially ordinary least squares (OLS) univariate regressions are estimated to identify 
the indicators with explanatory power on the credit risk of both countries. A central 
assumption of this modelling stage is that the time series of the variables do not 
contain unit roots. The latter has already been dealt with in the previous section. The 
generalized regression model that provides the basic framework, obtains the following 
form: 
tititt XXY   ...110     (2) 
 
Where ΔYt denotes the first differences of the credit risk variable employed for each 
country, ΔXt the change in explanatory variable Xi at time t, which could have an 
impact on the credit risk with direction and magnitude defined by αi, and εt is the error 
term at time t that is assumed to be an independent, normally distributed random 
variable, i.e.t i.i.d. (0, 
2
). 
Thus the monthly changes of the credit risk variables used for each country are 
regressed against each indicator that was included in the datasets which are presented 
in Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix. The univariate regressions provide fertile 
ground for identifying the variables that are correlated with the dependent variable. 
The credit risk indicators are regressed against each possible explanatory variable at 
time t but also at all lags up to one year, i.e. up to t-12. The rationale behind this 
extensive approach is to capture the potential lagged effects of any explanatory 
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variable on the credit risk indicators, implying that asset quality issues are usually 
disclosed on the banks’ financial statements quite a time after the bad loans’ problem 
emerges. The latter argument which finds support in many empirical studies (Kalirai 
and Scheicher, 2002; Boss, 2002; Quagliariello, 2004). Another advantage of this 
repetitive approach is that it enables analysis of the robustness of the models’ 
specification (Kalirai and Scheicher, 2002). In addition, Boss (2002) adds a dynamic 
component to his model by assuming that each of the macroeconomic, explanatory 
variables follows a univariate autoregressive process of order two, i.e. an AR(2) 
process. As this is considered a rather restrictive assumption, it was not adopted. 
In the next stage of model estimations, the statistically significant variables, as 
identified in the univariate regressions, are used in the estimation of a multivariate 
credit risk model. This stage uses the general-to-specific methodology as developed 
by Hendry (1993). The criteria to arrive at a final model formulation are as follows: 
a. The variables in the final specification of the multivariate model should bear 
the ‘correct’ economical sign. 
b. Ideally, one significant indicator from each group of variables88 should enter 
the model. 
c. The model should be reasonably plausible and simple. Such models are more 
easily interpreted and communicated (Maddala, 2001). 
d. All variables that enter the multivariate model should be significant at the 10% 
level of significance. 
e. The standard diagnostic tests should indicate no pathological issues in terms of 
first and second order serial correlation, multicollinearity or heteroskedasticity 
in the error terms.  
                                                 
88
 The groups of variables as presented in Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix are broadly defined as 
macroeconomic-cyclical indicators, monetary, financial markets-interest rates, and bank-specific 
variables. 
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A drawback of the OLS findings relates to a potential issue of endogeneity among 
variables. These are accommodated through the General Moments Method (GMM) 
estimations that under proper specification, instrumental variables (IV) can overcome 
the problem of endogeneity. In principle, estimations using IV can avoid biases that 
OLS estimation suffers when explanatory variables are correlated with disturbances 
(Murray, 2006). The real challenge in this endeavour is finding appropriate 
instruments. In this respect, the strategies outlined in Murray (2006) and Roodman 
(2009) have been utilised. However, it should be noted that there is a trade-off 
between OLS and IV as there is a trade-off between bias and efficiency in GMM 
estimators. In detail, there is an efficiency loss in IV estimation compared to OLS, 
especially in small samples (Altonji and Segal, 1996; Canova, 2007). On the other 
hand, the GMM estimators perform better when the number of observations is large 
(well-above 100) but, for small samples, their performance can be far from appealing 
(Canova, 2007).     
The use of univariate and multivariate OLS regressions provides some preliminary 
indications on the relationships among the variables of interest. Building on the 
premises provided by the previously outlined modelling stage, the empirical analysis 
proceeds by using cointegration techniques in an endeavour to unravel credit risk in 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
5.2.3 Cointegration analysis techniques: ARDL and VECM modelling 
In recent years, reams of academic papers have been produced proposing different 
methodologies on how to investigate long-run equilibrium between time series 
variables. In this respect, cointegration analysis can prove fruitful in providing 
information on the long-term equilibrium relationships among credit risk and a set of 
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explanatory variables. On the other hand, the error correction modelling (ECM) as a 
tool of analysis overcomes the problems of spurious regression through the use of 
appropriate differenced stationary residuals in order to determine the short-term 
adjustments in the model. Within the spectrum of cointegration techniques, the vector 
error correction model (VECM) and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration
89
 occupy the lion’s share in empirical studies. On the 
univariate front, cointegration techniques such as those of Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Phillips and Hansen (1990) have been applied. As for multivariate cointegration, 
the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood 
procedures, i.e. the VECM framework, are extensively used in empirical research. A 
relatively new procedure is the ARDL approach that has gained increasing popularity 
in recent years. The approach that has been advanced by Pesaran and Smith (1998), 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001), presents flexibility as well as 
several appealing aspects that are not present in other cointegration techniques. For 
instance, as long as the ARDL model is free from residual correlation, endogeneity 
becomes less of a problem. Pesaran and Shin (1999) demonstrated that the appropriate 
lags in the ARDL model correct for both serial correlation and endogeneity problems. 
The ARDL approach to cointegration has been applied in studies dealing with the 
finance-growth nexus. However, in the case of credit risk determinants, studies that 
use the VECM framework are limited, while those that apply the ARDL approach are 
rare. This can be attributed to the fact that the ARDL approach is relatively new, as is 
broadly the case with the banks’ stability studies that link credit risk to the 
macroeconomy.  
                                                 
89
 Also found in the literature as a bounds testing approach within the ARDL framework. 
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The ARDL approach yields certain econometric advantages over other cointegration 
techniques. More specifically, endogeneity problems and the inability to test 
hypotheses on the estimated coefficients in the long-run associated with the Engle-
Granger method are avoided; the long and short-run parameters of the model are 
estimated simultaneously; all variables are assumed to be endogenous; it also obviates 
the need to establish the order of integration amongst the variables (Alexiou et al., 
2008). The bounds testing method as proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) can be 
implemented regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(0), I(1), or 
fractionally integrated. Another advantage of this approach is that the model takes a 
sufficient numbers of lags to capture the data generating process in a general-to-
specific modelling framework. Lastly, a dynamic error correction model (ECM) can 
be derived from ARDL, which integrates short-run dynamics with the long-run 
equilibrium without losing long-run information (Shrestha and Chowdhury, 2005; 
Mallick and Agarwal, 2007; Masih and Hamdan, 2008) through a linear 
transformation (Banerjee et al., 1992). 
For reasons of simplicity, equation (3) provides the generic framework of the ARDL 
model as used in the empirical research: 
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In the first part of equation (3) the terms denoted by βi, in the summation operators, 
represent the error correction or short run dynamics of the model, whereas the second 
part with the terms denoted by λi represent the long run relationship, Δ denotes the 
first difference operator, p is the optimal lag length and εt is a random disturbance 
term. To keep the model tractable and interpretable, five variables at most enter the 
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cointegrating equation, taking into account the sample size and the loss in degrees of 
freedom. It is worth noting that the ARDL approach to cointegration estimates a 
considerable number of regressions in an attempt to obtain the optimal lag length for 
each variable. Specifically, the ARDL approach estimates the (p+1)
k
 number of 
regressions, where p is the maximum number of lags to be used while k is the number 
of variables in the equation. As the sample includes monthly data, a sensible option is 
to set the maximum lag length at twelve periods (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). The 
determination of an appropriate and correctly specified ARDL model, i.e. the optimal 
lag-length of each variable, is based on selection criteria, either the SIC or the AIC. 
Next, the null hypothesis of λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0, which implies the non-
existence of a long-run relationship against the alternative that at least one is non-
zero, is tested. If a cointegrating relationship exists, then the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Hence, the long run relationship amongst the variables is put to the test using 
the bounds testing approach coined by Pesaran et al. (2001). This approach is based 
on the F-test or Wald-test statistics. Once a long-run relationship is established, the 
long-run estimates can be obtained as well as the speed of adjustment to equilibrium 
level after a shock that is captured by the error correction representation, as conveyed 
in the following form: 
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Where λ is the speed of adjustment and EC is the error correction component defined 
as: 
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Following the estimation of the ARDL model, standard diagnostics and stability tests 
are performed to test the model’s validity. The results obtained from the ARDL 
approach for both countries are subsequently cross-checked using the cointegration 
techniques of Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992). The 
authors proposed a maximum likelihood testing procedure for the number of 
cointegrating vectors that also include testing procedures for linear restrictions on the 
cointegrating parameters. The general framework of the VECM specification is 
described in equation (6). Any p-dimensional vector Xt of non-stationary variables 
which follows a Gaussian VAR process with lag order k+1and a drift μ can be written 
as: 
tktkt
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Where t = 1,..,T, εt, is an independently and identically distributed p-dimensional 
vector, and T is the sample size. The dimension of the cointegrating vector is given by 
the rank of matrix –Γk+1. When the rank is r, we can decompose Γk+1into –Γk+1=αβ’, 
here α and β are pr matrices. The rows of β’ from the r represent cointegrating 
vectors.  If we consider the elements of the r  1 vector β’Xt-k-1 as ‘error correction’ 
terms, then the elements of matrix (-α) show the speed of adjustment of the dependent 
variables towards the equilibrium. Johansen (1988, 1991) proposed how to derive 
maximum likelihood estimates of α and β and suggested two likelihood ratio test 
statistics to determine the rank of the cointegration space. Using the trace statistic, the 
null hypothesis under test is that there are at most r cointegrating vectors. With the 
use of maximum eigenvalue statistics, one can test for the presence of r versus r+1 
cointegrating vectors. Similar to the ARDL approach, the issue of finding the optimal 
lag length is important as it is required to have Gaussian error terms. Hence, the lag 
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length selection criteria are utilized, i.e. the AIC and SIC information criteria as well 
as the standard diagnostics of the error terms. 
The next step entails the estimation of the VECM models based on the Pantula 
principle as suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1992). This involves the estimation 
of all possible models and a model selection procedure that moves from the most 
restrictive hypotheses in intercept and trend to the least restrictive ones. According to 
Granger and Lin (1995) causality in the long-run exists only when the coefficients of 
the cointegrating vector are statistically significantly different from zero. In the 
present research, the variable deletion (F-type) tests have been applied for the 
coefficients of the cointegrating vector and for the lagged values of the Bulgarian and 
Romanian credit risk proxies.  
In essence, the VECM framework is used as complementary to the ARDL one since it 
has been noticed in the empirical literature that researchers rarely cross-validate the 
estimated cointegrating vectors through an alternative technique. Certainly, this is not 
always feasible as the cointegration framework applied is dictated to some extent by 
the order of integration of the participating variables. Although the ARDL approach to 
cointegration can accommodate for a mix of I(0) and I(1) variables,
90
 the same is not 
desirable in the VECM framework, as the inclusion of such variables can massively 
affect the results (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). The present research allows the validation 
of the ARDL findings using the VECM, as the variables that entered the ARDL 
cointegrating equations were found to be integrated of order one, i.e. I(1). 
Cointegration analysis is a useful tool that is used extensively in applied research. The 
estimated models provide information on the long run equilibrium relationships 
between the Bulgarian and the Romanian credit risk and a set of endogenous variables 
                                                 
90
 Yet, it should be pointed out that the ARDL approach to cointegration fails to provide robust results 
when dealing with I(2) variables (Pesaran et al., 2001).  
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that were selected on the basis of the OLS regression equations estimated previously. 
Nonetheless, cointegration is a purely statistical concept that is based on the properties 
of the time series considered. It is a-theoretical econometrics (Maddala, 2001). As 
such, it lacks the theoretical foundations of economics and for this reason the 
estimated models cannot be taken as de facto ‘true’ or ‘realistic’ representations of the 
underlying relationships. Instead, the estimated models should be viewed as an 
attempt to capture empirically relevant features of the observed data that may have 
arisen from a variety of different structural models.  
Since its birth, the cointegration approach has received criticism for several reasons. 
Smith (2000) commented on the low power of unit root tests, implying that it is 
dangerous to insist on pre-testing for unit roots and then develop models, while 
Hendry (2000) criticized the error-correction mechanisms for not being in reality what 
their name suggests. It is also often not clear how the coefficient estimates should be 
interpreted, especially in the short-run relationships when signs are not as expected. In 
particular, some lagged variables may have coefficients which may change sign 
across the lags, and this, together with the interconnectivity of the equations, could 
render it difficult to see what effect a given change in a variable would have upon the 
future values of the variables in the system. Hendry (2000) states that 
multicollinearity occurs appallingly in models that use many cointegrated variables 
with uninterpretable effects. Hence, in the estimation of cointegrating regressions, 
many of the problems found in usual regressions, such as parameter instability due to 
structural change, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity, are often ignored. In the 
present thesis the residual diagnostic tests are properly disclosed.  
Although both cointegrating techniques used in the research are widely accessible to 
applied economics, the author of this thesis justifiably limit the number of variables 
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that enter the model in order to simplify the cointegrating relationships. In this 
respect, both cointegration techniques provide reasonable approximations of the 
relationships and the models obtained were plausible, informative and stochastically 
simple. The estimated relationships allow the consistency of the proposed hypotheses 
to be tested without pretending to, literally, represent the phenomena under study. 
Cointegration models intend merely to clarify the relationships among general 
concepts. As such, they are simplified to exhibit that the author understands that the 
real world is in fact more complicated. The bottom line is that applied research needs 
to overcome the obstacles encountered due to the complex nature of the phenomena 
involved. To model phenomena, one needs to simplify them. And simplifications of 
the real world rely on a set of assumptions that may prove invalid. This is because the 
exact distributions for finite samples are unknown. Equally, most tests do not follow 
their usual distributions or hold asymptotically.  
Macroeconomic theory is interested in long-run equilibrium relationships. As these 
relationships hardly ever hold exactly in reality, there is a need for empirically 
supported knowledge on the long-run equilibrium relationships. Such information can 
be generated much better and more precisely by using cointegration analysis, rather 
than by employing traditional econometric models (Kirchgässner et al., 2013).  
So far, the empirical research provides valuable insight into the long run relationships 
between credit risk and a set of variables. As the evidence in favour of unit root 
processes in most economic time series has been found to be fragile, preoccupation 
with cointegration as a sole vehicle for studying dynamic relationships is unwarranted 
(Maddala, 2001). For this reason, the research considers next the Markov regime 
switching models that account for non-linearities in the data.  
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5.2.4 The Markov switching vector autoregression modelling approach 
The motivation for using the Markov switching structural vector autoregression (MS-
SVAR) framework is the crises episodes, the global financial crisis and the Greek 
debt crisis and their potential influence on the Bulgarian and Romanian credit risk 
indicators.  
Reflecting on the global financial crisis, Gorton (2012) suggests that a crisis is a 
regime switch-type event that puts under scrutiny the assumed linearity of models 
(Blanchard, 2014). Evidently, many studies on credit risk determinants use series up 
to 2008 as further estimation may reveal potential signs of instability in the 
coefficients. Several authors report that the statistical properties of the data during or 
around crises periods depart from those in stable times (Danielson, 2002; Haldane, 
2009). However, models that are built upon forward looking agents should account 
for potential parameter changes in the future.  
The original application of regime switching can be found in Hamilton’s (1989) 
seminal work on business cycles expansions and recessions, where the regimes 
capture cycles of economic activity around a long-term trend. Markov switching 
models generally have the ability to fit the data better in a sample, compared to other 
time series methods (Smith and Summers, 2005; Brooks, 2008). Furthermore, 
ordinary VARs have the drawback that the generated impulse responses cannot be 
given any structural interpretation because their innovations are not identified with the 
underlying structural error. Hence, following the argument found in the burgeoning 
literature coining that “the data ask for Markov switching models” and the extensive 
application of these models in empirical finance
91
 (Ang and Timmermann, 2011; 
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Applications of the method in empirical finance can be found in asset returns modelling, interest rates 
and exchange rates. Typical applications of the Markov switching models relate to the study of 
business cycles (Kim and Nelson, 1999; Smith and Summers, 2005). 
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Guidolin, 2012), the approach is potentially a useful one, given that there is no related 
empirical evidence
92
 in the research’s area of investigation.  
The MS-SVAR framework combines two important developments of VAR analysis, 
the Markov regime-switching and the identification
93
 one. Under the Markov 
switching approach, the universe of possible outcomes is split into n states, denoted st, 
t=1,…,n, corresponding to n regimes. Hence, it is assumed that Yt, the credit risk 
variable, switches regime according to an unobserved variable st. Movements of the 
state variable between regimes are governed by a Markov process that can be 
expressed as:  
   1121 ,...,,   tttt YYaPYYYYaP       (7) 
 
Equation (7) implies that the probability distribution of the state at any time t depends 
only on the state at time t-1 and not on the past states, t-2, t-3,… Thus, the Markov 
processes are not path dependent. In the research’s context, the estimated MS-SVAR 
model obtains the following form that describes an autoregressive process: 
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Where stΩ={1,...,n} is the unobserved state variable which follows a Markov 
process with transition probability matrix P=(pij)’i,jΩ. The elements of the transition 
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 Among the few studies that use Markov models in the Romanian context, but not on banks’ credit 
risk, are those by Racaru et al. (2006), Caraiani (2010) and IMF (2012a). Racaru et al. (2006) test two 
early warning systems on currency crises in a sample of emerging economies based on the 
methodology initiated by Kaminsky et al. (1998). IMF (2012a) uses ARCH Markov regime switching 
techniques to examine financial stress in Romania. The results of the analysis that uses daily data from 
2007 to mid-2012 indicate that Romania’s bond and equity markets moved to a high volatility state, 
suggesting that domestic asset prices have been impacted on from European crisis spillovers. Based on 
the findings, IMF (2012a) suggests that the recessionary period starts in 2008, earlier than conventional 
thought. Caraiani’s (2010) study signals a great potential in using regime switching models for the 
analysis of Romanian macroeconomic dynamics. 
 
93
 Structural VARs (SVAR) solve the problem of interpreting VARs by introducing restrictions 
sufficient to identify the underlying shocks. In turn, these restrictions used for identifying the model 
can be a mix of theoretical and a-theoretical ones.  
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probability matrix suggest that if the unobserved state variable at time t is in regime i 
there is a probability pij will move to regime j at time t+1, i.e. )|( 1 isjsPp ttij   . As 
for the error terms, it is assumed that ) (0, NID ~ )ε(s 2
tt  S
 . According to Krolzig’s (1997) 
taxonomy, MS-VAR models can be classified into two broad categories: models with 
switches in their intercept and models with switches in their mean. Then, these two 
categories can be further classified, depending on which of the VAR parameters are 
allowed to vary across regimes: the intercept (or mean), the autoregressive 
coefficients, or the variance-covariance matrix. Assuming no prior knowledge, all 
parameters are allowed to be state dependent in the context of the research. Hence, the 
approach allows the data generating process to exhibit completely different dynamics 
across a predefined number of regimes. The process can switch from one regime to 
another several times yielding a stochastic behaviour that resembles the presence of 
breaks, which the relevant literature often calls endogenous to signify that their 
appearance can be modelled.  
Next, a state-dependent structural shock u(st)= A(st)ε(st) is identified by imposing sign 
restrictions on the impulse response of credit risk to a set of macroeconomic, bank-
specific and Greek-crisis related shocks. The impulse responses that are regime-
dependent are computed based on the QR decomposition of an n×n random matrix K 
and the Cholesky factor of: 
)'()()( ttt sAsAs   (9) 
 
Where Q is a unitary matrix and R is an upper triangular matrix. More concretely, 
using a random matrix K of dimension n×n from the N(0,1), the QR decomposition of 
K=QR is obtained and the structural impact matrix A(st)= A(st)Q′ is computed. If the 
draw satisfies the restriction it remains in the model, otherwise it is disregarded. In 
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line with the set-up in the cointegrating equations, the sample data consist of five 
variables in order to keep the models tractable. Furthermore, in the Markov switching 
setting, a common set of indicators has been used for both countries
94
 to facilitate 
comparisons. In order to achieve identification of the VAR system, a positive 
response of credit risk (NPL or LLP) to shocks from LOAN, UN and the Greek crisis 
(LLPGR) is imposed. Alternatively, a negative response of credit risk to M2 is 
imposed. Although there may be arguments for a positive response of credit risk to 
M2 through the risk taking channel, it is assumed that a positive money supply shock 
is the response to an increase in economic activity. It should be mentioned though, 
that the approach allows the ‘data to speak’. In other words, if the restrictions prove 
invalid then they will be rejected by the shape of the impulse responses. Next, the 
parameters of the MS-SVAR models are estimated using the maximum likelihood 
method as described by Kim and Nelson (1999).  
The MS-SVAR modelling framework is complemented by the use of a time-varying 
structural vector autoregression model (TV-SVAR) which allows parameters to 
change across different regimes, assuming that regimes change exogenously. The 
approach differs from the standard time-varying VAR model where parameters evolve 
slowly and the MS-SVAR model where the parameters change across different 
regimes but remain the same within the same regime. In the TV-SVAR approach 
employed, the time variation of the parameters is driven by exogenous shocks that 
alter the mean or the volatility dynamics of the stochastic process. In line with the 
views of Ang and Timmermann (2011), who treat financial crises as dramatic events 
that change the dynamic interaction between financial and macroeconomic variables, 
the TV-SVAR modelling approach suggests that the time-variation of parameters is 
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driven by dramatic exogenous shocks. The TV-SVAR approach involves (a) the 
identification of the number and timing of shocks using a two-step procedure 
proposed by Karoglou (2010) and (b) estimating the impact of the structural shocks 
using a structural VAR based on the same model-consistent restrictions imposed in 
the case of MS-SVAR.   
Karoglou (2010) proposed the ‘nominating-awarding’ procedure to identify the timing 
of an unknown number of breaks. In essence, the procedure involves two stages: a 
nominating stage of break dates and an awarding one. The nominating stage is an 
algorithm-based procedure that uses one or more statistical tests to identify the 
possible break dates in the data. The procedure utilises some recently developed 
tests
95
 for structural breaks that have different properties from the standard ones 
(Sansó et al., 2003). The aim is to take advantage of the special characteristics of each 
test and particularly the trade-off between size distortions and low power. The 
underlying idea of the procedure is that discrepancies in the detected break dates 
could be informative about the properties of the stochastic process. The algorithm 
used in the nominating procedure is implemented with each of the single break date 
statistics of the unit root tests and is applied to each series in ascending and 
descending time order to avoid masking effects. Following the nomination of the 
potential breakdates, the awarding stage serves as a screening process for the detected 
(nominated) ones. Essentially, the awarding stage describes the process used in 
deciding whether a nominated breakdate is indeed a break date. Initially, the 
procedure assumes that all potential nominations are breakdates. Then, it unites the 
contiguous nominated segments, i.e. the segments identified by the nominated break 
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 These tests have been developed by Inclán and Tiao (1994), Andreou and Ghysels (2002) and Sansó 
et al. (2003). Nevertheless, Karoglou (2006) suggests that the relative performance of each of the tests 
depends on the underlying data generating process.    
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dates, unless the means or variances of the contiguous segments are statistically 
different. In essence, the tests in the awarding stage follow a different approach to the 
one used in the nominating stage, as they test for the equality of means and variances 
of different samples, which in this case are two contiguous segments. This testing 
procedure is repeated until no further segments can be united. 
The described approach allows the estimation of the MS-SVAR model under the 
different predefined regimes and the TV-SVAR model under the time segments 
identified by the use of the ‘nominating-awarding’ procedure. Through the estimated 
models, the impulse responses are uncovered. The impulse responses trace out the 
responsiveness of credit risk to shocks to each of the other variables in the SVAR 
models. Thus, for each variable from each model separately, a unit shock is applied to 
the error, and the effects upon the SVAR models over time are interpreted. As Runkle 
(1987) argues, the impulse responses are difficult to interpret with any great accuracy. 
For this reason, Runkle (1987) suggests, confidence bands around the impulse 
responses are constructed. 
The MS-SVAR framework jointly with the TV-SVAR provides a useful, yet 
unexplored tool for analysing the dynamics of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania by 
identifying the different regimes in the former case and the time segments in the latter. 
Occasionally, the Markov regimes in models where all parameters are allowed to 
switch can be hard to interpret. In this respect, the regime segment-dependent impulse 
responses, where the credit risk of both countries is subjected to an unexpected shock, 
can be of benefit.  
Certainly, non-linear time series models are not a panacea and have their own 
limitations. For instance, the number and frequency of observations are critical for the 
sensitivity of the estimated models. Secondly, MS-SVARs possess multiple regimes, 
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and the number of impulse responses is equally augmented, which can lead to 
cumbersome empirical analysis as different regimes with diverging dynamics can 
become hard to interpret. Furthermore, Haldane and Madouros (2012) suggest that the 
complexity of models may generate robustness problems. Equally the complex 
dynamics intervening in the propagation of shocks due to the possibility of regime 
switches over the studied horizon, can lead to large error bands with low significance. 
Despite these limitations, the Markov switching models can yield significant 
improvement, compared to the constant-parameter, linear time series models. In this 
respect the approach provides valuable results in the context of the thesis and any 
reliability issues that may arise are dealt with through the variety of estimation 
techniques used in the research. 
The next section concludes the chapter. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter presented the dataset and provided a critical account of the 
methodological approaches used in the empirical part of the thesis. Founded on the 
research’s theoretical underpinnings and the review of empirical studies, the chapter 
presented the formulation of testable hypotheses. The data constraints have been 
disclosed and the limitations of each econometric technique acknowledged.  
The dataset collection process has identified the credit risk metrics for the Bulgarian 
and the Romanian banking systems. The choice of credit risk proxies is dictated by 
data availability issues. In this respect, the measurement of credit risk suffers from a 
lack of directly comparable data. Given the importance of addressing credit risk in the 
SEE emerging economies, the ability to quantify it adequately in data-restricted 
environments becomes a challenging task. Broad sets of macroeconomic, financial, 
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monetary and bank-specific indicators with potential explanatory power on each 
country’s credit risk were collected. The monthly datasets for both countries span 
from 2001 to 2010, thus covering part of the boom-bust cycle in both countries. A set 
of indicators was also collected to approximate the spillover effect of the Greek crisis 
in the banking systems of the focal countries.  
To the author’s knowledge this is the first empirical study that deals with the 
Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems on a country level. Although both countries 
have participated in panel estimations, critical idiosyncratic factors related to each 
country’s economy and banking sector have not been addressed. As the chapter 
identified and the data plots displayed, there are stark differences between the two 
countries in terms of credit risk evolution, growth in credit and regulatory framework. 
In view of the endeavour to explore an uncharted territory, the empirical research 
applies a robust five-staged approach to tackle the drivers of credit risk and examine 
the potential spillover effect from the Greek crisis. As such, an extensive unit root 
strategy is applied that makes use of the standard tests as well as those that account 
for the presence of structural breaks. Then, univariate and multivariate OLS and 
GMM regressions are estimated to provide an insight into the explanatory variables 
for the focal countries’ credit risk. Subsequently the analysis applies cointegration 
techniques that were rarely used in related studies. Driven by the crises episodes that 
suggest regime shifts and non-linear data generation processes, the empirical analysis 
is further complemented by the Markov switching framework that is used jointly with 
a time varying structural VAR model. The latter approach mitigates the problem of 
structural changes in the data and facilitates the investigation of credit risk’s responses 
to shocks originating from a set of variables under different regimes.  
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A key contribution of the empirical research relates to the choice of econometric 
techniques used, namely, the ARDL approach to cointegration and the Markov 
switching modelling. Although both techniques have been used in other fields of 
economic research, in the case of empirical work on credit risk determinants, the 
evidence is almost non-existent. The application of these techniques allows the 
gaining of an insight into a turbulent period for both banking systems. In view of that 
the next chapter discusses the empirical findings.  
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Chapter 6: Empirical Evidence 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present and interpret the findings of the econometric 
modelling with respect to the scope of the thesis. The empirical analysis purports to 
investigate the determinants of credit risk in the Bulgarian and Romanian banking 
systems. Furthermore, the empirical research explores the spillover effects from the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis that transmitted almost instantly to the Greek banksand 
soon became a threat to the SEE countries, where the presence of Greek banks’ 
subsidiaries is substantial. 
Using a comprehensive monthly dataset comprised of macroeconomic, monetary, 
financial and bank-specific variables that spans the period 2001-2010, the research 
follows a four-stage modelling route to embrace the phenomena in a systematic 
methodological research design. The roadmap of this chapter is closely aligned to the 
previous one to preserve consistency. Hence, Section 6.1 discusses the unit root tests 
and Section 6.2 sheds light on the shaped relationships by reporting the findings of the 
univariate and multivariate regressions. Section 6.3 presents the results of the 
cointegration analysis, and Section 6.4 interprets the responses of credit risk to a 
common set of key variables for both countries, as uncovered by the Markov regime 
switching models. In the case of the business cycle and bank-specific determinants, 
the results in all sections are assessed in the light of theoretical and empirical studies 
that deal with different samples covering diverse geographical areas or different 
countries. The last section concludes the chapter and provides the implications of the 
empirical analysis.  
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6.1 Unit root tests 
The issue of unit roots in macroeconomic time series has received a considerable 
amount of both theoretical and applied research over recent decades. Conventional 
regression estimators, including VARs, have good properties when applied to 
stationary time series, but encounter difficulties
96
 when applied to non-stationary 
processes. The insight of Granger and Newbold (1974) jointly with Nelson and 
Plosser’s (1982) views that unit roots may be present in a wide variety of 
macroeconomic series either in levels or in logarithms, gave rise to the industry of 
unit roots testing, and the implication that variables should be rendered stationary by 
differencing before they are included in an econometric model. Since the work of 
Nelson and Plosser (1982) and further theoretical developments by Engle and Granger 
(1987), there has been much controversy on the issue and no consensus has been 
reached on the most appropriate methodology when applying unit root tests (Libanio, 
2005). 
In line with the unit root testing strategy, as depicted in Chapter 4, initially the 
standard tests of Augmented Dickey-Fuller(1979), Phillips and Perron (1988) and 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) are applied to the time series. In addition, the research uses 
the tests proposed by Perron (1997) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) that allow for the 
presence of endogenous structural breaks, given the preliminary indications arising 
from the inspection of the data plots. Tables C1 to C4 in Appendix C report the unit 
root results for Bulgaria and Romania respectively. Similarly, the unit roots tests for 
the Greek crisis indicators are reported in Tables C5 and C6, also in Appendix C. The 
results suggest that all series used in the research are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1). 
As such, the first differences are taken to obtain the required stationarity. This 
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of spurious regressions.  
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transformation applies to all variables that enter the models, with the exception of the 
Bulgarian and Romanian systems’ loans and the monetary aggregates that are 
differenced in logarithmic form to obtain elasticities.  
In the case of Bulgaria, the standard unit root tests provide evidence that all series are 
integrated of order one. The tests of Perron (1997) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) 
suggest that a structural change in most variables takes place around the end of 2008. 
However, the graphical inspection of the Bulgarian NPLs suggests a spike that occurs 
mid-2006 while the loan series appear to hike by early 2005 and then return to their 
‘normal’ upward trend up to the end of 2008. This is explained by the policy measures 
introduced by the BNB in early 2005 in an attempt to impose ceilings on bank lending 
(Frömmel and Karagyozova, 2008; IMF, 2010b) in view of the overheating economy. 
As the new measures were announced and prior to their implementation, the banks 
rushed to disburse any outstanding loan applications knowing that in a few months 
credit ceilings would apply. Later, as the regulatory authorities lifted these measures, 
the credit flowed in the system in high volumes until the burst of the global financial 
crisis that landed in the region in 2008. Hence, the removal of policy measures in 
2006 explains the mid-2006 jump in the Bulgarian NPLs. 
The results of the unit root tests for the Romanian variables provide similar evidence 
to the Bulgarian ones, that all the time series are integrated of order one. Notably, the 
tests that accommodate for structural breaks in several Romanian macroeconomic 
time series hint at a possible structural break occurring at about the end of 2006 to 
mid-2007. This latter break could be the effect of a sharp depreciation in the domestic 
currency from its peak level that happened in early 2007 (IMF, 2010a). Initially, the 
capital inflows in Romania led to an appreciation of the exchange rate in both real and 
nominal terms, eroding the country’s external competitiveness. The NBR confronted 
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with a dilemma in view of the newly adopted inflation targeting regime, initiated 
interventions in foreign exchange markets by purchasing considerable amounts of 
foreign currency in an attempt to prevent the appreciation of the national one. 
In the case of the Romanian credit risk, loan growth and unemployment rate, a 
common break date is detected in 2008. This can be attributed to a confluence of the 
global financial crisis and the Greek sovereign debt crisis in the country. Similarly to 
the Bulgarian and Romanian time series, the unit root tests of the Greek indicators 
provide evidence of I(1) series, while the tests that allow for structural changes in the 
data generating process signal a possible break occurring somewhere between the end 
of 2008 and mid-2009 as the Greek sovereign crisis deepens. This crisis is also 
reflected in the spread between the Greek and the benchmark German long-term 
government bond. A visual inspection of the evolution of the Greek credit risk (NPL) 
and the spread between the Greek and the German bond (SPGD) suggests that the 
Greek debt crisis almost in synchronization transmits to the Greek banking system’s 
balance sheet. In broad agreement, policymakers and researchers suggest that if 
Greece were to default on its sovereign debt, the Greek banking system would default 
on its debt as well, given the close ties in place (Bank of Greece, 2010; Moody’s, 
2011b; Pagratis, 2012). 
Overall, the unit root tests of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979), Phillips and Perron 
(1988) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) in some cases yield conflicting results. This can 
be attributed to power and size distortion issues, subjects that are thoroughly 
discussed in the literature. However, the use of the standard unit roots tests, jointly 
with those tests that account for structural changes and facilitated by the analysis of 
the times series in their historical context, provides insight and equips adequately the 
econometric setting. The first step of the modelling approach involves the estimation 
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of univariate and multivariate models. The respective results are reported in the next 
section.  
6.2 The results of the univariate and multivariate models 
The starting point of the econometric analysis applies the method proposed by the 
IMF in their assessment of financial sectors (Blaschke et al., 2001). In this setting, the 
impact of macroeconomic shocks on credit risk, which by and large represents the 
most significant risk faced by banks worldwide, is modelled using a linear regression. 
The advantage of this approach is the considerable flexibility in specifying the 
aggregate credit risk proxy that is regressed on potential factors. In the research’s 
framework the proxies of credit risk of Bulgaria and Romania are regressed against all 
the potential explanatory variables, which can be macroeconomic-cyclical, monetary, 
financial, and bank-specific, as shown in Tables B1 and B2, Appendix B. Then, the 
effect of the Greek crisis is investigated using the respective variables displayed in 
Table B3, Appendix B. The regression coefficients in the specified framework capture 
the sensitivity of credit risk to a number of identified factors. 
Following an analogous modelling approach to that of Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) 
and Boss (2002), initially the research set out to estimate univariate regressions. 
Drawing on Wilson’s (1997a,b) approach, Boss (2002) assumes that each explanatory 
variable follows an autoregressive process of order 2, i.e. AR(2). However, this 
assumption has not been used in the research since the aim of the univariate and 
multivariate regressions, in contrast to Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Boss (2002), 
is to provide preliminary indications of the underlying relationships that will facilitate 
more advanced modelling techniques. The next subsection reports the regression 
results for Bulgaria. 
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6.2.1 Univariate and multivariate results for Bulgaria 
The selected proxy of the Bulgarian credit risk (NPL) is regressed against each 
indicator, as shown in Table B1 at time t but also at all lags up to one year. This 
intensive approach enables the capture of any possible lagged effects of the 
explanatory variables on the credit risk of Bulgaria but also the analysis of the 
robustness of the specifications (Kalirai and Scheicher, 2002). Following the 
methodology detailed in Chapter 6, the estimated univariate OLS models are reported 
in Table D1 in Appendix D together with the expected signs of the coefficients. A 
positive sign suggests that factor Xt (or when lagged, Xt-s) is expected to yield a 
positive impact on the changes of the NPL ratio in line with empirical evidence and 
vice versa. Broadly, the results obtained are in consensus with the expectations. 
Hence, the univariate regressions show a pronounced effect of cyclical indicators, 
such as construction (CON), industrial production (IPI), unemployment (UN), and 
real effective exchange rate (REEL), either at a contemporaneous or lagged level. As 
for the monetary indicators, M2 which approximates money supply, is significant in 
determining credit risk in both contemporaneous and lagged levels. In terms of the 
interest rate and financial markets’ variables, the evidence suggests that only the 
lagged 3-month Euribor rate is associated with the Bulgarian NPLs. The latter makes 
sense in a bank-based financial sector, such as the Bulgarian one, where the share of 
foreign currency loans
97
 considerably exceeds those granted in domestic currency 
(Brown and De Haas, 2012).  
The univariate results lend support to the credit growth hypothesis, suggesting that 
rising loans potentially mask asset quality problems. Notably, the results do not 
provide evidence of a statistically significant association between the Bulgarian credit 
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 In essence these loans are denominated in euros and as such the rate applied is based on the Euribor 
reference rate.  
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risk and the Greek crisis indicators, either at the current or lagged level. The variables 
that yield the highest predictive power appear to be the loan growth (LOAN) jointly 
with unemployment (UN), the construction activity (CON), and the industrial 
production (IPI). 
Building upon the statistically significant factors identified in the univariate modelling 
approach, a multivariate credit risk model is estimated following the general-to-
specific methodology and using the model selection criteria outlined previously. The 
final specification of the multivariate model for Bulgaria is presented in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 The multivariate model for Bulgaria 
 
Dependent Variable: NPL   
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.011 0.011 0.967 0.336 
NPL(-1) -0.324 0.159 -2.037 0.044 
CON (-6) -0.004 0.002 -1.882 0.063 
IPI -0.004 0.002 -1.947 0.054 
UN 0.065 0.025 2.612 0.010 
REEL(-3) -0.008 0.003 -2.445 0.016 
LOAN -0.939 0.258 -3.640 0.000 
DUMMY (FINANCIAL CRISIS) 0.394 0.157 2.502 0.014 
DUMMY (2006) 0.044 0.014 3.194 0.001 
R-squared 0.552 Mean dependent var 0.004 
Adjusted R-squared 0.517 S.D. dependent var 0.097 
S.E. of regression 0.067 Akaike info criterion -2.481 
Sum squared resid 0.472 Schwarz criterion -2.264 
Log likelihood 149.1 F-statistic 15.994 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.816 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
     
The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of lags in months of the respective variables 
used in the model. 
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As Table 14 displays, the multivariate model uses an autoregressive term of order one 
for the Bulgarian NPLs, which was strongly suggested by the data. In the light of the 
unit root test results, two dummy variables are introduced in the final specification of 
the model. The first one, also evidenced by a Chow test,
98
 accounts for the breakpoint 
in the series identified in mid-2006. The second dummy that starts as of end-2008, 
also in line with the unit root tests, captures the effect of the global financial crisis
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on the Bulgarian credit risk. The model’s specification suggests that, taken 
simultaneously, the construction activity lagged by a period of six months, the 
industrial production, the unemployment rate, and the real effective exchange rate 
lagged by three months jointly with the credit growth, and accounting for the effect of 
the global financial crisis, the change in regulation and the persistent effect of 
problem loans, together explain about 55% of the variation of credit risk in the 
Bulgarian banking system. The relatively good fit of the regression suggests that 
NPLs in Bulgaria can be reasonably explained by a set of macroeconomic variables 
that embrace the Bulgarian business cycle. The findings are in broad agreement with 
related studies. For instance, a breadth of studies that uses either time series or panel 
estimations, evidences the linkages between macroeconomy, construction or real 
estate activity, credit growth, and effective exchange rates on NPLs (Hoggarth et al., 
2005b; Jiménez and Saurina, 2006; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Nkusu, 2011; De 
Bock and Demyanets, 2012). 
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 The Chow test, which tests the hypothesis of a break in the Bulgarian loans, that occurs in June 2006 
produces an F-statistic of 4.391 and a log likelihood ratio of 26.195. Both statistics are significant at the 
1% level of significance, providing evidence that June 2006 is a breakdate. 
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 The use of the dummy variable to account for the global financial crisis is also supported by market 
evidence. For instance, EBRD (2010) reports that the crisis started to aggravate in Bulgaria towards the 
end of 2008. According to EBRD’s (2010) report, all countries in the SEE region registered a sharp 
output decline by that time, with the Bulgarian and the Romanian economies being the most distressed. 
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Turning to the role of the lagged real effective exchange rate in the model, a plausible 
explanation relates to the empirically grounded association between capital inflows 
and real exchange rate appreciation (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Data suggest that the countries of 
emerging Europe were among the main recipients of FDIs on a global scale during 
2003-2008. At the same time, Bulgaria
100
 and Romania experienced large real 
exchange rate appreciations. These inflows contributed to rapid growth in demand and 
significant appreciation in real exchange rates. But countries that experience large real 
exchange rate appreciations, historically have witnessed large current account deficits, 
less buoyant exports, and a shift in resources from the tradable to the non-tradable 
sector. As the capital inflows reverse, the NPLs rise and the effect becomes more 
visible after a quarter of a year. Overall, the effect of the real effective exchange rate 
on the Bulgarian credit risk is in consensus with country-level empirical studies in 
both developed and developing economies (Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2008; 
Baboucek and Jancar, 2005).  
Broadly, the Bulgarian results are aligned with the Minskian meltdown and Arestis 
and Gonzalez (2013). The negative effect of construction activity on credit risk 
signals a speculative boom-bust cycle fuelled by the lending acceleration in the pre-
crisis period. During the good times, both borrowers and lenders are lulled into 
complacency, construction activity booms and asset prices rise. As credit flows freely, 
households and corporations alike take on greater risk, borrowing to the hilt. 
However, when construction activity plunged in the aftermath of the crisis and credit 
came to a halt, the NPLs started to mount (De Haas and Knobloch, 2010).  
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 Bulgaria was by far the main recipient of FDI between 2003 and 2008. Average annual FDI inflows 
reached almost 28% of 2003 GDP, peaking at 165% of GDP in 2008 (IMF, 2010b). 
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The findings can also be interpreted under the ‘collateral channel’ view in the 
contribution of Arestis and Gonzalez (2013) that essentially explains how rising asset 
prices introduce a relaxation of the conditions that a borrower has to face in obtaining 
and repaying a real estate-backed loan. Furthermore, as the IMF’s (2010b) country 
report stresses, the recession in Bulgaria in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
was preceded by an investment boom in construction and real estate. Hence, as in the 
West-European economies, the root cause of the bad debt problem was the abundant 
and cheap funding that goes hand-in-hand with a gradual relaxation of banks’ lending 
standards and an excessive reliance on rising real estate values (De Haas and 
Knobloch, 2010).  
The hypothesis that the Greek crisis matters for its neighbouring countries (Bartlett 
and Monastiriotis, 2010; Anastasakis et al. 2011) was not found to be supported by 
the data. Specifically, a potential adverse effect of the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian 
credit risk is not evidenced in both the univariate and multivariate model 
specifications. These results have remained consistent, irrespective of the chosen 
proxy for the Greek crisis. Equally, the effect of the financial markets and interest rate 
variables was insignificant. The results can be explained in the light of the relatively 
immature capital market in Bulgaria which has low liquidity and attracts little interest 
from foreign investors. On the other hand, the global financial crisis appears to be a 
significant external shock for the stability of the banking system. Overall, the growth 
model of reliance in rapid credit growth, sparked by foreign banks under the financial 
liberalization thesis, has been called into question by the global financial crisis. 
The diagnostic tests for the error terms of the multivariate model are reported in Table 
D2. The issue of heteroskedasticity is dealt with by the use of White’s consistent 
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estimators. On the basis of the Breusch-Godfrey test, there is insufficient evidence of 
serial correlation in the error terms.  
Theory suggests that the presence of lagged values of the dependent variable (NPL) in 
the equation can be a reason for inconsistency in the OLS estimators. In general, the 
issue of endogeneity, i.e. one or more regressors to be correlated with the error term, 
gives rise to the need for estimating the multivariate model by the use of instrumental 
variables (IVs). Overall, the results of the GMM estimators reported in Table D3, 
converge reasonably with the OLS model. The magnitude of the coefficients is close 
to those obtained through OLS, while all variables present the expected signs. The 
effect of the financial crisis, the regulation and the effective exchange rate, are less 
pronounced compared to the OLS model, still significant at the 10% level of 
significance, while CON becomes insignificant. Overall, the re-estimation of the 
multivariate model regression using instrumental variables provides a useful 
‘bracketing’ property to the OLS results.  
The next section reports the results of the univariate and multivariate estimations for 
Romania.  
6.2.2 Univariate and multivariate results for Romania 
In the endeavour to investigate the determinants of Romanian credit risk, an identical 
process to that described for Bulgaria is applied. Hence, univariate regressions are 
initially estimated using a single explanatory variable. As such, the selected proxy for 
the Romanian credit risk proxy, i.e. the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
(LLP), is regressed against each of the Romanian indicators shown in Table B2 in 
Appendix B, at time t but also at all lags up to one year. Then, the process continues 
using the Greek crisis indicators, as shown in Table B3. The rationale of this 
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systematic approach is to capture potential lagged effects of the explanatory variables 
on LLP, considering that the LLPs are a backward-looking measure of credit risk. In 
effect, this approach introduces a ‘regulatory-lag’, as LLPs appear on the rise in 
banks’ financial statements quite a time after the problem has actually begun to 
emerge. A higher need for provisioning puts a strain on banks’ profitability. As such 
the banks tend to increase provisions in the face of increased credit risks as these 
become more certain.  
Table D4 in Appendix D summarizes the results of the univariate regressions along 
with the apriori expected signs of the regression coefficients. A positive sign indicates 
that the respective factor Χt (or when lagged, Χt-s) exhibits a positive impact on the 
changes in the LLP ratio and vice versa. In tandem with the empirical evidence, a 
broad set of macroeconomic indicators is found to be associated with the asset quality 
of the Romanian banks. The results indicate that in each data category of Table B2, 
with the exception of the one that captures the effect of the financial markets and 
interest rates, there is at least one variable that enters significantly and with the 
expected directional impact in the regression. Specifically, the construction output, the 
investment expenditure as proxied by the gross fixed capital formation, the ratio of the 
country’s debt to GDP, the consumption, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate 
and the trade balance, are all significant in explaining the Romanian credit risk. 
Furthermore, almost all macroeconomic indicators present the expected directional 
effect on the LLP ratio. The inflation rate yields the highest t-statistic and the best fit 
of all univariate regressions. This result is not surprising as a high inflationary 
environment has prevailed in the country since the market transition period. As the 
data suggest, the growth in the Romanian CPI averaged 43% annually from 1995 to 
2005. In line with the stylised facts, the regression results suggest that the hypothesis 
 202 
 
that inflationary pressures drive up credit risk cannot be rejected in Romania. None of 
the financial markets indicators appear to exert a significant role on the dependent 
variable. Despite the rapid growth of the trading volumes on the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange in recent years, the deepening of the stock market remains relatively poor. 
In contrast to Kalirai and Scheicher’s (2002) study for Austria, the indicators related 
to volatilities, commodity prices and exchange rates do not yield a statistically 
significant effect on the Romanian endogenous variable, as was the case in Bulgaria. 
This result can be attributed to the different structure between a developed financial 
sector and one in transition. At the same time, the result provides support to the view 
that banks dominate the financial sector in Romania leaving little room for other types 
of financial intermediation.  
As for the interest rate indicators, only the 3-month Euribor rate is significant both at 
current and lagged levels. In line with the Bulgarian case, the share of foreign 
currency loans in Romania far exceeds that of domestic currency (Brown and De 
Haas, 2012). The lion’s share in foreign-currency denominated loans is occupied by 
loans in euros, given that both countries are considered to be euro accession ones. 
Respectively the interest charged on these loans is determined by the Euribor rate. 
Foreign banks in both countries were motivated to lend in euros in order to match 
their funding. This lending created imbalances in the system that turned out to be one 
of the greatest vulnerabilities in the economy. The negative sign in the Euribor rate 
coefficient diverts from the expectation that credit risk increases in tandem with 
higher borrowing costs. Although there is a wide consensus that real interest rates 
affect the capacity of borrowers to serve their loans, there is some evidence in the 
literature that this may not be the case for transitional economies (Baboucek and 
Jancar, 2005).  
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Except for the lending growth (LOAN), all the other bank-specific indicators are 
found to be statistically insignificant in explaining credit risk. The credit overheating 
that occurs in the period up to the burst of the crisis raises questions on the lending 
criteria during the euphoric years. It may be the case that risks were not accurately 
evaluated by the banking system (Louzis et al., 2012). Given the ambiguous effect of 
the loan growth, as evidenced in theory as well as other empirical studies,
101
 the 
variable is dropped from the final specification of the multivariate model. Turning to 
the monetary aggregates, both M1 and M2 are significant in explaining the variation 
in credit risk, presenting also the expected direction. Interestingly, four indicators that 
proxy the dynamics of the Greek crisis are highly significant in affecting the 
Romanian credit risk in the expected positive direction. Hence the result provides 
evidence of spillover effects from the Greek crisis to the Romanian banking system. 
Building upon the factors identified in the univariate estimations, a multivariate credit 
risk model is estimated using the general-to-specific methodology used in the variable 
selection criteria outlined previously. Table 15 presents the estimated model.  
  
                                                 
101
 Effectively, the univariate results maintain that increasing credit growth reduces bad debts. This 
result goes against the procyclical credit policy hypothesis which implies that banks adopt a liberal 
credit policy during the boom of the cycle and a tighter policy in the contraction phase. On the other 
hand the result implies that ever-growing loan books could mask the quality of the loans.  
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Table 15 The multivariate model for Romania 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.001 0.000 1.317 0.193 
CPI -0.001 0.000 -4.100 0.000 
UN 0.001 0.000 3.423 0.001 
CON -0.003 0.001 -2.807 0.006 
INV(-12) -0.004 0.001 -2.467 0.016 
DGDP (-3) 0.012 0.002 4.615 0.000 
M2 -0.008 0.002 -3.536 0.001 
LLPGR 0.453 0.194 2.332 0.022 
SPGD (-1) 0.001 0.000 2.843 0.006 
R-squared 0.657     Mean dependent var 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.625     S.D. dependent var 0.002 
S.E. of regression 0.001     Akaike info criterion -11.046 
Sum squared resid 0.000     Schwarz criterion -10.801 
Log likelihood 522.6     F-statistic 20.128 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.261     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of lags in months of the respective variable  
used in the model. 
 
The model’s final specification suggests that, taken together, inflation, 
unemployment, construction output, investment activity in lagged form, the country’s 
external debt to GDP lagged by a quarter, money supply jointly with the Greek banks’ 
credit risk and the one-month lagged spread between the Greek and the German long-
term government bonds, explain a substantial fraction (66%) of the variation in the 
Romanian credit risk. The good fit of the regression indicates that the banks’ credit 
risk in Romania can be reasonably explained by macroeconomic fundamentals and 
Greek crisis indicators in the light of the substantial presence of Greek banks in 
Romania.  
 205 
 
The explanatory power of the Romanian macroeconomic variables such as inflation, 
unemployment rate and money supply, is aligned with expectations as well as related 
studies (Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998; Boss, 2002; IMF, 2010a; Trenca and 
Benyovszki, 2008; Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2008; Louzis et al., 2012). The 
external debt can have a destabilising impact on the domestic banking system as it 
significantly and positively affects credit risk. A look at the Romanian data, reveals 
that the growth of external debt has been particularly strong since the onset of the 
crisis.  The potential channels of transmission could be the relationship between debt 
dynamics and asset bubbles or weaknesses in the banking sector (Becker et al. 2010).  
The idiosyncratic features of the Romanian transition economy and those of a sector 
dominated by foreign banks are also evident in the findings. For instance, the 
construction output, as fuelled by the lending boom in the pre-crisis period, is among 
the critical factors that determine the Romanian credit risk. Based on the results, the 
hypothesis that the Greek crisis exerts an adverse effect on the Romanian financial 
stability cannot be rejected. The Romanian credit risk (LLP) seems responsive to risks 
arising from Greece. In other words, there is evidence that spillover effects stemming 
from the Greek twin crises are manifest in the Romanian banking sector, raising the 
risk of contagion.  
The adjusted R-squared provides evidence of a satisfactory closeness of fit in the 
multivariate regression model. Equally, the F-test that tests the joint significance of 
the regressors suggests that the null hypothesis, that none of the coefficients is 
significant apart from the intercept, can be rejected. As in the Bulgarian case, the 
estimated results for Romania are adjusted with the use of White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent estimators. The diagnostic tests for the Romanian multivariate model, 
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reported in Table D5, do not provide evidence of first and second-order serial 
correlation. 
The results of the OLS multivariate model for Romania have been validated through 
the GMM estimation that uses instrumental variables (IVs) to accommodate for 
potential endogeneity in the regressors. This process serves as a robustness test of the 
OLS results, considering that the extensive dataset facilitates a reasonable selection of 
acceptable sets of instrumental variables in both countries’ models. Overall, the GMM 
results converge reasonably with the OLS ones in terms of coefficients’ signs and 
magnitude with the exception of two variables. Although bearing the correct sign, 
INV and DGDP were not found to be insignificant in the GMM estimation. The latter 
is consistent with Canova (2007) who documents the trade-off between OLS and IV 
suggests that the performance of GMM estimators in small samples can be far from 
appealing. Nonetheless, the use of GMM is more justified in Bulgaria, as OLS 
estimates of the AR parameters are biased when the model is dynamic. In both 
countries’ GMM models, as Tables D3 and D6 display, the overidentifying test 
statistic (J-statistic) suggests that the null hypothesis, that all the instruments are 
exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, cannot be rejected.       
The OLS results, supported by the ‘bracketing’ property of the GMM estimations for 
the multivariate models, rely upon comprehensive datasets for both countries. Hence, 
the shaped relationships provide a solid ground for the use of the more advanced 
econometric techniques that follow in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. The estimations so far 
clarify the picture and the underlying relationships that do not deviate from the 
theoretical and empirical expectations. Notably, the Greek crisis appears to be a 
destabilizing factor for the Romanian banking system. On the other hand, the effect of 
the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian system, while positive, was not found to be 
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significant. The Bulgarian credit risk seems to be more sensitive to the global 
financial crisis and shifts in the regulatory policy.  
Blaschke et al. (2001) propose that conclusions obtained from a one model, 
estimation technique should be cross-checked with those derived from different 
approaches. The next section presents the results obtained from the cointegration 
techniques.   
6.3 The results of the cointegration analysis 
Cointegration models have been in use for decades, but in more recent times they 
have been shown to provide a valuable as well as reliable vehicle when testing for the 
presence of long-run relationships between economic time series. More concretely, 
these models solve the problem of spurious regressions while the error correction 
mechanism that measures the disequilibrium from the previous period provides 
remarkable economic implications. However, the empirical literature on credit risk 
that applies cointegrating techniques is rather lacking, and becomes almost non-
existent in the case of the ARDL approach.  
The next subsection presents the results of the cointegration analysis for Bulgaria. 
6.3.1 Results of the cointegration analysis for Bulgaria 
Having established that all variables are integrated of order one through the use of a 
comprehensive unit root testing strategy, the aim now is to uncover the potential 
short- and long-term relationships among a set of significant variables in determining 
the credit risk in Bulgaria. To this end, initially the ARDL approach to cointegration 
is applied. The ARDL modelling in both countries uses four to five variables at most 
to avoid complexity, as simple models can more easily be interpreted and 
communicated (Maddala, 2001), considering also the sample’s size. On the other 
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hand, increasing the number of variables in a cointegrating vector comes at a non-
negligible cost in terms of parameters to be estimated. In view of this, variables found 
not to possess any meaningful additional information are discarded from the final 
ARDL specifications. Through the use of a systematic analysis on the cointegrating 
relationships, the equation that describes adequately the determinants of the Bulgarian 
credit risk in the timeline of the research obtains the following crude form: 
 
NPL = f (NPL-t, LOAN, UN, CON, LLPGR, SHOCK)             (10) 
 
Where NPL is the non-performing loans as a share of total loans in the Bulgarian 
banking system, NPL-t is the lagged value of NPL, LOAN is the loan growth, UN is 
the unemployment rate, CON measures the construction output in Bulgaria, and 
LLPGR denotes the proxy for the Greek crisis
102
. SHOCK is a dummy variable that 
captures the effect of the regime change in Bulgaria but also accounts for theglobal 
financial crisis aligned with the results obtained from the tests of Perron (1997) and 
Zivot and Andrews (1992). Theoretically, LOAN is expected to affect positively the 
NPLs, as credit booms could imply lax lending standards and deterioration in the loan 
quality in line with the hypothesis that lending booms end up in tears (Gavin and 
Hausmann, 1996; Duenwald et al., 2005; Aikman et al., 2011; Zemel, 2012). For 
instance, Zemel (2012) provides evidence of a predictive power of credit growth in 
determining future NPLs. In this respect, the expansion of the loan portfolio conveys 
useful information in assessing a system’s resilience, suggesting that unhealthy banks 
may hide problem loans by ever-growing their loan portfolios. Hence, an accelerating 
                                                 
102
 In the context of the cointegration analysis, two Greek crisis proxies have been used to explore the 
effect of the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian credit risk. These were the loan loss provisions as a share of 
total loans of Greek banks (LLPGR) and the spread differential between Greek and German long-term 
bond yields (SPGRD). 
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lending growth can serve as a ‘red flag’ for future banking distress. However, an 
opposite direction in the association between LOAN and NPL should not come as a 
surprise, given the theoretical grounding discussed in the estimation of the 
multivariate models. A negative impact is expected from CON, a proxy of 
construction output,
103
 a positive impact from unemployment and a positive effect 
from the Greek debt crisis indicators, given the dominant position of Greek banks in 
Bulgaria and aligned with the formulated hypotheses.      
A preliminary finding is that both proxies of the Greek crisis are insignificant,
104
 in 
consensus with the OLS and GMM regressions. This result lends evidence to support 
that the effect of the Greek crisis in the Bulgarian system is not material and has 
somehow been neutralised through the regulatory-supervisory policies. On the basis 
of the Schwartz-Bayesian criterion, the specification ARDL (1,1,0,0,0) is selected. 
Table 16 reports the long-run estimates of the specified model.  
 
Table 16 Estimated long-run coefficients using the ARDL approach to 
cointegration for Bulgaria 
 
Dependent variable is NPL 
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio 
LOAN 0.049 2.683 
UN 0.006 3.754 
CON -0.001 -2.857 
LLPGR 0.870 1.425 
C -1.128 -2.692 
SHOCK 0.031 4.228 
                                                 
103
 Based on data from the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria (NSI), the influx of foreign funds in 
Bulgaria led to rapid construction and real-estate development, with property prices appreciating by 
over 50%. Also Moody’s (2012) stresses that the construction and real-estate sector is the primary 
source of credit risk. 
 
104
 The results reported include only one of the two Greek-crisis proxies used, the LLPGR. Similar 
results were obtained when the proxy SPGD was used instead of the LLPGR. The effect of both 
variables, although positive, was not found to be significant in explaining the Bulgarian credit risk.  
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Evidently, all the variables, with the exception of the Greek-crisis proxy (LLPGR), 
are significant at the 1% significance level, presenting also the expected sign. Under 
the pro-cyclicality hypothesis, the credit boom in Bulgaria induces NPLs in the long 
run. The construction activity yields the expected negative effect on credit risk while 
rising unemployment renders the banks’ loan books vulnerable because of the 
deteriorated capacity of borrowers to service their debts. Broadly, the findings are in 
tandem with other country-specific studies that apply different econometric 
techniques (Quagliariello, 2004; Baboucek and Jancar, 2005). Furthermore, the shock 
dummy used is highly significant at the 1% significance level. Notably, the inclusion 
of other macroeconomic variables that were identified as significant in the estimation 
of the multivariate model for Bulgaria, such as the industrial production or the real 
effective exchange rate, do not add any substantial improvement in the estimated 
model. The long-run relationship among the cointegrated variables is examined using 
the bounds testing methodology of Pesaran et al. (2001).The F-statistic for testing the 
joint null hypothesis, that the coefficients of the variables in levels are jointly zero, i.e. 
there exists no long-run relationship between them, is 7.24, thus it exceeds the critical 
lower and upper bounds of 3.41 and 4.68 respectively at the 1% significance level. 
Hence, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between NPLs, loan growth 
(LOAN), unemployment (UN) and construction (CON) can be rejected. Alternatively, 
the results suggest that LOAN, UN and CON can be treated as the long-run forcing 
variables for the explanation of the Bulgarian credit risk. The short-run dynamics of 
the model are reported in Table 17. 
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Table 17 Error correction representation for the ARDL model of Bulgaria 
 
Dependent variable is dNPL 
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio 
dLOAN -0.015 -1.852 
dUN 0.001 3.741 
dCON 0.001 -4.215 
dLLPGR 0.143 1.137 
dC -1.851 -3.934 
dSHOCK 0.005 4.255 
ECM(-1) -0.164 -3.717 
R
2
= 0.59 F(6,99)=23.396 
 
Table 17 reports that all variables with the exception of the Greek crisis proxy 
(LLPGR) are statistically significant. As was the case in the long-run relationship, the 
effect of the Greek crisis on Bulgaria’s credit risk remains insignificant in the short-
run as well. The error correction coefficient (ECM) is highly significant, bears the 
correct sign and points to the existence of a long-run relationship between the 
variables in the equation. Estimated at -0.164, the ECM suggests a moderate 
adjustment process. Specifically, about 16.4% of the disequilibria of a shock in the 
previous month adjust back to the long-run equilibrium in the current month. Table 
E1 in Appendix E provides the regression statistics and Table E2 reports the 
diagnostics tests. The results in Table E2 indicate that the underlying ARDL model 
passes all the diagnostic tests. 
Next, the results obtained from the ARDL approach to cointegration are validated 
using the framework developed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).  
The summary results of the Johansen cointegration analysis are presented in Table E3. 
Specifically, the result of the cointegration test presented in the first panel of Table E3 
suggests that there exists one cointegrating vector based on the maximal eigenvalue 
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statistic. The long-run equilibrium relationship is reported in the second panel of 
Table E3 that presents the normalized coefficients so that the coefficient on NPL is 
unity. According to the cointegrating equation, a strong positive relationship is 
observed between NPL, LOAN and UN and a negative one between NPL and CON 
while the effect of LLPGR is insignificant, yet positive. The ECM component that 
indicates the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is statistically 
significant and has the correct negative sign. The ECM’s value of -0.164 suggests a 
moderate adjustment process of about 6.4 months for the equation to return to its 
equilibrium once it has been shocked. The diagnostic tests reported in the last panel of 
Table E3 suggest that there is no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity in the error 
terms as the Johansen method presupposes. The VECM results present reasonable 
convergence with those derived from the ARDL model taking into account the 
underlying estimation procedure. 
The research is also motivated by the hypothesis of spillover effects from the Greek 
crisis to the Bulgarian banking system through a credit or sovereign risk transmission 
channel. However, the findings do not provide evidence linking the Greek-crisis 
indicators to the Bulgarian credit risk. The stability of Bulgarian banks seems to be 
insulated from contagion risks from Greece, but is affected by the global financial 
crisis and institutional factors pertaining to the regulatory framework. The lack of 
sufficient evidence to associate the Bulgarian NPLs with the Greek crisis can be 
attributed, to some extent, to the regulatory/supervisory policy exercised by the BNB 
(IMF, 2010b). Overall, the explanatory power of the Bulgarian macroeconomic 
variables is in agreement with empirical studies in other geographies, samples or 
estimation techniques (Nkusu, 2011; Klein, 2013). Also, the idiosyncratic features of 
the developing economy, including those of a banking system dominated by foreign 
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institutions in the financial liberalization process, are evident in the findings. For 
instance, the construction activity, as fuelled by a lending boom in the pre-crisis 
period, was among the important influences of the Bulgarian credit risk. The 
pronounced role of unemployment has also surfaced, asserting that deteriorating 
conditions in labour induce asset quality problems in the respective banking system. 
Broadly, the cointegration analysis for Bulgaria suggests that a long-run relationship 
is shaped between credit risk (NPL), unemployment (UN), construction (CON) and 
lending growth (LOAN), and that UN, CON and LOAN can be treated as the long-run 
forcing variables for the explanation of the Bulgarian credit risk. 
The following section presents and interprets the results of the cointegration analysis 
for Romania.  
6.3.2 Results of the cointegration analysis for Romania 
In the attempt to identify the cointegrating relationships in the case of Romania, a 
systematic analysis analogous to the Bulgarian case has been pursued. The equation 
that best describes the determinants of the Romanian credit risk in the period of the 
research has the following crude form: 
 
LLP = f (LLP-t, LLPGR, M2, LOAN, UN)             (11) 
 
Where LLP is the loan loss provisions as a share of total loans in the Romanian 
banking system, LLP-t is the lagged value of LLP, LLPGR the proxy for the Greek 
crisis
105
, M2 is the respective monetary aggregate that approximates the money 
supply, LOAN is the growth in loans of Romanian banks, and UN is the 
                                                 
105
 Similarly to the cointegration analysis for Bulgaria, two Greek crisis proxies have been used to 
explore the effect of the Greek crisis on the Romanian credit risk: the loan loss provisions as a share of 
total loans of Greek banks (LLPGR), and the spread between the Greek and the German long-term 
bond (SPGRD).  
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unemployment rate. Theoretically, we would expect a positive impact on LLPs from 
LOAN as accelerating credit expansion usually goes hand in hand with a deterioration 
in the lending standards, a negative impact from M2 that proxies money supply, a 
positive impact from unemployment and a positive impact from the Greek banks’ loan 
loss provisions (LLPGR), given the preliminary indications arising from the OLS/IV 
framework. 
Initially, the maximum number of lags is set at 12 and subsequently is gradually 
reduced on the basis of the formal lag selection process that was followed. The final 
specification which is an ARDL (1,1,0,0) model is selected on the basis of the 
Schwarz Bayesian criterion that has a lower prediction error in comparison with the 
Akaike-based model. The long-run estimates of the final ARDL model specified for 
the Romanian credit risk are presented in Table 18. 
 
Table 18 Estimated long-run coefficients using the ARDL approach to 
cointegration for Romania 
 
Dependent variable is LLP 
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio 
LLPGR 2.8581 20.667 
M2 -0.0142 -4.217 
LOAN 0.0118 4.835 
C 0.0109 3.193 
UN(-10) 0.0001 2.516 
 
The results depicted in Table 18 suggest that all the variables included in the 
cointegrating equation are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance 
having also the expected sign. A pronounced, yet lagged effect is evidenced in the 
case of unemployment (UN). The latter deviates from the OLS findings for Romania 
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where the effect of UN was contemporaneous, albeit is in agreement with empirical 
evidence that uses the VAR framework in modelling NPLs. These studies find that 
unemployment has a significant lagged effect on NPLs of almost a year (Baboucek 
and Jancar, 2005; Jakubík and Heřmanek, 2008). Most importantly, the lagged effect 
of unemployment on credit risk is in agreement with a study conducted in NBR by 
Moinescu (2008). Using a panel of 31 Romanian banks during 1999-2007, he 
documents that the key transmission channels of instability in the sector are the 
unemployment rate and the lending growth. The effect of unemployment on the 
Romanian credit risk is positive and has a lag of one year, suggesting that the 
Romanian credit risk is inelastic to shocks in the labour markets.  
What appears to be in broad consensus with the estimated multivariate OLS model is 
the pronounced effect of the Greek crisis spillovers on Romanian banks. Specifically, 
the Greek crisis, proxied by the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLPGR), 
yields a highly significant positive influence in the long-run on the Romanian credit 
risk. Furthermore, the loan growth (LOAN) positively affects credit risk in the long-
run, suggesting that the foreign-bank dominated system of Romania may have 
disbursed loans of questionable quality in the upper side of the cycle (De Haas and 
Knobloch, 2010). Lastly, M2 which proxies the money supply in the system, appears 
to retain the expected negative effect on credit risk. The result suggests that the effect 
of a monetary policy shock is contemporaneous and highly significant in the 
Romanian credit risk. Overall, the findings of the macroeconomic determinants of 
credit risk in Romania are strongly supported by the evidence provided by 
Quagliariello (2004), Baboucek and Jancar (2005) and Moinescu (2008), among other 
studies.  
The validity of the estimated long-run relationship is confirmed using the bounds 
 216 
 
testing methodology proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001). Specifically, the null 
hypothesis that the long-run coefficients are jointly zero is tested using the F-statistic. 
As the latter has a value of 6.51 that exceeds the upper bound of the critical value 
band tabulated in Pesaran et al. (2001), the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship 
between the Romanian credit risk (LLP), the Greek credit risk (LLPGR), the money 
supply (M2), the credit growth (LOAN) and the unemployment (UN), can be rejected. 
The short-run dynamics of the model are reported in Table 19.  
 
Table 19 Error correction representation for the ARDL model for Romania 
 
Dependent variable is dLLP 
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio 
dLLPGR 2.097 12.089 
dM2 -0.004 3.558 
dLOAN 0.004 3.974 
dC 0.003 2.746 
dUN(-10) 0.001 2.658 
ECM(-1) -0.298 5.048 
R
2
= 0.84 F(5,80)= 83.80 
 
As Table 19 depicts, all variables are statistically significant in the short-run. In 
particular, the Greek crisis appears to have an influential role on Romania’s credit 
risk, also in the short-run. The change in money supply (M2) presents a significant 
negative effect on the change in LLP, while the changes in loan growth and 
unemployment present a statistically significant positive effect, although 
unemployment has a relatively small coefficient. The ECM is highly significant and 
presents the correct sign, thus it is pointing to the existence of a long-run relationship 
between the endogenous variables. The magnitude of the ECM coefficient, which is 
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estimated at -0.298, suggests a relatively quick speed of convergence to equilibrium. 
Specifically, about 30% of the disequilibria of the previous month’s shock adjusts 
back to the long-run equilibrium in the current month. Table E4 in Appendix E 
presents the key statistics of the regression and Table E5 reports the diagnostics tests 
of the ARDL model. The test results are acceptable, apart from the evidence of 
heteroskedasticity that is dealt with by the use of White’s (1980) adjusted standard 
errors.    
Next, the results obtained from the ARDL approach to cointegration were cross-
checked against those obtained using the maximum likelihood (ML) procedure 
proposed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). The summary results 
obtained using the Johansen approach are reported in Table E6 in Appendix E. The 
first panel of Table E6 presents the test of cointegration. Based on the maximum 
eigenvalue, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected against the 
alternative of one cointegrating vector. The second panel of Table E3 reports the long-
run equilibrium relationship in normalized form, so that the coefficient on LLP is 
unity. A strong positive relationship is evidenced between LLP, LLPGR, LOAN and 
UN while a negative one appears to exist between LLP and M2. The ECM that is 
presented in the third panel of Table E3, along with the results of the regression, is 
statistically significant and has the correct negative sign. The diagnostic tests reported 
in the last panel of Table E3 suggest that there is no serial correlation in the error 
terms, while the evidence of heteroskedasticity is dealt with by the use of White’s 
(1980) adjusted standard errors. Similarly to the Bulgarian case, the Romanian results 
obtained from the Johansen cointegration approach converge reasonably with the 
ARDL approach, conditioned to the estimation process that each cointegration 
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technique follows. Given that one cointegrating vector has been found in both 
countries, no further restrictions were imposed on the coefficients. 
The evidence in Romania provides support to the Greek-crisis hypothesis, suggesting 
a channel of contagion arising from the interlinked banking systems. Initially, when 
the problem of a potential Greek sovereign default emerged, some dismissed it as 
trivial, given the country’s small weight in the euro area’s GDP. Ever since the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis deepened, policymakers have feared that the turmoil afflicting 
Greece would engulf larger developed economies. In contrast, limited attention was 
paid to the peripheral economies in the SEE region. As such, the consequences of a 
potential collapse of Greece’s banking sector in the neighbouring banking systems 
have not been thoroughly addressed. Yet, the empirical research provides evidence 
that relates the Greek crisis to the long-run stability of the Romanian banking system.  
The interconnectedness of the Greek and the SEE banking systems has increased the 
risk of contagion. Hence, systemic risk in one country can wipe out a large share of 
cross-border liabilities and ultimately undermine banking assets in other countries 
through direct linkages among the banks. Besides the macroeconomic and bank-level 
variables documented in the literature, the research provides evidence that a key 
driver for the Romanian credit risk appears to be the Greek crisis emanating from the 
close links between the two banking systems. The cointegration analysis for Romania 
evidences a long-run relationship between credit risk (LLP), money supply (M2), 
lending growth (LOAN), unemployment (UN) and the Greek credit risk (LLPGR). 
Hence, these indicators can be treated as the long-run forcing variables for the 
explanation of the Romania credit risk. 
In both focal countries, the cointegration results highlight the effect of a credit 
expansion gone wild in the pre-crisis period fuelled by ample liquidity in both 
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banking systems in an unfenced financial liberalization process, and the role of 
unemployment in deepening banks’ asset quality problems. 
The empirical evidence so far lies in the assumption of linearity in the models, put 
into question in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The following section 
discusses the results obtained from using the Markov switching modelling framework.  
6.4 The results of the Markov switching models 
One increasingly popular and useful advance in empirical studies is to allow for 
Markov switching effects in the specified model. Although in many areas of 
macroeconomics, it has become common to model time series as vector 
autoregressive processes subject to regime changes, the evidence on credit risk is 
almost non-existent. In the light of Gorton’s (2012) view that ‘a crisis is a sudden 
event, a structural break or a regime shift’, the empirical research sets out to explore 
the credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania by applying the Markov switching setting. To 
this end, and considering the lack of comparable results with other studies, the 
Markov switching modelling approach uses a common set of variables for both 
countries, namely the loan growth (LOAN), the monetary aggregate M2 as a proxy for 
money supply, and the unemployment rate. As for the Greek crisis hypothesis, the 
Greek credit risk (LLPGR) is used in the modelling approach as the crisis 
transmission channel. The inclusion of the monetary aggregate M2 in the sample of 
both countries allows not only the investigation of the role of money supply on credit 
risk but also exploring its interaction with the loan growth in proliferating credit risk 
in the focal SEE countries. As Buiter (2008) suggests, too little attention has been 
paid, especially during the asset and credit boom that preceded the global financial 
crisis, to the behaviour of the monetary and credit aggregates. 
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In the endeavour to trace the drivers of credit risk, the research estimates a Markov 
switching structural VAR model (MS-SVAR) that allows for non-linear endogenous 
or exogenous stochastic processes. The Markov switching setting can overcome the 
assumption that the statistical properties of the data during stable periods remain the 
same as after a crisis episode. Hence, the approach allows for the data generating 
process to exhibit different dynamics across a predefined number of regimes. The 
process can freely switch from one regime to another several times yielding a 
stochastic behaviour that resembles the presence of breaks, which the literature often 
calls endogenous to signify that their appearance is modelled.  
The Markov switching approach is complemented by a linear SVAR model that traces 
the different segments identified in the data on the basis of the nominating/awarding 
procedure proposed by Karoglou (2010). This approach allows for either endogenous 
or exogenous breaks in the time series. Based on the research’s theoretical 
underpinnings as supported by the evidence from the OLS-GMM estimations and the 
cointegration techniques, sign restrictions are applied to the impulse responses of 
credit risk.  
The following section reports the results for Bulgaria.  
6.4.1 The Markov switching model results for Bulgaria 
 
The Markov switching model is estimated, allowing means, intercepts, autoregressive 
parameters, variances and covariances to switch. In the identification stage, 
restrictions are imposed on the parameter estimates on the basis of the previous 
estimated models in order to derive a separate structural form for each regime, from 
which the regime-dependent impulse response functions are calculated. Two regimes 
are identified in the case of Bulgaria. Figure F1 presents the filter probability of these 
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two regimes. Regime 1 is distinguished as the ‘low volatility’ regime and regime 2 
determines a period of high volatility. The data provide evidence of a regime switch 
from the low to the high volatility state in November 2008. The result is in line with 
the findings in the unit root testing when accounting for structural breaks, as shown in 
Table B2. Hence, it can be argued that the low volatility regime coincides broadly 
with the booming period and the high volatility regime with the bust that followed, as 
the global financial crisis was unveiled in the SEE region. Furthermore, Figure F1 
provides evidence of short-lived regime switches from the low to high volatility state 
in September 2004 and June 2006, also in line with the unit root tests discussed earlier 
in the chapter (Table B2). The upper plot of the filtered probabilities maintains that, 
with the exception of short-lived disruptions, regime 1 yields a high probability up to 
October 2008. Thereafter, the high volatility regime 2 takes on and remains present 
with high probability up to the end of the sampling period. 
Figure F2 presents the impulse responses of the Bulgarian credit risk, as obtained 
from the MS-SVAR model, to innovations in the other endogenous variables. 
Traditional impulse response analysis reports the results of an experiment where a 
shock hits a system at time t, with no further shocks hitting afterwards, compared to 
the case where a system stays undisturbed all of the time. In this case, the impulse 
responses reflect the responsiveness of NPLs to shocks in each of the variables – 
LOAN, LLPGR, M2 and UN. In the case of the low volatility regime – regime 1 in 
Figure F2 – none of the variables appears to affect significantly the Bulgarian credit 
risk. In essence, the weak response of credit risk in LOAN, M2 and UN reflects the 
low variability of the data in the period before the financial crisis in 2008. However, 
in regime 2, with the exception of Greek crisis proxy (LLPGR), all variables appear to 
have a significant and theoretically-consistent effect on Bulgarian credit risk. As the 
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impulse responses in regime 2 suggest, the Bulgarian credit risk increases after a 
positive shock of LOAN and decreases after a positive shock of M2, in line with 
expectations. Moreover, the response of credit risk to a shock by M2 is explosive in 
the sense that the, initially negative, trend becomes significant in about three months 
after the shock. Equally, there is evidence of a volatile response of credit risk to a 
positive shock by UN, though not significant in the first three months following the 
shock. Although there is evidence of a positive reaction of credit risk to a positive 
shock by UN, the confidence interval includes the baseline, as shown in Figure F2, 
regime 2. Nevertheless, the response of credit risk has a positive trend without 
declining to zero. An implication of such an explosive response in the context of the 
Markov switching framework can be related to self-fulfilling expectations. For 
instance, an expectation for future recession will have a negative impact on 
investment and employment, hence aggravating the current recession and generating 
expectations for further distress in the banking system. Thus, the model is subject to 
the omitted variable problem which concerns expectations about future banking 
distress in the face of a negative shock in economic activity. As for the Greek crisis 
hypothesis, the impulse responses in both regimes suggest that there is no spillover 
effect from the Greek crisis to the Bulgarian credit risk. Although, LLPGR seems to 
yield a positive and sizeable impact on the Bulgarian NPLs, it is not statistically 
significant. Hence, in line with the previous modelling techniques, the data do not 
provide evidence of Greek crisis contagion in the Bulgarian banking system.  
The next stage involves the treatment of regime switches as exogenous, using a set of 
structural break tests in the spirit of the nominating stage (Karoglou, 2010). Table F3 
reports the results of the tests for the nomination of break dates in the data and Table 
F4 the results of the awarding stage. On the basis of the findings, the sample is 
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divided into three contiguous segments as follows: segment 1 spans from January 
2001 to June 2006, segment 2 spans from July 2006 to October 2008, and segment 3 
starts in November 2008 and continues to the end of the sample period in December 
2010. Then, for each segment a SVAR model is estimated using the same model-
consistent restrictions that were imposed in the MS-SVAR approach. Figure F5 
presents the impulse responses for the three identified segments. As in the case of the 
MS-SVAR model, the plots do not suggest a significant response of credit risk to a 
shock by any of the variables in the timeframe of segments 1 and 2, which in essence 
cover the period before the financial crisis hits the SEE region by the end of 2008. 
The finding can be explained by the fact that the period before the crisis is less 
volatile, compared to the period after the eruption of the crisis. Evidently, under this 
setting it becomes difficult to estimate the true relationship among the model’s 
variables in a sample where the variability of the data is low. On the other hand, the 
results in segment 3 are aligned to those obtained in regime 2 of the MS-SVAR 
model, albeit the responses of credit risk are now more sizable. However, in the TV-
SVAR model the response of credit risk to a shock by UN is more stable compared to 
the volatile one evidenced in the case of the MS-SVAR model.  
The observed differences between the time varying SVAR and the MS-SVAR model 
may be driven by expectation formation effects. The latter is accounted for in the case 
of the MS-SVAR model but not in the TV-SVAR one.
106
 The MS-SVAR model 
makes use of an unobserved state variable as a proxy of market expectations while the 
time varying SVAR ignores market expectations about future regime changes. 
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 The expectation formation effects emphasized by Davig and Leeper (2007) can be explained as an 
omitted variable problem that proxies the expectation about future regimes. The authors show that 
impulse responses from a model where agents account for possible regime changes are different from 
those where agents assume that the regime change is a once and for all event. 
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The following subsection discusses the Markov switching modelling results for 
Romania.  
6.4.2 The Markov switching model results for Romania 
 
Following an approach analogous to the Bulgarian one, a Markov switching model is 
estimated allowing all parameters to switch freely. Using the MS-SVAR analysis, two 
regimes are evidenced in Romania, regime 1 that is identified as the low volatility 
regime and regime 2 that determines a period of high volatility. The timing of the 
switches as depicted by the filter probabilities in Figure F6 suggest that the low 
volatility regime coincides with the booming period while the high volatility relates to 
the recession that reigns next. The filter probability of regime 1 suggests that, with the 
exception of a few short-lived disruptions, regime 1 yields high probability up to 
September 2008. Following the 2007-08 financial crisis the high-volatility regime 
(regime 2) becomes fixed, retaining a high probability up to the end of the sampling 
period. 
The next stage involves interpreting the impulse responses of the Romanian credit risk 
to a shock of a standard error from each variable in the model, LOAN, LLPGR, M2 
and UN, for each regime identified. Figure F7 displays the impulse responses of the 
Romanian credit risk (LLP) to innovations in the other endogenous variables in the 
two regimes as identified by the MS-SVAR model. Evidently, in both regimes LOAN 
appears to have a positive and significant effect on credit risk. In regime 1, the 
response of the Romanian credit risk to a LOAN shock is increasing and remains 
above the baseline for the remaining period. Turning to regime 2, it appears that the 
effect of LOAN on credit risk becomes larger compared to regime 1. As for the effect 
of M2, there is evidence of a significant negative effect on credit risk in line with the 
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traditional monetary channel view. Hence, an expansionary money supply shock 
reduces rates and stimulates investment and output. In turn, rising output boosts 
current cash flows, which in turn enhance the internal funding sources of firms, thus 
generating financial accelerator effects. Taken together, the positive effect of LOAN 
and the negative one of M2 on credit risk, provide support to the risk-taking channel 
view of the monetary transmission mechanism. An expansionary monetary policy 
lowers nominal rates, increases investment and output growth. Yet, in a low interest 
rate environment and high economic growth, banks will aim to maximize profits by 
extending more credit. Banks increasingly search for yield in a low interest rate 
environment (De Haas and Knobloch, 2010). However, this tendency increases banks’ 
leverage but also magnifies the system’s credit risk (Buiter, 2008; Admati and 
Hellwig, 2013). In Buiter’s (2008) view, every asset, credit boom, or institution in 
history has been characterized by rising and, ultimately, excessive leverage. Hence, 
the banks’ leverage appears to be the key in the Romanian case. Duenwald et al. 
(2005) argue that the fall in SEE countries’ risk premium, matched by improving 
business conditions, whetted the appetite for borrowing and improved the banks’ 
perception of borrowers’ creditworthiness. Therefore, it is no surprise that risk 
assessment may have suffered from the sizeable amount of new loans extended to the 
previously credit-constrained households and firms, a situation that eventually led to 
lax lending practices. As a wealth of studies support, the perceived risk during lending 
booms is usually underestimated as is it based on the prevailing euphoric conditions 
(De Haas and Knobloch, 2010).    
Turning to the role of UN, Figure F7 displays a positive effect on the build up of 
credit risk in both regimes. Yet, the impact of unemployment is significant only in the 
high volatility regime. Specifically, the evidence from regime 2 suggests that credit 
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risk increases in response to a positive shock of UN and remains above the baseline 
for the remaining period. As for the role of the Greek credit risk (LLPGR) on the 
Romanian one, Figure F7 (regime 2) suggests positive but marginally significant 
spillover effects.  
The next modelling stage involves the treatment of regime switches as exogenous 
using a battery of structural break tests in line with the nominating stage (Karoglou, 
2010). Table F8 reports the results of the tests for the nomination of breakdates in the 
data and Table F9 the results of the awarding stage that, in essence, tests for the 
equality of means and variances of the contiguous segments identified in the 
nominating stage. Based on the results, reported in Table F9 the sample is divided into 
three contiguous segments. Specifically, segment 1 covers the period from February 
2001 to August 2003, segment 2 from September 2003 until October 2008, and 
segment 3 from November 2008 to December 2010. Then for each segment a SVAR 
analysis takes place using the same model consistent restrictions that were imposed in 
the estimation of the MS-SVAR model. Figure F10 presents the impulse responses of 
the credit risk for the three identified segments. An initial observation is that in 
segments 1 and 2, which coincide with the low volatility regime in the MS-SVAR 
approach, none of the variables seems to have a significant effect on the Romanian 
credit risk. As in the case of Bulgaria, this can be attributed to the less volatile period 
before the crisis in comparison with the after-crisis period. An exception is the effect 
of LOAN in segment 1 and M2 in segment 2. The lending growth (LOAN) has a 
positive and significant effect only at the shock while M2 has a negative influence 
that becomes significant after three periods following an expansionary shock. 
Nevertheless, the size of the impact in both cases is relatively small. On the other 
hand, in segment 3,all variables with the exception of LLPGR, yield a significant and 
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prolonged effect on the Romanian credit risk. In line with the results obtained from 
the Markov switching analysis, LOAN, UN and LLPGR affect positively the 
Romanian credit risk while M2 yields a negative effect. In the cases of LOAN, UN 
and LLPGR, the impulse responses remain above zero, below in the case of M2, 
without presenting any tendency of convergence on the baseline.   
The results for both countries using the Markov switching framework put the linearity 
assumption into question, suggesting that linear models may work well under regular 
economic conditions but, as the impulse responses suggest, relatively small shocks in 
the models’ variables could have large effects on banking stability (Blanchard, 2014). 
Yet, the study of crises is, by definition, challenged by small samples and incomplete 
data (Gorton, 2012), and this also applies in the Markov switching framework in the 
research. 
This section completes the empirical results of the research, which broadly suggest 
that macroeconomic shocks, lending booms and busts, along with the crises episodes, 
took their toll in determining the credit risk in the banking systems of both Bulgaria 
and Romania. Equally, unemployment has a pronounced role in credit risk in both 
countries.  
The next section concludes the chapter.  
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented and interpreted the results of the empirical analysis in the 
thesis based on the theoretical underpinnings and relevant empirical studies. 
Following an analytical and systematic methodological design, several estimation 
techniques were applied in an endeavour to unravel the determinants of credit risk in 
Bulgaria and Romania in a comprehensive dataset over a critical time period. The 
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empirical part of the research used a robust multi-staged modelling framework that 
encompassed unit root tests, univariate and multivariate regressions, cointegration 
techniques (ARLD and VECM) and the Markov switching framework supported by a 
time varying SVAR setting. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
apply the ARDL approach to cointegration and the Markov switching framework to 
modelling credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania.    
The unit root testing strategy that encompassed standard unit root tests as well as tests 
that account for the presence of structural breaks are aimed at identifying the order of 
integration of the variables – a critical issue in avoiding spurious regressions. The 
results of the unit root tests, in the light of the historical evolution of the Bulgarian 
and Romanian banking systems within the timeline of the research, have facilitated 
insights into the patterns and trends of the time series.  
Next, a set of econometric techniques allowed the development of credible 
estimations and testing of the hypotheses set earlier in the research. In view of the 
debate in economics over methodological approaches, a set of different techniques 
was utilised. The univariate and multivariate models provided some preliminary 
evidence on the drivers of credit risk in the focal countries. Besides the linkages 
between credit risk and the macroeconomic conditions that are well documented in 
the literature, institutional and bank-specific factors were found to convey significant 
information in explaining credit risk in the context of the focal SEE countries. The 
next modelling stage involved the use of cointegration techniques. One of the 
appealing features of cointegration analysis is that it facilitates the estimation of 
models that describe the long-run relationships among the variables of interest. The 
results from the ARDL approach to cointegration that were cross-checked by the 
VECM framework, were broadly aligned with the initial modelling results, albeit 
 229 
 
utilizing a smaller set of meaningful variables. In this respect the estimated 
relationships were tractable and comprehensible. It seems that in the case of Bulgaria 
and Romania, small models, apart from being more delicate, can tell the underlying 
story equally as well as models that use many variables. The research findings were 
broadly consistent with the expectations arising from theory and empirical evidence. 
In both countries’ banking systems, lending growth and unemployment were found to 
be significant in determining credit risk in the long run. Contrary to Bulgaria, in 
Romania there was evidence of spillover effects from the Greek crisis. In the case of 
the Bulgarian credit risk, the role of the construction activity, the effect of the global 
financial crisis and that of the regulatory policies were decisive. In Romania, the 
money supply appeared to exert a negative significant effect on the credit risk, given 
the stylised facts associated with the established monetary regime. 
In the final modelling approach, the research benefited from the appealing features of 
the Markov switching model that produced promising results in the exploration of 
credit risk. Unlike the existing literature on credit risk, the research triggered by the 
crises episodes accounted for regime changes. In this respect, an MS-SVAR was used 
jointly with a time varying SVAR model. The empirical findings were broadly 
consistent with the previous modelling approaches and theoretical priors. In both 
countries the loan growth and unemployment had a positive and significant effect on 
credit risk, while the money supply had a negative and significant effect. Taking 
together the effect of the lending growth and monetary aggregates in credit risk, it is 
reasonable to assume that their interaction deserves more attention in future research, 
especially under irregular economic conditions. The evidence of spillover effects 
arising from the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian and Romanian banking system was 
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limited, yet positive, possibly constrained by the small sample size in the volatility 
regimes.  
Overall, the modelling treatment of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania and the 
meaningful results lend support to the argument that the SEE countries do not form a 
homogeneous block. As such, the implicit hypothesis that country-specific research 
yields superior results to cross-country research was confirmed. Furthermore, the 
empirical results broadly confirm the testable hypotheses, namely the banks’ pro-
cyclicality, the excess lending, the monetary transmission and the crisis spillover 
hypotheses. Considering the data constraints, the empirical results for both countries 
are interesting and important in many respects.  
The next chapter, which concludes the thesis, provides an evaluation of the findings 
by addressing the research questions and the objectives of the research. Using the 
knowledge from previous chapters, the last chapter draws comparison lines between 
the two countries, discusses the limitations, provides recommendations and sheds 
some light on future research avenues.  
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
Some years on, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 still haunts the SEE region, 
one of the worst affected regions in the emerging world. In the aftermath, the 
economic impact was more severe than anticipated, reflecting home-grown 
vulnerabilities. While the crisis spread relatively quickly into the euro area, contagion 
in the transitional economies of Bulgaria and Romania was delayed. Institutional 
settings including, among others, the process of liberalization, left the banking sectors 
in both countries exposed to a number of risks, highlighting the complementarities 
and trade-offs between financial stability and economic growth. In the years prior to 
the global financial crisis, the literature on finance and growth accumulated a body of 
evidence suggesting that financial sector deepening is a key component of the 
economic development process. Encouraged by such evidence, policy makers in the 
developing countries questioned little the ability or willingness of the financial sector 
to channel funds to socially productive uses.  
The global financial crisis made it clear that the idiosyncratic features of a country’s 
banking sector such as liberalization, competition, size, cross-border linkages, and 
regulation, can exacerbate the trade-off between economic efficiency and banks’ 
stability. In other words, the crisis of 2007 has qualified the conventional wisdom that 
finance always interacts with growth in a positive way. The expansion of the banking 
sector in the SEE region has signalled a misallocation of credit to less productive 
economic activities. The spike in financial intermediation before the crisis in the 
research’s focal countries was associated with household credit, and mostly credit 
allocated to the real estate/construction sector. As discovered from the empirical 
evidence, the development of the banking sectors in Bulgaria and Romania has 
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increased risk-taking. The intense competition between the foreign banks encouraged 
in-country banks to engage in imprudent behaviour that weakened the resilience of 
both systems to external shocks. A liquidity-abundant environment combined with 
highly leveraged banks exacerbates moral hazard problems, increasing banks’ appetite 
for risk. In turn, increased risk-taking if left unchecked by regulators can render the 
banking sector more fragile, thereby increasing the probability of a systemic 
meltdown with harmful effect on long-term growth. Households and corporations 
alike in the SEE region became dependent on debt-financing promoted by rising 
property prices (De Haas and Knobloch, 2010). The banks that had staked their 
prospects on ever rising asset prices and unstoppable ‘hot money’ inflows, found 
themselves in trouble from rising problem loans.  
The liberalization process of the SEE markets has given rise to an unprecedented, 
high penetration of foreign banks
107
 that were eager to establish subsidiaries and 
exploit profitable opportunities available in these transitional economies. It has also 
created highly interdependent banking systems in which shocks in one system can 
quickly spread and threaten the others. In this respect, foreign banks appear to have 
played a key role in the dynamics of the crisis in the region. Although a crisis can 
spread through many channels, most of them are closely connected to cross-border 
banking linkages.  
The accelerating credit growth during the euphoria times appears to have been unique 
in the SEE region, judging by the banks’ lending ratios that have been greater than 
average on a worldwide scale. The growth model of reliance on abundant credit gave 
rise to an unsustainable boom that was ended abruptly by the crisis. The legacy of the 
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 Cross-border penetration from EU countries reached 82% of total banking assets in Bulgaria and 
89% in Romania in the period 2006-2010 (EU Banking Structures, ECB).  
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boom-bust cycle in the region was reflected in the accumulating problem loans that 
challenged the banks’ soundness and became a hindrance to economic growth.  
For several decades, little interest has been paid to financial stability (Goodhart and 
Tsomocos, 2012). However, all that changed and now central banks and academics 
unanimously agree that banking stability is a key policy objective, underscoring that 
monetary policy and financial stability are interrelated.  
The crises episodes have highlighted the importance of understanding the causes of 
financial instability, especially in the context of banks’ credit risk. A prerequisite in 
establishing the long-term viability of a country’s banking sector involves an in-depth 
diagnosis of the determinants of credit risk. 
This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing on the results of the empirical research 
obtained via a variety of econometric techniques applied rigorously in an endeavour 
to unravel the determinants of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania. The chapter’s 
roadmap begins by evaluating the results with respect to the research questions and 
the formulated testable hypotheses. Next, the chapter draws comparison lines between 
the two countries and provides policy recommendations. The chapter closes by 
shedding some light on future research avenues.  
The aim of the thesis was to explore the determinants of credit risk in Bulgaria and 
Romania in a critical timeframe spanning from 2001 to 2010 that embraced a rapid 
lending growth up to 2008 and accelerating problem loans thereafter. The empirical 
research focused on two individual countries, Bulgaria and Romania, using time series 
models after accounting for the specificities in the institutional settings of each 
country. In contrast, most studies that have involved the focal countries in panel 
estimations, broadly treat the SEE region as a homogeneous area. Deviating from the 
latter approach, the research has taken a case-by-case approach treating each country 
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separately. Comprehensive monthly datasets were collected for both countries and the 
potential drivers of credit risk were grouped into four broad categories: 
macroeconomic, monetary, financial markets, and bank-specific indicators. Next, a set 
of Greek indicators was selected to trace the crisis spillover effects from Greece to the 
neighbouring two countries, given the banking linkages in place. As the twin – 
sovereign debt and banking – crises unfolded in Greece, the authorities in Bulgaria 
and Romania tried to determine if and how they would be affected by these 
developments in the light of Greek banks’ substantial presence in the region. The risk 
of contagion became a key concern for policy makers (Bartlett and Monastiriotis, 
2010; Allen et al. 2011).   
Assessing the credit risk determinants in the Bulgarian and Romanian banking 
systems has been a research-stimulating area, especially in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing Greek crisis that was instantly 
transmitted to the domestic banking system, causing enormous distress. The transition 
economies of Bulgaria and Romania provided a particularly motivating setting in 
which banks played a key role. The banks in those countries emerged from the 
centrally planned economies that followed a less than smooth process of development 
amid macroeconomic collapses and banking crises. Both these nascent banking 
sectors inherited a legacy of problem loans that continued to evolve, even during the 
last phase of the large-scale bank privatization.  
Credit risk has always been central to all banking crises experienced in both countries 
starting from the collapse of the Soviet bloc and leading up to the recent financial 
turmoil. The banking sectors of Bulgaria and Romania developed remarkably quickly, 
albeit with stark differences between them, and reached a point that looked similar to 
their counterparts in other emerging economies, except for the high percentage of 
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foreign ownership. The policy in both countries encouraged foreign bank participation 
as it was viewed as a vehicle for liberalizing their banking sectors and importing 
expertise. With hindsight, it appears that a banking system dominated by foreign 
banks is a mixed blessing. In general, foreign bank participation is expected to reduce 
volatility in developing countries, as their lending operations tend to be less pro-
cyclical, and increase efficiency, but all this depends on individual country 
circumstances. The massive entry of foreign banks in the SEE region seems to have 
increased contagion risks without providing guarantees for the smooth process of 
finance and growth. The unprecedented credit expansion followed by rising 
investment activity in construction and skyrocketing property prices was mainly 
driven by foreign banks competing for market share. That came to a sudden halt in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis as liquidity drained and the result of the ‘easy-
credit’ growth model was mirrored in the balance sheets of both banking systems with 
evident implications for their stability. The banks in both focal countries were found 
at the forefront of a severe credit crunch with deteriorating asset quality and problem 
loans on the rise.  
The research problem is built upon a set of questions in which the key area of focus is 
the financial stability of Bulgaria and Romania. Since credit risk is the primary source 
of risk in both countries’ banking systems, a number of related proxies have been 
used. Table 20 presents the central research questions as transformed into testable 
hypotheses and investigated in the empirical part of this thesis. 
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Table 20 Research questions of research and mapping to the hypotheses explored by 
econometric analysis 
 
Key research questions Testable hypotheses 
1. Can business cycle indicators explain the 
vulnerabilities of the Romanian and 
Bulgarian banking systems arising from 
deteriorating asset quality? 
 
 
Deteriorating credit risk/asset quality has 
a negative relationship with economic 
growth (pro-cyclicality hypothesis). 
 
2. What is the role of lending growth in 
determining credit risk? 
Credit risk is positively (negatively) 
related to increasing lending growth 
(excess lending/financial liberalization 
hypothesis). 
 
3. What is the role of money supply in 
determining credit risk? 
Increasing (decreasing) money supply has 
a negative impact on credit risk (monetary 
transmission mechanism hypothesis). 
4. Is there evidence of the Greek crisis 
(global financial crisis) in the Bulgarian 
and Romanian banking systems? 
 
5. What is the effect of the Greek credit risk 
on the Bulgarian and Romanian banking 
systems? 
 
 
 
 
Credit risk is positively related to the 
Greek crisis - global financial crisis (crisis 
spillover hypothesis). 
 
Although the empirical literature on the linkages between credit risk and 
macroeconomic performance has recently gained momentum, a number of gaps have 
been identified and these motivated the research that has been undertaken. They are 
summarized in the following list:  
a. There is a notable absence in the literature of country-specific studies for 
Bulgaria and Romania. Both countries have been used in cross-country studies 
that could not fully account for each individual country’s idiosyncratic 
features and particular circumstances. In general, panel studies that include the 
focal countries do not explicitly account for structural breaks.  
b. To the author’s knowledge no studies have been undertaken to apply the 
ARDL approach to cointegration or the Markov switching framework to the 
focal countries. The former approach proved useful in exploring the long-run 
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relationship of credit risk and its key drivers. The latter allows for regime 
shifts and non-linearities in the data generating process. 
c. The role of credit growth and the effect of money supply on credit risk do not 
present a clear-cut picture in the empirical literature. 
d. Empirical studies in the SEE region have not explored or accounted for the 
spillover effects arising from the Greek debt crisis.  
e. Cross-validation of the empirical results reported in the related literature is 
absent.  
The identified gaps along with the theoretical underpinnings of the research 
rationalize the country-level research approach followed in the thesis. The research 
employs a methodological design that benefits from the appealing features of several 
econometric techniques. Specifically, a multi-staged modelling framework is applied 
that uses a detailed unit root testing strategy, OLS and GMM regressions, 
cointegration techniques (ARDL and VECM), and the Markov regime switching 
modelling approach. Using this robust framework, the research provides evidence on 
the determinants of credit risk in two SEE countries that have been neglected in the 
empirical studies. The novelty of the research involves the investigation of the effect 
of the Greek crisis on the banking systems of Bulgaria and Romania, by identifying 
the Greek bank subsidiaries operating in the SEE region as the most likely channel of 
contagion. The contribution of the thesis is largely determined by the critical 
timeframe used that covers, at least in part, the boom-bust cycle, but also the 
empirical treatment of the datasets, as it applies several methodological approaches to 
cross-validate the robustness of the findings. Table 21 summarizes the key findings of 
the empirical research on credit risk determinants.  
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Table 21 Summary of findings by country and type of econometric technique used in 
the research. 
 
Methodology Bulgaria Romania 
Ordinary Least Squares   
 Lagged NPLs, lagged 
construction, industrial 
production, unemployment, 
real effective exchange rate, 
loan growth, global financial 
crisis and regulation. 
CPI, unemployment, 
construction, lagged 
investment, external debt, 
M2, Greek credit risk, Greek 
bond yield and lagged spread 
between Greek and German 
long-term bonds. 
ARDL - VECM   
 Loan growth, unemployment, 
construction,  
global financial crisis  
and regulation. 
Loan growth,  
unemployment,  
money supply, 
Greek credit risk. 
Markov Switching SVAR   
 Regime 1 (pre-crisis): none  
Regime 2 (crisis):  
loan growth,  
unemployment,  
money supply. 
Regime 1 (pre-crisis):  
loan growth 
Regime 2 (crisis):  
loan growth, unemployment, 
money supply. 
 
Against the backdrop of the research’s findings, a numbers of conclusions can be 
drawn. A first observation is that a small set of explanatory variables are relatively 
good predictors of credit risk in both countries. Particularly in the context of more 
advanced estimation techniques, the use of small-scale models renders them tractable 
and interpretable (Foglia, 2008). The empirical findings agree broadly with the 
theoretical underpinnings and the empirical evidence underlying the investigated 
transmission channel that runs from the macroeconomy on bank’s credit risk. In this 
respect the prevailing macroeconomic conditions in both countries are vital in 
conditioning credit risk. In broad consensus with the literature on banking crises and 
credit risk, leading economic indicators such as unemployment, construction activity, 
effective exchange rate, industrial production and investment are found to be closely 
related to the stability of the banking sectors in either Bulgaria or Romania (Kaminsky 
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et al., 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Arpa et al., 2001; Barro, 2001; 
Boss, 2002; Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Hoggarth et al. 2005a,b; Bhattacharya and 
Roy, 2008; Crotty, 2009; Nkusu, 2011; Klein, 2013). In both countries, loan growth 
and unemployment were found to be key channels in transmitting instability in the 
respective banking systems. Given the joint effect in explaining system-wide 
movements in credit risk, it is reasonable to conclude that the resilience of the banking 
systems in Bulgaria and Romania could weaken significantly in the case of a wave of 
unemployment.  
Notably, both countries relied excessively on foreign bank credit that fuelled the 
construction activity, which has been the worst affected sector by the global financial 
crisis in terms of unemployment. Certainly the effect of credit is complicated, 
especially during the above average booming periods, as it usually masks the problem 
of quality in lending standards. Nevertheless, the findings support the view that in the 
case of Bulgaria and Romania, the rapid lending growth increased credit risk 
substantially. Both countries encouraged the rise of financial intermediation through 
the entry of foreign banks. In retrospect, it seems that the contribution of foreign 
banks to intermediation and financial deepening was not as straightforward as it was 
expected to be by the proponents of a fast financial liberalization in these countries. 
Furthermore, it seems that the period marked by excessive lending in highly 
competitive market structures may have incentivized lax loan screening and 
underwriting policies. When the negative shock hit, the financial fragility paved the 
way to financial instability manifested in a surge of NPLs. The experience of Bulgaria 
and Romania accords well with the empirical priors, while the global financial crisis 
was a severe crash test of the intense process of cross-border banking. The results of 
the impact of loan growth and unemployment are robust in the long term estimated 
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relationships, as the cointegration techniques highlighted, but also in the high 
volatility regimes as traced by the Markov switching model. In the latter case, the 
growth of the broad monetary aggregates seemed to track adequately the credit risk in 
Bulgaria and Romania, suggesting that central banks should pay attention to those 
aggregates and the behaviour of credit in their effort to maintain banking stability. In 
accordance with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, during the business 
cycle upswing, the low interest rates – increased money supply environment – 
encouraged credit but also induced banks to take greater risks.  
The research also indicates that the cross-border effects of contagion pose important 
implications for credit risk. As for the role of the Greek debt crisis specifically, a 
broad observation is that the SEE region policymakers face great challenges in 
navigating risks that are differentiated across countries, given the inter-linkages of 
banking systems. The financial turbulence that engulfed the SEE region provided a 
stark reminder that the ties in place between the banking systems of Bulgaria and 
Romania and the Greek system do matter as they affect the risk of cross-border 
spillovers. The findings suggest that compared to Bulgaria, Romania faced greater 
downside risks from potential spillovers arising from the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
and bank distress. This result was robust in the univariate and multivariate 
regressions, and cointegration estimations, but not in the case of the Markov 
switching model. In the latter case the Greek crisis effect was found to be positive but 
not significant. A potential explanation relates to the small number of observations in 
the ‘high volatility’ regime as it is well documented in the literature that these models 
are sensitive to the sample’s observations. 
The research forms the basis of a comparative analysis of the credit risk determinants 
in Bulgaria and Romania. Evidently, the results of the univariate-multivariate 
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regressions and those of the cointegration, purport that the set of explanatory variables 
was not identical in both countries. As expected from the outset, the Bulgarian credit 
risk was more affected by construction activity and the regulatory framework, 
especially when the authorities attempted to stave off the overheating of the economy 
through the introduction of credit ceilings. Drawing comparison lines between the two 
countries is constrained to some extent by data limitations that prevented the use of a 
similar proxy of credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania. However, a number of studies 
have indicated that both metrics – LLPs and NPLs –are imperfect proxies for the 
evolution of credit risk in a banking sector over the business cycle. In practice, LLPs 
are backward-looking, as banks tend to underestimate future losses in periods of 
economic expansion because of disaster myopia or herding behaviour. Yet, both 
proxies have been widely used in empirical studies as reliable credit risk indicators 
whilst there is clear evidence in the literature that the proportion of either NPLs or 
LLPs increases dramatically before and during banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). Similarly there is an almost 
contemporaneous relation between loan loss provisions and NPLs. Under the caveat 
of the different credit risk proxies used in Bulgaria and Romania, an evident 
divergence between these countries relates to the spillover effects of the Greek crisis. 
The latter stirs the need to examine the past and can be explained in the light of the 
following factors:  
- It seems that in Bulgaria the memory of the severe crisis of 1996-1997 was 
still fresh. The hard lesson from the banking collapse that followed was well 
learnt by the authorities. In retrospect, the introduction of the currency board 
along with the disciplined fiscal policy appear to have contributed to the 
stability of the banking system during the research’s timeframe. Bulgaria did 
 242 
 
not request any external help in stabilizing either its fiscal position or its 
banking system.  
- The speed of adjustment that differed considerably between the two countries, 
from the previous centrally-planned regime to the new market-based one. It is 
well documented that Romania was a late starter while Bulgaria was an early 
bird in terms of the adjustment period and the process of bank privatization. In 
view of this, it seems that the Bulgarian authorities had more time to adjust to 
the new setting and understand the potential drawbacks of the regulatory 
framework by adopting a more proactive stance. This is reflected in the credit 
ceilings imposed on lending by 2006, which aimed to slow down, even 
temporarily, the economy’s overheating.  
- The Bulgarian sovereign and banking system balance sheet was healthier than 
the Romanian one when the crisis erupted. In terms of the banking systems, it 
appears that the degree of leverage prior to the crisis was critical. The 
Bulgarian banks were better capitalized and less leveraged. Overall, a stronger 
capital position ring-fences the system more effectively. The imposition of 
tighter regulation on capital buffers in Bulgaria limited the contagion from 
parent banks. During the boom years, regulation in Bulgaria required banks to 
reinvest their profits rather than repatriating them to their foreign parents. 
Hence, as numerous sources suggest, a prudent regulatory framework was in 
place in Bulgaria. (EBRD, 2010; BNB, 2011, Moody’s 2012). 
- In terms of macroeconomic policy, it may be that the currency peg 
implemented in 1997 in Bulgaria that put in place hard budget constraints and 
limits to the financing of the State via the banks, may have worked as a 
stabilizer in the banking system. Another possible reason for the insignificant 
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effect of the Greek crisis on the Bulgarian credit risk, despite the larger market 
share of Greek banks compared to Romania, relates to the lowest exposure of 
Greek banks in Bulgaria in monetary terms. 
Overall, it is safe to conclude that in the aftermath of the past crises episodes, the 
credit risk emerged to varying degrees, depending on the initial conditions in Bulgaria 
and Romania. In common with both transition countries, what was considered to be an 
advantage during booming times, such large FDI inflows and liberalization of the 
financial system, became a disadvantage during the crisis, exposing these countries to 
greater risk of ‘catching a virus’ (Shostya, 2014). Starting in the autumn of 2008, 
economic output and real estate prices plunged, along with the construction sector, 
unemployment soared and banks that were engaged in excessive lending faced a 
rapidly deteriorating asset quality. The banking systems of Bulgaria and Romania had 
to face a number of challenges as they adapted to the post-crisis economic 
environment. The key policy recommendations of the research are the following: 
- The central banks have to safeguard financial stability. When a crisis strikes, 
the connections between the real economy and the banking system are 
manifest and overstressed. There is a central role that problem loans play in 
banking crises; usually a large increase in NPLs marks the onset of the crisis. 
In times of stability, there is a tendency to downplay these connections. Hence, 
the links between banks and the economy are always relevant – not only in 
crises times. The degree to which central banks can use policy instruments to 
counter the effect of the crisis and support the resilience of the banking sector 
presents heterogeneity, as it depends on factors such as fiscal conditions, 
exchange rate and monetary regime.    
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- Regulators and supervisors in different countries with interconnected banking 
systems need to collaborate in designing and implementing macro-prudential 
policy. On the same wavelength, the banking regulation in the EU needs to go 
beyond the home country principle. The latter recommendation reinforces the 
urgent need for a pan-European regulation that will also account for cross-
border banking linkages. In the meantime, regulators need to explicitly 
coordinate across borders taking steps towards ring-fencing the activities of 
foreign subsidiaries and burden-sharing arrangements in the event of cross-
border crisis.  
- Regional dialogue and joint bank monitoring between the host country 
regulators in SEE region and the home country regulators of more advanced 
European economies may be particularly useful, especially in cases where the 
exposure of foreign banks to host countries are significant. In countries such as 
Bulgaria and Romania, where Greek banks control a relatively large market 
share, potential spillover and contagion risks need to be closely monitored. 
Contingency plans that will aim to contain any potential shocks to confidence 
in the banking systems should be in place. 
- Bulgaria and Romania are among the new members of EU with the prospect of 
adopting the single currency at some point in the future. Both banking systems 
are dominated by foreign banks of EU origin and also appear vulnerable to 
sudden swings in global sentiment. Once the hot money stops flowing 
globally, a credit crunch is on the doorstep. The latter, in conjunction with the 
evidence of spillover effects from Greece, may have implications not only for 
the financial stability of the focal countries but also for the euro area. 
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- Closely interrelated banking systems make them susceptible to shocks. 
Reducing vulnerabilities at their roots, such as the Greek crisis, will effectively 
make the Bulgarian and Romanian banks more resilient and minimize the 
effect of potential instability in Bulgaria and Romania from transmitting to 
other countries either in the neighbouring or euro area.  
- In the light of the uncertain environment, it is important that both countries’ 
central banks continue their intensive bank supervision and expand their crisis 
preparedness. Careful planning and imposition of speed limits on credit 
growth, as proposed by Honohan (1997) and Hellmann et al. (2000), 
especially when the economy begins to overheat, are expected to address the 
moral hazard in banking and encourage prudential lending.  
- Banking and monetary stability are closely intertwined. As such, the 
authorities should pursue a stability-oriented monetary policy. An empirical 
implication of the bank-centric view of monetary transmission is that lending 
growth should be closely monitored along with measures of economic activity. 
Following changes in monetary policy, there is a strong correlation between 
credit risk, bank lending and unemployment, and other key macroeconomic 
indicators. The scale of unemployment can be devastating for the resilience of 
the financial sectors in the focal countries. Unemployment is undoubtedly a 
complex phenomenon and in the case of the research’s focal countries, caused 
by a large and sustained negative shock to the GDP as a result of the Great 
Recession in the aftermath of both the global financial crisis and the Greek 
sovereign debt one. In the context of the research, unemployment lies at the 
heart of the problem loans’ dynamics meaning that it adds pressure to central 
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banks and requires a coherent strategy by policy makers in achieving a 
sustainably high level of employment.   
This research has surfaced the fragility of the banking sectors in Bulgaria and 
Romania both of which are exposed to the macroeconomic conditions and spillovers 
from the Greek crisis. Broadly, the data suggest that credit risk is sensitive to 
macroeconomic shocks which in turn quickly transmit to banks’ balance sheets. As 
such, the research yielded tangible results and contributed to knowledge and the 
existing literature on credit risk determinants. The thesis surfaced the control variables 
in both countries, illuminated the relationships shaped in the research’s timeframe and 
provided a number of policy recommendations. Understanding the mechanics of 
crises in the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems remains a key challenge 
limited by the lack of related studies. The crises soon become a “forgotten story” and 
the crisis-related studies are constrained by small samples and incomplete data 
(Gorton, 2012). A drawback of the research relates to data limitations. Constraints 
such as the availability and quality of data, the frequent revisions and other reporting 
weaknesses, restrict the modelling approaches. For instance, the quarterly GDP data 
for the emerging EU countries, including Bulgaria and Romania, are available only 
after 2002, the Romanian NPLs after 2003, while the Greek data had seen several 
revisions. In the latter case, in the light of the ‘new’ Greek time series, the results of 
the research may have been different. Regarding future research directions, it will be 
worth reviewing the situation in the Bulgarian and Romanian banking systems as of 
2014. In Bulgaria, the banking sector's liquidity remains high, supported by deposit 
growth that outstripped lending growth. Banks have wound down external debt 
positions between 2008 and 2013 while increasing their assets held abroad over the 
same period. The currency board regime and the high share of loans in foreign 
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currency restrict the monetary flexibility of the central bank and limit its ability to act 
as a lender of last resort. Credit growth has been anaemic, reflecting banks’ low risk 
appetite along with the poor demand from the real economy. The resolution of NPLs 
has been slow, given that they remain high at about 17% of total loans. In June 2014, 
deposit runs at two large domestic banks
108
 stirred concerns about the state of the 
Bulgarian banking system. Swift actions by the BNB helped to head off a large scale 
bank run in EU’s poorest member state (Hope, 2014). Hence, it is safe to conclude 
that the problem seems to persist in Bulgaria’s financial sector, which faces rising 
rates of NPLs in a weak economy. Although the BNB was found to be a stabilizer for 
the system during the sovereign debt crisis, it has limited power to revive the 
economy. On top of that, political uncertainty
109
 poses further risks for the country’s 
financial sector.  
In the light of this, a possible direction for future research in Bulgaria’s banking 
system entails the extension of the dataset with more observations as well as 
qualitative variables, such as political stability, rule of law or regulation. Such 
approach would try to explain the variables effect on bank’s credit risk as well as the 
factors that prevent the resolution of NPLs in Bulgaria.  
In the case of Romania, which has a flexible exchange rate regime, the independent 
monetary policy remains constrained by a relatively high share of foreign currency in 
the economy. The financial sector’s stability appears to be on track, albeit with an 
elevated level of NPLs. The subdued growth increased the banking system’s NPLs to 
                                                 
108
 Savers withdrew more than 20% of deposits from the Corporate Commercial Bank, the country’s 
fourth largest bank, causing a liquidity crunch that forced the bank to seek emergency funding from the 
BNB. The collapse of one of Bulgaria’s largest banks, one with political connections, has further 
unsettled a country that has increasingly become a source of concern within the EU for poor 
governance. The BNB decided to recapitalize the bank by a state-owned one and the Deposit Insurance 
Fund in an attempt to protect the stability of Bulgaria’s banking system. 
 
109
 By the end of July 2014, Bulgaria’s prime minister resigned leaving his successor to sort out the 
Balkan state’s worst banking crisis since the 1990s (Reuters, 2014). 
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21.9% of total loans, as of December 2013. Hence, over the past few years, the 
banking sector’s asset quality has weakened while the slow credit growth has had an 
impact on domestic demand recovery. Overall, the banking sector weaknesses remain 
a constraining factor as well as a key risk factor for the economy (Moody’s, 2014). 
These weaknesses are counterbalanced to some extent by the strong capital adequacy 
ratio in the Romanian banking system and the high level of bank provisioning for 
problem loans. Hence, it seems that further investigation of credit risk determinants is 
high on the research agenda for Romania, accounting also for the role of the 
institutions and the political turmoil during the crisis. 
Few years have passed since the global financial architecture came to the brink of 
collapse and the global economy was plunged into the Great Recession. Europe was 
hit by the global financial crisis and recession, but this external crisis soon 
transformed into a home-grown one, dubbed the ‘euro sovereign debt crisis’. 
Although sentiment has improved, several voices still contend that the crisis in the 
euro area is not over yet. Growth remains lethargic; unemployment and the standard 
of living has deteriorated in the affected countries, and peripheral economies are 
adjusting to tough economic realities. The Greek debt crisis has cast a shadow in both 
focal countries’ banking sectors. Both countries had limited policy manoeuvring room 
just when they needed it most, i.e. in the wake of the worst recession since the Great 
Depression. Banks continue to take a cautious stance in lending to the real economy 
and NPLs have been rising since the onset of the crisis. Without promoting 
investment in the real economy as credit is shrinking, the chances are high that this 
could lead to a self-reinforcing downward spiral. In this setting, policymakers have to 
rediscover that monetary policy works through the stability of the financial system.  
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In the light of the previous analysis, future research entails the extension of both 
datasets. The latter will not only allow the re-evaluation and validation of the 
relationships identified but is expected to shed some light on the persistent problem of 
credit risk and its interactions with the real economy.  
Another reason for refreshing and extending the dataset is that loans which have been 
restructured during the crisis may turn up in the NPL statistics with some delay. 
Furthermore, more data will allow the investigation of the channels through which 
macroeconomic, financial or monetary variables affect credit risk. The effect of the 
sovereign debt crisis on bank’s credit risk calls for further research, including the 
investigation of second round effects, given that financial channels can amplify 
sovereign risks and vice versa. Financial sector linkages can transmit one country’s 
sovereign or banking credit risk to other economies and financial sectors, especially in 
SEE countries that have proved to be sensitive to external shocks. The confluence of 
monetary policy and lending growth on credit risk in Bulgaria and Romania needs 
further examination as well as the feedback effects of credit risk to the real economy 
and the macro-financial performance. In this respect, the measure of credit to GDP 
that has proved to be useful in analysing cyclical variations can be used for the focal 
countries. A measure of bank stability that increasingly gains popularity is the z-score, 
which measures banks’ solvency risk and distance to default. Certainly, variables such 
as NPLs or LLPs are extensive, but they are also known to be lagging indicators of 
banks’ soundness (Čihák and Schaeck, 2010). 
Research questions arising from the global financial crisis and the ensuing Greek 
sovereign debt crisis identified several macro-prudential policy challenges. Such 
questions are identified to be at the leading edge of research that integrates financial 
intermediation and the macroeconomy (Ali and Daly, 2010; Gorton, 2012). Amongst 
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these challenges are improving our understanding of macro-financial linkages and 
developing tools that can be utilised in macro-prudential surveillance. In terms of 
modelling approaches, the future research avenue points to three possible directions. 
Given that the evidence from past banking crises suggests irregularities under 
economic stress, the relationship between credit risk and the business cycle continues 
to pose modelling challenges and remains an open question in developing economies. 
In view of the limited attention attracted by empirical studies, the ARDL approach to 
cointegration and the Markov regime switching models are promising in explaining 
credit risk. As such, these approaches need to be applied in the context of other 
developing countries and be complemented by the use of other modelling techniques 
to study how credit risk shocks are propagated across countries with financial or 
economic inter-linkages. Secondly, the dynamics of the relationship in question could 
imply two-way causality that is worth investigating, also under the non-linearity 
assumption, given the stagnation in lending and the recession in the aftermath of the 
crises. A growing body of empirical literature that uses threshold VAR models has 
demonstrated the existence of non-linear conditions among credit conditions, 
monetary policy and real economic activity in a number of countries (Balke, 2000; Li 
and St-Amant, 2010; Avdjiev and Zeng, 2014). Hence, this empirical stand is a 
research avenue worth exploring in the focal countries. A third strand of future 
research that provides a promising way forward can be built around the transmission 
mechanisms between credit risk and exogenous events in the spirit of the modelling 
framework developed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and Segoviano and Padilla (2006).  
The effort to get the banking right is a major thread in the research as the cult of risky 
behaviour is ingrained not only in banks but also in corporations and households, 
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especially when both the latter were for a long time credit constrained, as in the case 
of the focal countries in the thesis. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Financial crisis indicators and credit risk determinants in the literature 
 
Table A1 Financial crisis indicators in the literature 
 
 Authors Indicators 
Kindleberger (1978) Asset price bubbles. 
Minsky (1982a) Reinforcing process between financial and real economy, credit and asset prices boom. 
Bernanke (1995)   Monetary contraction and deflation. 
Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998)  Bank solvency and risk. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) Financial liberalization. 
Honohan (1997)  Aggregate banks’ balance sheet indicators and macroeconomic indicators: loan-to-deposit ratio, foreign borrowings to deposits, 
credit growth, reserves to deposits, lending to government, central bank lending to banking system.  
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) 
Weak macroeconomic environment, high inflation and real interest rates, banking sector problems.  
Corsetti et al. (1998)  Depreciation in exchange rate and change in foreign reserves, stock of NPLs to total assets, stock of NPLs to GDP, current 
account balance to GDP, ratio of monetary aggregate and foreign exchange reserves, foreign debt payment to foreign reserves. 
Goldstein (1998) Credit boom to real estate, export slowdown, fixed exchange rates, liquidity-currency mismatches, connected lending, low levels 
of transparency, current account deficits, low quality of investment, deteriorating competitiveness reflected in real exchange 
rates. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) International reserves, real exchange rate, credit growth, credit to public sector, inflation, real exchange rate, banking crises, 
exports, stock prices, M2 to international reserves output. 
Baig and Goldfajn (1998)  Nominal exchange rates, stock markets, interest rate (overnight rate), interest rates on foreign currency–denominated debt, and 
spread with US treasury bill yield.  
Gonzalez-Hermossilo (1999) 
 
Measures of bank solvency and risk: loan-to-assets ratio. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998)  Foreign exchange reserves, domestic-foreign interest rate differential on deposits, increasing M1-M2, domestic credit to GDP, 
real interest rate, lending to deposits, M2 to reserves, bank deposits, exports-imports, terms of trade, real exchange rate, foreign 
exchange reserves, output, stock prices, fiscal deficit to GDP. 
Berg (1999) GDP, inflation, exports, imports, terms of trade, exchange rate, real effective exchange rate, trade balance, current account, 
capital inflows, short-term external debt, public debt, domestic debt to GDP, domestic credit growth, short-term debt to reserves, 
M2 to reserves, export growth, NPLs to total loans, debt to equity, return on assets, private bank lending to GDP, current account 
deficit, spread differential on dollar-denominated sovereign bonds, stock market indices, real interest rate.  
Reinhart et al. (2000) Growth rate in real output, M2 to international reserves, bank deposits growth rate, M2 multiplier, equity prices, international 
reserves, exports-imports, terms of trade, general government consumption, and domestic credit to GDP. Domestic-foreign real 
interest rate differential, excess real M1 balances, real interest rates on deposits, lending-deposit interest rate, real exchange rate 
deviation from trend, sovereign credit rating monthly-semiannual change, budget deficit to GDP ratio, public sector credit to 
GDP, central bank credit to public sector to GDP, short-term capital inflows to GDP, FDI to GDP, current account imbalance to 
GDP. 
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Barro (2001)  Currency depreciation, nominal interest rate, real per capita GDP, investment to GDP, stock market prices. The explanatory 
variables were the per capita GDP, measures of human capital, government consumption to GDP, openness to international trade, 
terms of trade, inflation, and real investment to GDP. 
Neftci (2002)  Pegged exchange rate, open foreign exchange position in the banking system, non-transparent bank books, undercapitalized 
banks, ownership in banks and limited prior experience with banking crises. 
Collyns and Senhadji (2002) Real estate-property prices, stock market prices, property prices, consumer price index, credit to private sector, bank lending, real 
GDP per capita. 
Calomiris and Mason (2003) Degeneration of banks’ fundamentals: bank solvency, credit risk, idiosyncratic and country-specific characteristics. 
Caprio (2009)   Financial innovation without adequate regulation. 
Crotty (2009) Low interest rates, low loan default rates, low risk spreads and security price volatility jointly with high profits and rising stock 
prices. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) CPI, exchange rate, real GDP, exports, public-government debt, current account deficit, short and long-term interest rates, 
commodity prices, currency, other crises, external and domestic default. 
Rose and Spiegel (2009)   Real GDP, stock market, sovereign credit ratings, exchange rate, share of bilateral trade between a pair of countries in total trade, 
a country’s balance sheet.  
Frankel and Saravelos (2010) Central bank’s reserves, real effective exchange rate overvaluation, current account, and national savings.  
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) 
 
Credit boom, real currency appreciation.  
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Table A2 Credit risk determinants found in the SEE-related literature and theoretical background 
 
 Authors Determinants Theoretical background  
Babihuga (2007) Macroeconomic variables, bank-specific and structural factors in 
96 countries.  
Macroeconomic factors: GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, 
real interest rates and exchange rates. 
Bank-specific factors: bank deposits. 
Structural: banking regulation and supervision. 
Endogenous relationship between macroeconomic 
indicators and the financial sector, determinants of 
banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt, 1998; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hardy and 
Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005), stress testing approach (Arpa et 
al., 2001; Hoggarth et al., 2005a). 
Festić et al. (2011) Macroeconomic variables, bank-specific variables in 5 CESEE 
countries (new EU member states). 
Macroeconomic factors: FDI in financial intermediation and real 
estate, exports of goods and services, gross fixed capital 
formation, net foreign assets and compensation to employees. 
Bank-specific factors: deposits to loans and loans to assets. 
Structural: concentration and Basel core principles. 
Empirical studies showing that credit risk is pro-
cyclical with respect to economic growth (Borio and 
Lowe, 2002), financial crises related studies 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 
2000), interaction between the business cycle and 
the financial sector (Arpa et al., 2001; Blaschke et 
al., 2001; Schinasi, 2005; Babihuga, 2007). 
De Bock and Demyanets (2012) Macroeconomic and bank-level factors in 25 emerging markets. 
Macroeconomic factors: GDP growth, exchange rate, terms of 
trade and capital inflows. 
Bank-specific factors: lending growth.  
Interactions between the financial sector with the 
real economy (financial accelerator framework), 
information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers, balance sheet effect (Fisher, 1933; 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 
1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Borio et al., 
2001; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Nkusu, 2011).  
 Beck et al. (2013) Macroeconomic factors in 75 countries. 
Macroeconomic factors: GDP growth, exchange rate, share 
prices and lending interest rates.    
Interactions between the financial sector with the 
real economy (King and Plosser, 1984; Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; 
Bernanke et al., 1999).  
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Klein (2013) Macroeconomic and bank-level factors in 16 CESEE countries. 
Macroeconomic factors: unemployment rate, exchange rate, 
GDP growth and global risk aversion. 
Bank-specific factors: equity-to-assets, return to equity, lending 
growth. 
 
Macroeconomic factors: past empirical studies. 
Bank-level factors: hypotheses developed by Berger 
and DeYoung (1997). 
Jakubík and Reininger (2013) 
 
Macroeconomic and bank-level factors in 9 CESEE countries. 
Macroeconomic factors: GDP growth, stock exchange index and 
exchange rate. 
Bank-specific factors: lagged credit risk, lending growth.  
Empirical studies (Nkusu, 2011; De Bock and 
Demyanets, 2012; Becket al., 2013). 
Laidroo and Männasoo (2014)  Macroeconomic and bank-level factors in 15 CEE countries.  
Macroeconomic factors: GDP growth. 
Bank-specific factors: undrawn committed credit lines, lending 
growth, lagged loan loss reserves. 
Financial accelerator framework (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke 
et al., 1999). 
Empirical studies (Keeton, 1999; Cavallo and 
Majnoni, 2001; Leaven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2005). 
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Appendix B: The dataset 
 
 
Table B1 The dataset of Bulgaria  
 
Credit risk 
indicator 
Definition  Source 
NPL Doubtful and loss loans to total loans granted by Bulgarian banks. BNB 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
  
GDP Real Gross Domestic Product. NSIB 
CPI 
Percentage change in consumer price index (period average), over 
previous year. 
 
NSIB 
CA Current account balance. NSIB 
CON Construction production index. NSIB 
BCON Building construction index. NSIB 
UN 
Recorded official unemployment as a percentage of total labour force, 
average. 
NSIB 
REEL Real effective exchange rate (CPI deflated).  BNB 
DGDP 
Total debt (both local and foreign currency) owed by government to 
domestic residents, foreign nationals and multilateral institutions 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
 
NSIB 
EXP Exports of goods. 
 
NSIB 
IMP Imports of goods. 
 
NSIB 
OILG Oil imports to GDP. 
 
NSIB 
IPI Industrial Production Index. 
 
NSIB 
AMW Average monthly wage. 
 
NSIB 
Monetary 
variables 
  
M1 
Narrow money. Comprises currency in circulation plus overnight 
deposits. 
BNB 
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M2 
Intermediate money. Comprises narrow money (M1) and, in addition, 
deposits with a maturity of up to two years and deposits redeemable at a 
period of notice of up to three months.   
BNB 
M3 
Broad money. Comprises M2 plus marketable instruments issued by 
monetary and financial institutions. 
BNB 
Financial markets 
and interest 
ratevariables 
  
EUR1 
Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) of one month, period average  
(% p.a.). 
Reuters 
EUR3 
Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) of three months, period average 
(% p.a.). 
Reuters 
SOF1 
Sofia Interbank Offered Rate (Sofibor) of one month, period average  
(% p.a.). 
 
BNB 
SOF3 
Sofia Interbank Offered Rate (Sofibor) of three months, period average 
(% p.a.). 
 
BNB 
SPLD 
Interest rate differential between loans and time deposits of non-financial 
corporations and households (% p.a.). 
 
BNB 
BY10 Average interest rate of long-term Bulgarian government bond (% p.a.). ECB 
SPBG 
Spread differential between Bulgarian and Greek long-term government 
bond yield. 
ECB 
EUSX50 
The Dow Jones EuroStoxx 50 equity index. Indicator of economic 
prospects and market sentiment. 
Datastream 
OIL Brent crude oil price (fob), euro per barrel. 
 
ECB 
USE US dollar per euro, period average. 
 
ECB 
Bank-specific 
variables 
  
LOAN Growth in total loans granted by Bulgarian banks (%). BNB 
CAR Capital to assets. BNB 
LTA Gross loans to total assets. BNB 
LDR Loan to deposit ratio. Proxy for liquidity. BNB 
All ratios are expressed in percentage points.  
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Table B2 The dataset of Romania 
Credit Risk 
indicators 
Definition Source 
LLP 
Doubtful and loss loans provisions to total loans granted by credit 
institutions. 
NBR 
CRR 
Gross exposure related to non-bank loans and interest under ‘doubtful’ 
and ‘loss’ to total loans and interest classified related to non-bank loans. 
NBR 
DDR Number of total defaulters (legal and natural entities) to loan debtors. NBR 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
  
CPI Consumer price index (% p.a.) 
NISR 
 
GDP Real Gross Domestic Product. NISR 
CA Current account balance. NISR 
CAG Current Account as percentage of GDP. NISR 
CON Construction production index. NISR 
GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Proxies the investment expenditure. NISR 
TCON Total consumption expenditure. NISR 
HCON Private consumption expenditure, households. NISR 
FDIS Stock of foreign direct investment into the country at current prices, net. NBR 
FDIF Flow of foreign direct investment into the country at current prices, net. NBR 
TB Imports minus exports. NBR 
UN 
Recorded official unemployment as a percentage of total labour force, 
average. 
NBR 
DGDP 
Total gross external debt (general government, monetary authority, 
banks and other sectors)expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
NBR 
DGGDP 
Total debt (both local and foreign currency) owed by government to 
domestic residents, foreign nationals and multilateral institutions, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
NBR 
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TBGDP 
Total gross external debt of banks (short and long-term)expressed  
as a percentage of GDP. 
NBR 
Monetary 
variables 
  
M1 
Narrow money. Comprises currency in circulation plus overnight 
deposits. 
NBR 
M2 Intermediate money. Comprises M1 plus highly liquid deposits. NBR 
M3 
Broad money. Comprises M2 plus marketable instruments issued by 
monetary and financial institutions. 
NBR 
Financial markets 
and interest 
ratevariables 
  
ROB3 
ROBOR (Bucharest Interbank Offered Rate). Reference interbank 
money market rate. Average 3-month interest rate on operations to 
place funds (% p.a.). 
NBR 
SPRE Robor 3-month less Euribor 3-month. NBR 
BET 
The Bucharest stock exchange (BSE) trading index. Comprises the ten 
most liquid companies listed on the BSE regulated market. 
NBR 
BETC 
The Composite Index of the Bucharest stock exchange (BSE). 
Captures the overall performance of all companies listed on the BSE 
regulated market. 
NBR 
RAS The RASDAQ index. Captures the over-the-counter market. NBR 
EUSX50 
The Dow Jones EuroStoxx50 equity index. Indicator of economic 
prospects and market sentiment. 
Datastream 
OIL Brent crude oil price (fob), euro per barrel. ECB 
RONE National currency (Romanian RON) per euro, period average. ECB 
RONU National currency (Romanian RON) per US dollar, period average.  ECB 
LTBR 
Average interest rate of long-term Romanian government bond  
(% p.a.). 
NBR 
SPRG 
Spread differential between Romanian and German long-term 
government bond yield. 
ECB 
INTL 
Average lending interest rate applied by banks to non-financial 
corporations and households for outstanding amounts (% p.a.). 
NBR 
INTD 
Average deposit interest rate applied by banks to non-financial 
corporations and households for outstanding amounts (% p.a.). 
NBR 
SPLD 
Interest rate differential between loans and deposits of non-financial 
corporations and households’ time deposits (% p.a.). 
NBR 
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Bank-specific 
variables 
  
LOAN Growth in total loans granted by Romanian banks (%). NBR 
LEV 
Capital to assets. Key prudential indicator of the Romanian banking 
system. 
NBR 
LTA Gross loans to total assets of the system. Key prudential indicator. NBR 
LIQ 
Effective liquidity to required liquidity. Measures the system’s 
liquidity. Key prudential indicator. 
NBR 
LDR Loan to deposit ratio. Proxy for liquidity. NBR 
All ratios are expressed in percentage points.  
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Table B3 Greek Sovereign Crisis and Greek Banking System Distress Indicators 
 
Variable Definition Source 
LLPGR Loss loans provisions to total loans granted by Greek credit institutions BOG 
LEV Capital to assets ratio. Proxy of capital position - leverage BOG 
LD Loan to deposit ratio. Proxy for liquidity BOG 
GR10Y Secondary market yield of the 10-year Greek government bond ECB 
SPGRD 
Spread differential between Greek and German long-term government 
bond yield. 
ECB 
ECBI 
Ratio of emergency financing provided by ECB to total liabilities of 
Greek banks. A stress index, as it proxies the liquidity gap of the Greek 
banking system. 
ECB &BOG 
ASE General Index of the Athens Stock Exchange BOG 
BASE Banking Index Athens Stock Exchange BOG 
All ratios are expressed in percentage points.
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Appendix C: Unit root tests 
 
I. Results for Bulgaria 
 
 
Table C1 Unit root tests of the variables used for Bulgaria 
 
 ADF PP KPSS 
Variables Levels First Dif. Levels First Dif. Levels First Dif. 
NPL 1.523 -11.265* 1.266 -11.408* 0.286 0.135 *** 
LOAN 1.578 -11.775* 1.188 -12.015* 0.223 0.166* 
UN 0.165 -4.896* 1.529 -4.570* 0.270 0.209* 
CON -0.605 -3.258** -0.406 -13.368* 0.184** 0.272* 
IPI -0.520 -14.120* -0.785 -13.690* 0.259* 0.121*** 
REEL -2.391 -7.855* -2.034 -7.715* 0.158** 0.091** 
M2 0.123 -13.650* -0.089 -13.577 0.190** 0.195* 
Notes:  
a. (*), (**) and (***) imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
b. ADF stands for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, PP for the Phillips-Perron test,  
and KPSS for the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test.  
 
 
 
 
Table C2 Unit root tests with structural breaks for Bulgaria 
 
 Perron Zivot-Andrews 
Variables TB Lag tr TB Lag tr 
NPL 2008M5 3 -2.860* 2008M7 3 -2.887* 
LOAN 2008M11 0 -2.948* - 2 -2.992 
UN 2008M6 3 -2.158* 2008M4 3 -2.568* 
CON 2006M2 4 -3.358* 2006M3 4 -3.349* 
IPI 2008M11 1 -4.869* 2008M11 3 -3.811* 
REEL 2007M6 1 -4.737* - 1 -4.593 
M2 2007M7 1 -3.822* 2007M6 1 -3.839* 
Note: (*), (**) and (***) imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance level;  
TB  denotes the estimated break date.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 295 
 
II. Results for Romania 
 
 
 
Table C3 Unit root tests of the variables used for Romania  
 
 ADF PP KPSS 
Variables Levels First Dif. Levels First Dif. Levels First Dif. 
LLP 2.150 -3.775** 2.001 -8.849* 0.298* 0.192** 
CON -1.588 -7.846* -1.601 -7.919* 1.102 1.023 
INV -1.418 -7.286* -1.402 -7.407* 0.147** 0.089 
DGDP -1.113 -3.228*** -0.849 -4.942* 0.272* 0.067 
UN -2.835 -9.748* -0.976 -9.147* 0.255 0.114* 
CPI -3.320** -8.474* -3.222*** -8.474* 0.287* 0.1185 
M2 -2.037 -12.590* -0.460 -12.333* 0.210 0.228* 
EUR3M -1.829 -4.180* -1.369 -4.185* 0.157** 0.108 
LOAN -0.057 -4.480* 0.300 -7.623* 0.193** 0.243* 
Notes:  
a. (*), (**) and (***) imply the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.  
b. ADF stands for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, PP for the Phillips-Perron test,  
and KPSS for the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test.  
 
 
Table C4 Unit root tests with structural breaks for Romania 
 
 Perron Zivot-Andrews 
Variables TB Lag tr TB Lag tr 
LLP 2008M1 1 -3.868* 2008M2 4 -3.539* 
CON 2006M8 1 -3.828* 2006M9 2 -3.867* 
INV 2006M8 1 -3.988* 2006M9 1 -4.010* 
DGDP 2006M12 4 -3.963* 2007M1 4 -3.973* 
UN 2008M12 1 -7.393* 2008M12 1 -7.355* 
CPI 2007M7 0 -2.443* 2007M7 1 -4.074* 
M2 2006M11 4 -3.606* 2006M12 4 -3.633* 
EUR3M 2008M10 1 -4.710* 2008M11 1 -4.690* 
LOAN 2008M1 2 -3.442* 2008M2 2 -3.692* 
Note: (*), (**) and (***) imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance level;  
TB denotes the estimated break date.  
 
 
 
 
 296 
 
III. Results for the Greek crisis indicators 
 
 
Table C5 Unit root tests of the Greek crisis indicators 
 
 ADF PP KPSS 
Variables Levels First Dif. Levels First Dif. Levels First Dif. 
LLPGR 3.956 -1.266 1.617 -6.430* 0.276 0.162** 
GR10Y 0.630 -1.950 1.982 -11.983* 0.257* 0.160** 
SPGRD 3.668 -3.307*** 1.674 -11.707* 0.238 0.146** 
Notes:  
a. (*), (**) and (***) imply the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.  
b. ADF stands for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, PP for the Phillips-Perron test,  
and KPSS for the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test.  
 
 
 
 
Table C6 Unit root tests with structural break of the Greek crisis indicators 
 
 Perron Zivot-Andrews 
Variables TB Lag tr TB Lag tr 
LLPGR 2008M8 4 -5.196* 2008M6 4 -5.012*** 
GR10Y 2009M6 0 -3.774* 2009M6 1 -2.596* 
SPGRD 2009M7 4 -2.602* 2009M7 4 -2.337* 
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) imply 1%, 5% and 10% significance level;  
TB denotes the estimated break date.  
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Appendix D: Results of the OLS univariate and GMM multivariate regressions 
 
I. Results for Bulgaria 
 
 
Table D1 Summary of the univariate regressions for Bulgaria 
 
  Regression on current factor Xt Regression on lagged factor Xt-s(s=1...12) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic R2 Coefficient t-statistic R2 Lags 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
        
CON - 0.000 -1.346 0.01 -0.002 -4.543 0.16 6 
IPI - -0.001 -4.482 0.15 -0.001 -5.771 0.23 6 
UN + 0.004 4.686 0.16 0.004 4.825 0.17 3 
REEL - 0.001 -1.864 0.01 -0.001 -1.951 0.03 3 
Monetary variables 
        
M2 - -3.231 -2.629 0.05 -2.977 -2.445 0.05 4 
Interest rate variables 
        
EUR + -0.000 -0.099 0.00 -0.003 -2.545 0.05 9 
Bank-specific 
variables 
        
LOAN +/- -0.049 -4.751 0.16 -0.037 -3.568 0.10 6 
Greek crisis variables           
LLPGR + 0.032 1.131 0.01 0.033 1.041 0.03 3 
SPGRD + 0.069 0.862 0.10 0.101 0.563 0.02 3 
Notes: 
a. The table presents all the statistically significant variables up to 10% level of significance, except for 
two proxies of the Greek crisis shown for informative purposes. 
b. The indicator UN is also significant at lags 9,10 and 12.  
 
 
 
Table D2 Serial correlation for the multivariate model of Bulgaria 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test  
F-statistic 0.938 Probability 0.395 
Obs*R-squared 2.040 Probability 0.361 
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Table D3 Summary of the GMM results for Bulgaria 
 
Dependent Variable: NPL   
Method: Generalized Method of Moments   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.017 0.019 0.839 0.404 
NPL(-1) -0.329 0.144 -2.282 0.025 
CON (-6) -0.005 0.004 -1.081 0.283 
IPI -0.012 0.005 -2.072 0.041 
UN 0.065 0.024 2.612 0.010 
REEL(-3) -0.020 0.011 -1.693 0.093 
LOAN -1.059 0.310 -3.410 0.001 
DUMMY (FINANCIAL CRISIS) 0.051 0.028 1.834 0.070 
DUMMY (2006) 0.042 0.019 2.132 0.036 
R-squared 0.336     Mean dependent var 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.292     S.D. dependent var 0.002 
S.E. of regression 0.002     Sum squared resid 0.001 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.493     J-statistic 5.098 
Instrument rank 16     Prob(J-statistic) 0.747 
     
The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of lags in months of the respective variables 
used in the model. 
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II. Results for Bulgaria 
 
 
Table D4 Summary of the univariate regressions for Romania 
 
  Regression on current factor Xt Regression on lagged factor Xt-s(s=1...12) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic R2 Coefficient t-statistic R2 lag(s) 
Macroeconomic variables 
        
CON - -0.005 3.15 0.09 -0.004 2.58 0.06 12 
INV - -0.005 3.13 0.09 -0.003 2.33 0.04 12 
DGDP - -0.002 4.59 0.17 0.02 3.90 0.13 3 
UN + -0.001 1.98 0.04 -0.001 3.75 0.13 12 
TCON - -0.005 2.66 0.06 -0.004 2.26 0.05 1 
CPI - -0.001 5.67 0.23 -0.001 4.86 0.19 3 
TB - -0.001 2.64 0.06 -0.001 3.06 0.09 12 
Monetary variables           
M1 - -0.006 2.99 0.08 -0.005 2.68 0.07 3 
M2 - -0.013 2.96 0.08 -0.01 2.50 0.06 3 
Interest rate variables           
EUR3 + -0.003 3.51 0.10 -0.003 3.46 0.11 3 
Bank-specific variables           
LOAN +/- -0.032 5.16 0.2 -0.02 4.10 0.14 3 
Greek crisis variables           
LLPGR + 0.46 2.66 0.06 0.40 2.10 0.04 3 
SPGRD + 0.01 3.24 0.09 0.01 3.00 0.08 3 
GR10Y + 0.01 2.45 0.05 0.01 3.50 0.10 1 
ECB Reliance Index I +/- 0.04 1.71 0.03 0.07 3.87 0.13 3 
Notes: 
a. The table presents all the statistically significant variables up to 10% level of significance. 
b. The indicator spread SPGRD is also significant at lag 1.  
 
 
 
Table D5 Serial correlation test for the multivariate model of Romania 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test  
F-statistic 0.883 Probability 0.418 
Obs*R-squared 1.959 Probability 0.375 
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Table D6 Summary of the GMM results for Romania 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000 0.002 0.318 0.751 
CPI -0.000 0.000 -0.773 0.441 
UN 0.001 0.000 1.993 0.050 
CON -0.001 0.000 -4.459 0.000 
INV(-12) -0.000 0.000 -0.169 0.866 
DGDP (-3) 0.019 0.006 3.021 0.203 
M2 -0.013 0.007 -1.839 0.069 
LLPGR 0.546 0.212 2.571 0.012 
SPGRD (-1) 0.003 0.001 2.362 0.020 
R-squared 0.516     Mean dependent var 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.469     S.D. dependent var 0.002 
S.E. of regression 0.001     Sum squared resid 0.000 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.066     J-statistic 11.521 
Instrument rank 19     Prob(J-statistic) 0.318 
 
The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of lags in months of the respective variables 
used in the model. 
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Appendix E: Results of the cointegration analysis 
 
I. Results for Bulgaria 
 
 
Table E1 The estimated ARDL(1,1,0,0,0) model for Bulgaria  
 
Dependent Variable: NPL  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient t-ratio 
NPL(-1) 0.836 18.944 
LOAN -0.015 -1.852 
LOAN(-1) 0.023 2.996 
UN 0.001 3.741 
CON 0.001 -4.215 
LLPGR 0.143 1.137 
C -0.185 -3.934 
SHOCK 0.005 4.255 
Adjusted R
2
=.994 F(7,98)=2489.4 
Notes: 
a. The model was selected based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. 
b. With the exception of LLPGR, all coefficients are significant at 1% significance level. 
 
 
 
Table E2 Diagnostic Tests for the ARDL(1,1,0,0,0) model for Bulgaria 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
 
LM Version 
Statistic 
p-value F Version Statistic p-value 
Serial Correlation X
2
(12)=8.494 0.745 F(12, 86) = 0.624 0.816 
Functional Form X
2
(1)=1.846 0.174 F(1, 108)=1.719 0.193 
Heteroskedasticity X
2
(1)= 0.066 0.798 F(1, 104)=0.065 0.800 
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Table E3 Summary results from Johansen cointegration (VECM) and diagnostic tests for 
Bulgaria.  
 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      None *  0.331  42.620  33.876  0.003  
At most 1  0.190  22.375  27.584  0.201  
      
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level.  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.   
 
 
Cointegrating Equation Log likelihood 1624.4   
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
NPL LLOAN UN CONS LLPGR  
 1.000 -0.075 -0.828  0.001 -0.420  
 (-5.039) (-4.831) (5.320) (-0.719)  
t-statistics in parentheses.   
Based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion, the order of VAR was chosen 1. 
 
 
Error Correction: -0.156 
  (0.023) 
 [-6.780] 
 R-squared  0.590 
 Adj. R-squared  0.561 
 Sum sq. resids  0.000 
 S.E. equation  0.002 
 F-statistic  20.224 
 Equation Log-likelihood  529.340 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ].   
 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
 
LM Version 
Statistic 
p-value F Version Statistic p-value 
Serial Correlation X
2
(12)=10.419 0.579 F(12, 103)=0.824 0.626 
Functional Form X
2
(1)=18.650 0.000 F(1, 114)=21.19 0.000 
Heteroskedasticity X
2
(1)= 0.918 0.338 F(1, 117)=0.909 0.342 
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II. Results for Romania 
 
 
Table E4 The estimated ARDL (1,1,0,0) model for Romania 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
LLP(-1) 0.702 8.217 
LLPGR 2.097 6.969 
LLPGR(-1) -1.246 -3.032 
LM2 -0.004 3.172 
LOAN 0.004 3.207 
C 0.003 2.830 
UN -0.001 1.499 
Adjusted R
2
= 0.96 F(6,79)= 911.1 
Note: The model is selected based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and 
is estimated using White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. 
 
 
 
Table E5 Diagnostic Tests for the ARDL (1,1,0,0) model for Romania 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
 
LM Version 
Statistic 
p-value F Version Statistic  p-value 
Serial Correlation X
2
(12)=18.151 0.111 F(12, 67) = 1.494 0.149 
Functional Form X
2
(1)= 0.271 0.602 F(1, 78)=0.247 0.620 
Heteroskedasticity X
2
(1)= 22.516 0.000 F(1, 84)= 29.793 0.000 
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Table E6 Summary results from Johansen cointegration (VECM) and diagnostic tests for 
Romania. 
 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     None *  0.287  35.483  27.584  0.000 
At most 1   0.135  15.188  21.132  0.276 
     
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level. 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.  
 
 
Cointegrating Equation Log likelihood 1572.0  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LLP LLPGR M2 LOAN UN 
 1.000 3.201 -0.019  0.015 -0.002 
 (13.225) (-3.591) (5.909) (-11.582) 
t-statistics in parentheses.   
Based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion, the order of VAR was chosen 1. 
 
 
Error Correction: -0.276 
  (0.027) 
 [-10.193] 
 R-squared 0.536 
 Adj. R-squared 0.530 
 Sum sq. resids 0.000 
 S.E. equation 0.002 
 F-statistic 103.901 
 Equation Log-likelihood 512.480 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ].   
 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
 
LM Version 
Statistic 
p-value F Version Statistic p-value 
Serial Correlation X
2
(12)=11.508 0.486 F(12, 78)=0.863 0.587 
Functional Form X
2
(1)=7.176 0.007 F(1, 89)=7.528 0.007 
Heteroskedasticity X
2
(1)= 2.761 0.097 F(1, 90)=2.784 0.099 
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Appendix F: Results of the Markov switching and the time varying SVAR models 
 
 
I. Results for Bulgaria 
 
 
 
Figure F1 Filtered Probabilities for regimes 1 and 2 in Bulgaria 
 
 
 
 
Note: The upper plot presents the filter probabilities for regime 1 (low volatility) and the 
one below presents the filter probabilities for regime 1 (high volatility). 
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Figure F2 Impulse responses in regimes 1and 2 of the MS-SVAR model for Bulgaria  
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Table F3 Timing of the break dates as suggested by each of the break tests for Bulgaria 
 
 
  ASC1 ASC2
BT
 ASC2
QS
 ASC2
VH
 KLBT KLQS KLVH LMT Adopted 
NPL - - - - - - - - 2006M06 
LOAN - - - - - - - - - 
M2 - - - - - - - - - 
UN 2008M11 2008M11 2008M11 - 2008M11 2008M11 - 2008M11 2008M11 
LLPGR 2008M11 - 2008M11 - - 2008M11 - 2008M11 2008M11 
 
Note: The shaded areas denote statistical significance at 5% level of significance; otherwise the 
statistical significance is at 1% level. The 2006M06 break date is adopted to capture the 
policy measures introduced by BNB. 
 
 
 
 
Table F4 Tests for the equality of mean and variance of two contiguous segments for 
Bulgaria 
 
 
Variable Segments t-test 
Satterthwaite-
Welch t-test 
F-test 
Siegel-
Tukey 
Bartlett Levene 
Brown-
Forsythe 
NPL 1 & 2 -1.90* -1,59 3.76*** 2.06** 16.29*** 0 0,02 
NPL 2& 3 -4.94*** -5.00*** 1,37 1,17 0,59 1,86 2,1 
LOAN 1 & 2 -0,61 -0,77 6.68*** 0,01 23.73*** 1,53 1,46 
LOAN 2 & 3 11.29*** 11.92*** 5.53*** 0,73 15.38*** 25.15*** 23.58*** 
M2 1 & 2 -0,31 -0,35 2.01** 1,07 3.90** 1,53 1,35 
M2 2 & 3 2.81*** 2.90*** 2.41** 0,84 4.46** 2,58 2,62 
UN 1 & 2 1.77* 1.79* 1,09 0,84 0,07 0,13 0,14 
UN 2 & 3 -10.22*** -10.09*** 1,4 0,76 0,69 0,44 0,07 
LLPGR 1 & 2 1.71* 1.72* 1,03 0,07 0,01 0,04 0,03 
LLPGR 2 & 3 -3.71*** -3.72*** 1,13 1,11 0,09 0,27 0,17 
Notes:   
a. The second column presents the contiguous segments under test. 
b. The third and fourth columns present the test statistics on the equality of means of the two 
contiguous segments on the basis of the standard t-test and the Satterthwaite-Welch t-test. The 
following five columns present the statistics of the tests on the equality of variances of two 
contiguous segments on the basis of the standard F-test, the Siegel-Tukey, the Bartlett, Levene, 
and the Brown-Forsythe tests.  
c. (*), (**) and (***) indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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Figure F5 Impulse responses in segments 1-3 of the SVAR model for Bulgaria 
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II. Results for Romania 
 
 
 
Figure F6 Filtered Probabilities for regimes 1 and 2 in Romania 
 
 
 
Note: The upper plot presents the filter probabilities for regime 1 (low volatility) and the 
one below presents the filter probabilities for regime 1 (high volatility). 
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Figure F7 Impulse responses in regimes 1 and 2 of the MS-SVAR model for Romania 
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Table F8 Timing of the break dates as suggested by each of the break tests for Romania 
 
 
 
 Variable ASC1 ASC2
BT
 ASC2
QS
 ASC2
VH
 KLBT KLQS KLVH LMT Adopted 
LLP 2008M11 2008M11 2008M11 - 2008M11 2008M11 - 2008M11 2008M11 
LOAN - - - - - - - - - 
M2 - - - - - - - - - 
UN - - - - - - - - - 
LLPGR 2008M11 - 2008M11 - - 2008M11 - 2008M11 2008M11 
 
Note: The shaded areas denote statistical significance at 5% level of significance; otherwise the 
statistical significance is at 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
Table F9 Tests for the equality of mean and variance of two contiguous segments for 
Romania 
 
 
Variable Segments t-test 
Satterthwaite-
Welch t-test 
F-test 
Siegel-
Tukey 
Bartlett Levene 
Brown-
Forsythe 
LLP 1 & 2 -2.67*** -2.00* 2.86** 3.40*** 8.22*** 10.33*** 8.90*** 
LLP 2& 3 -10.52*** -7.39*** 6.81*** 4.72*** 35.60*** 26.38*** 17.72*** 
LOAN 1 & 2 -2.37** -2.48** 1,17 0,12 0,15 0,01 <0.01 
LOAN 2 & 3 6.20*** 6.72*** 1,44 0,89 1,02 2,15 1,75 
M2 1 & 2 -1.73* -1,63 1,23 0,33 0,28 0,03 0,03 
M2 2 & 3 2.84*** 3.62*** 3.21*** 1,33 9.15*** 4.53** 4.51** 
UN 1 & 2 -2.59** -2.23** 1,69 0,54 1,89 0,63 0,66 
UN 2 & 3 -3.71*** -3.59*** 1,16 1,55 0,18 0,02 0,03 
LLPGR 1 & 2 -1.71* -1,37 2.20* 2.13** 4.44** 4.48** 3.75* 
LLPGR 2 & 3 -7.22*** -4.52*** 47.15*** 4.82*** 130.44*** 29.05*** 25.70*** 
Notes:   
a. The second column presents the contiguous segments. 
b. The third and fourth columns present the test statistics on the equality of means of two contiguous 
segments on the basis of the standard t-test and the Satterthwaite-Welch t-test. The following five 
columns present the statistics of the tests on the equality of variances of two contiguous segments 
on the basis of the standard F-test, the Siegel-Tukey, the Bartlett, Levene, and the Brown-
Forsythe tests.  
c. (*), (**) and (***) indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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Figure F10 Impulse responses in segments 1-3 of the SVAR model for Romania 
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